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During the nineties, Colombia experienced a two-fold process o f restructuring. First, the
political system underwent a process o f constitutional reform in order to strengthen the
state and increase its legitimacy, surpass the exclusionary character o f the political
regime, and achieve greater equity in the distribution o f social resources. Second, the
economy made the transition from a Keynesian development strategy to a strategy of
"opening" or liberalization and internationalization o f the economy, in order to increase
the economic efficiency by reducing the “size” o f the state and its regulatory role. The
purpose o f this dissertation is to analyze the interplay and contradictions o f economic
and political factors in the restructuring o f the Colombian politico-economic system.
The main finding o f this dissertation is that

the simultaneous adoption o f a

neoliberal economic strategy and o f the Political Constitution o f 1991, have had a
contradictory relationship: while the “political opening” has produced favorable
conditions for fostering

programs o f democratization and

social

integration, the

“economic opening” has counteracted that possibility given that it implies a social

exclusionary process.

This tension has aggravated the problems o f political and social

integration that have traditionally characterized Colombian society.
This crucial tension has also been characteristic o f Latin America in the nineties.
However, it has been neglected and undertheorized in most o f the democratization studies
of American comparative politics. Most o f them lack consideration o f structural aspects.
I

According to those studies, the cause of regime change is determined by the strategic
elections o f actors. Contrary to these approaches, I develop a structural perspective. I
consider that social phenomena are partly determined by structural factors, and scientific
research should, assign them decisive importance, since a fundamental basis for social
action and transformation is to be found in the dynamics o f relationships between
individuals and structures and the development o f contradictions within structures.
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Introduction

Colombia, like most Latin American countries, is currently undergoing profound
transformations in the state structure, complex processes of economic restructuring, and
formidable demographic and cultural transformations. This situation is compounded by
disintegrating tendencies produced in recent decades by the convergence o f a series of
factors such as: a) accelerated, chaotic urbanization caused by industrialization processes
that have promoted migration of the rural population to the large cities, as well as by
uprooting caused by the multiple forms o f violence that have afflicted the Colombian
countryside in recent years; b) tensions and ambiguities in the relationship between
processes of economic modernization and democratization; c) persistence o f a weak
democratic culture, and d) difficulties o f identifying the state with the nation.

This

process of social modernization is related to dynamics that links the country to the
present process o f economic, political, and cultural globalization that further accentuates
problems of social integration.

During the nineties, Colombia experienced a two-fold process o f restructuring.
In the first place, the political system underwent a process of constitutional reform in
order to strengthen the state and increase its legitimacy, surpass the exclusionary
character o f the political regime, and achieve greater equity in the distribution of social
resources.

In the second r • ice. the national economy made the transition from a

Keynesian development strategy - imports substitution industrialization - to a strategy of
"opening" or liberalization and internationalization o f the economy. The objetive of that
process was to increase the economic efficiency by reducing the “size” o f the state and
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its regulatory role. This two-fold restructuring has deepened Colombia's political and
social crisis and has transformed relations between the state, the civil society, and the
economy. For this reason, the analytical dimensions in this thesis will revolve around
the tensions and contradictions between political and social democratization, the
restructuring of the state, and the structural economic adjustment which requires the
adoption of a neoliberal development strategy.

A better comprehension o f the present political, economic and social processes
of Latin America is achieved if one begins with the notion that those processes are a
result o f the combination o f exogenous and endogenous factors. The former consists of
globalization and the generalized diffusion o f the neoliberal accumulation model. The
latter consist o f a series of factors present in varying degrees in all Latin American
societies, such as the weakness o f the state and civil society, the precarious legitimacy of
their political regimes, and their social heterogeneity. The result of the conjunction of
these exogenous and endogenous factors has been the worsening of the problems of
integration that have traditionally characterized the societies o f the region.

Thus, from the perspective of this dissertation it is impossible to examine and
comprehend the current crisis of the countries of the region without an interdisciplinary
view o f the way in which the relations among the state, society, and the economy have
been estructured in Latin America in general and in Colombia in particular since the
early nineties.

Any attempt to approach the subject from only one o f these angles,

would lead to a unilateral and distorted view of

2

of that process.

Closed-minded

"economistic" or "politistic" perspectives limit the construction o f models o f both
analysis and interpretation. This dissertation therefore constitutes an effort to carry out a
comprehensive and systematic analysis to show the complexity generated by the
interaction o f the political and economic phenomena that are determining Colombian
reality.

The first chapter o f this dissertation consists o f a critical review o f the
bibliography that has been produced by scholars in the United States to analyze both
political regime change and structural economic adjustment in Latin America.
According to most of the studies reviewed in that chapter, both phenomena are
determined by the strategic elections of the actors in the democratization and economic
adjustment processes. With the exception of some authors who emphasize international
and domestic structural factors in determining the economic restructuring of the Latin
American countries, in most o f the studies there is a lack o f consideration o f the
structural elements; o f the contradictions between the demands of the democratization
process and those o f neoliberal economic restructuring; of the implications of the change
of economic model in the transformation of the political regime; and, o f the decisive role
o f the international factors. The majority o f these studies base their explanations of the
rise o f neoliberal restructuring on the action and the interests of elites in both the public
and the private sectors, and the institutional limits within which that action is carried out,
or on the basis o f the influence, the interests, and the demands o f other social actors,
such as the organized popular sectors.

3

For the above reasons, the second chapter presents an alternative framework that
seeks to contribute, from a structural perspective, to a better understanding o f the effects
that economic and political restructurings have had on Latin American societies.
Emphasis will be placed on the sharpening of tendencies toward fragmentation and
social disintegration that the transformation o f the capital accumulation model has
generated.

The main hypothesis o f this dissertation is that globalization and adoption o f a
neoliberal economic strategy as its clearest expression, on the one hand, and
simultaneous adoption of the Political Constitution of 1991, on the other, have
aggravated the problems of political and social integration that have traditionally
characterized Colombian society.

The effects o f neoliberal strategies on social

integration are associated with an increased weakening of the state, the limits it imposes
on the continuity o f the clientelist political regime, and the the ruling class' inability to
elaborate and agree upon a societal project that is broad enough to articulate the diverse
social interests involved.

Therefore, the crisis Colombian society has experienced in the past ten years is
the result o f the convergence o f tendencies of political and social disintegration. The
former are expressed in the precarious legitimacy of the state due, among other things,
to its de-institutionalization, the breaking down of various of its basic functions, the
exacerbation of clientelism, the high degrees of violence, and the public's lack o f trust in
political institutions. The latter are expressed in the ruling classes' inability to elaborate
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and agree upon a societal project broad enough to integrate the diverse social interests;
in the fragility o f the social fabric; and, in the degradation in the ways in which the
social actors assume the conflict, diversity, and disagreement.

The analysis o f this

situation is the objetive of the third chapter.

In the fourth and fifth chapters, it is argued that the crisis o f integration in
Colombia has been aggravated by the failure to reach a minimum agreement regarding
the bases o f social order.

In this respect, the societal project that arose from the

Constitution o f 1991 competes with one that is rooted in the neoliberal economic model.
While the former was promoted by the progressive forces in the Constitutional
Assembly o f 1991, the latter has been promoted by the exogenous forces o f
globalization and by a new technocratic domestic elite.

These two projects have

advanced in parallel form since 1991, and neither o f the two has achieved enough o f a
consensus to impose its will. In the initial euphoria o f democratization caused by the
constitutional assembly, Colombian society did not realize the acute contradictions that
existed between the two projects, which have since then resulted in the present situation
in which it seems impossible to reach an agreement on the fundamental principles of
social order.

The effects o f the neoliberal development strategy on social integration are also
associated with the ruling class' inability to elaborate and agree upon a societal project
broad enough to articulate the diverse social interests.

That model has generated a

division among the economic elites and it is also exclusionary in nature due, among
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other things, to its attempt to reduce work benefits, public social spending and state
subsidies, and to the generation o f unemployment. Both dimensions o f the economic
restructuring process limit the elites' possibilities of forming alliances among themselves
and with other social sectors, in order to construct democratically the new rules o f the
game to regulate the relations between the social and political actors. The main objetive
of neoliberal economic restructuring has been to develop a market logic in the allocation
of resources, the search for fiscal balance, decreased state regulation, and insertion o f the
Colombian economy into the world market, all imposed by the imperatives of
globalization which, among other things, has implied a loss of both the sovereignty and
the autonomy of national societies in favor of supra-national regulatory agencies.

Regarding appropriate criteria for allocating social resources, the neoliberal
strategy has established that the "laws of economics" and the principles of scarce
resources, budget restriction, legal security and supply and demand should govern in
these matters. In contrast, the Constitution of 1991 opposed these very principles of
commutative justice with the principles of distributive justice, in which the criterion for
allocation is not economic but extra-economic, i.e., political. This has a negative effect
on neoliberal efforts to reduce public spending, but it was the result of a collective
foundational decision in which the criteria and the priorities to be applied in the
allocation of social resources were questions that were decided politically. What the
confrontation between the two societal projects is showing is that there is no agreement
on either the fundamentals of social order or on whether the assignment o f liberties,
goods and social opportunities should be done on the basis of political criteria and legal
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norms or on the basis o f the principles of economic science. The objective of the sixth
chapter is to analyze these contradictions.

Finally, it is concluded that if Colombian society wishes to surmount the crisis, it
is necessary to generate an agreement on a broader and more inclusive societal project.
However, the processes of restructuring the economy associated with the free market
and globalization, do not seem to leave room for the social dimension and distributive
justice. Nevertheless, the construction of an ethical foundation for agreement regarding
a new social order, constitutes the very essence o f democracy.

Chapter 1
Literature Review:
A Critical Appraisal o f Two Approaches
to Understanding Latin American Politics

The point of departure of this dissertation is that Colombian society has suffered, for
several decades, a severe crisis o f legitimacy and integration, understood

as the

weakness o f the state, political and economic exclusion, high levels o f violence, a lack
of trust on the part of the citizens in public and political institutions, and the absence of a
ruling class with a project of society strong enough to articulate different social interests.

Institutions are formal and informal rules which structure social life.

They

constrain social action in order to give political, economic and social relations a
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minimun o f covergence. Institutions also facilitate capital acumulation to the extent that
they establish property rights and reduce uncertainty, and information and transaction
costs (North, 1990).

For this reason it is important for society to have an adecuate

relation between political and economic institutions.

However, in Colombia the

simultaneous adoption o f a neoliberal economic model and a constitutional reform in the
nineties, has deepened problems of political and social integration. To resolve such a
crisis, Colombia would need to adopt strong and inclusive political and economic
institutions in order to integrate society and mediate its conflicts. But the process of
political and economic restructuring of the state and economy have evidenced a
contradictory relationship.
conditions for fostering

While the “political opening” has produced favorable
programs of democratization and

social

integration, the

“economic opening” has counteracted that possibility given that it implies a social
exclusionary process. This crucial tension between the weak state and the structural
constraints o f neoliberal economic adjustment has been characteristic of Latin America
in the nineties. However it has been neglected and undertheoized in most of the
democratization studies.

This double restructuring is the outcome of the confluence of international and
national factors.

Regarding the international factors,

I maintain that the search for

democracy and free markets in Latin America in general, and in Colombia in particular,
is, in part, the effect o f the current worldwide political and economical restructuring
toward globalization that reduces the state’s room for maneuver in the domestic sphere.
This tendency is determining a new relationship between the state, the economy, and
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civil society under the aegis o f neoliberalism,

producing the emergence of a new

situation in Latin America that cannot be analyzed with the traditional democratization
approach.

The interplay of economic and political factors in the

restructuring o f the

Colombian politico-economic system, engenders a contradiction between the two pillars
o f state action: legitimacy and economic efficiency. This contradiction stems from a
new constitutional order which claims “more state” as a condition to overcome the
legitimacy crisis and integrates society, and a development model which requires “less
state” in order to allow the free allocation of society’s resources by the market. This
contradiction determines the incapacity of the Colombian state and political regime for
integrating and orienting society, and redistributing its resources.

Given that the abovementioned tendency is similar in most of the Latin American
countries, in this chapter I will discuss my differences with the democratization and
political economy approaches that examine political regime change and economic
adjustment in the region, neglecting structural political and economic factors.
According to most of the studies reviewed in this chapter, the cause o f both phenomena
is determined by the strategic elections of actors in the democratization and economic
restructuring processes.

With the exception of some authors who emphazise

international and domestic structural factors, in most of studies there is a lack of
consideration of structural aspects of the contradictions between the demands of
democratization and those of the neoliberal restructuring; o f the implications o f change

9

of the economic model in the transformation of the political regime, and the influence of
international factors.

For purposes o f analysis, I will identify whether the literature on democratic
transition and transition to a market-oriented economy belongs to one or the other of
the two major theoretical perspectives in which it can be classified: a) the human
agency approach, which in turn, is manifested in two different versions: voluntarism
and rational choice theory, and b) the structural approach.

The human agency

approach places emphasis on the "micro" level, where social phenomena are
considered as the result of actors’ actions, interests, beliefs, preferences, and choices.
The structural approach places emphasis on the "macro" level where social
phenomena are explained as the result o f transformations in the relationships
between political, social or economic conditions, forces and institutions.

It is necessary to highlight these theoretical distinctions in order to establish
the framework for the perspective I will maintain in this dissertation, since I consider
social relations to consist of the actions o f human beings, which are constrained by
unintentional forces arising from their actions and interactions.

1.1. The D em ocratization A pproach
Owing to the wave of re-democratization that has been sweeping across Latin
America since 1980, the study of the region's political processes has been dominated
by the democratization approach for the past two decades. By this I refer to the
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entire area o f comparative political studies that aims to analyze different patterns o f
change from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones and the degree o f
consolidation of democracy in Latin American countries, as well as the relationship
between the actions o f different political actors and the kind o f democratic
institutions that arise therefrom.1

Although said studies contributed in part to an understanding o f the factors
that caused the process o f transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes in
Latin America and the role performed by the military, political parties, and civil
society in these processes, they display serious limitations such as “theoretical denial,
voluntarism, barefoot empiricism and intellectual recycling” (Remmer, 1991: 490).
From my viewpoint, there are five facts that limit the conceptual and explanatory
possibilities o f the democratization approach and prevent better understanding o f
Latin American politics.

First o f all, it is not clear that such studies provide

“a model o f regime

change that can be applied around the globe,” as asserted by Frances Hagopian
(1993:465). Indeed, despite the heterogeneity and complexity o f the democratization
processes, due to the heterogeneity o f socioeconomic conditions and types of
regimes that constitute the starting point for democratization, this approach tends to
what may be called “south-cone-ization, ” i.e., it tends to generalize and to apply the
1 The most representative studies within said current o f analysis are those by Guillermo O’Donnell,
Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (1986); James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson
(1987); Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset (1989); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne
Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992); and James Petras and Fernando I. Leiva (1994).
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analysis o f the Argentine, Chilean, Uruguayan and Brazilian political processes to all
o f Latin America.

Consciously or unconsciously, such analysis starts from the

premise that democracy may only be interrupted by a military or authoritarian
regime; that democracy existed before the authoritarian regimes emerged and that it
may be resumed through the simple substitution o f military regimes by civilian
governments. From this perspective, James M. Malloy, in an attempt to elaborate a
general framework within which to compare different cases o f transition to
democracy in Latin America, has had to conclude that the great diversity o f national
cases prevents the development o f general models or theories regarding the shift
from authoritarian to democratic regimes in Latin America (1987: 237).

Indeed, since there are cases like Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and
Colombia, in which non-authoritarian civilian regimes - by agreement among the
respective political elites - restrict the democratic character o f the political system,
the transition to democracy approach cannot be applied as a generally valid model.
This is especially clear with respect to the Colombian case, which some analysts
have asserted is difficult to categorize because,

unlike many of its continental neighbors, Colombia has avoided both military
rule and chronic political and economic instability since 1958, when the
leaders of the two major parties came together to form the con-sociational
National Front (...) The rigid con-sociational practices (relaxed in the post1974 period), combined with other restrictions and have limited the
democratic nature of the regime (Hartlyn, 1989: 292-293).
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Secondly, the democratization approach neglects the crucial role that
socioeconomic structures play in determining social phenomena. This is a
consequence of the theoretical displacement from structuralism to human agency,
that has taken place in Latin American political studies in the past decade.

One

example o f this displacement is the change in the theoretical position of O'Donnell
(1973), who, after having explained the breakdown of democracy in Latin America
in terms o f political and economic contradictions engendered by the industrialization
process, asserted, along with Schmitter, that “What actors do and do not seems much
less tightly determined by "macro" structural during the transitions we study here
than during breakdowns o f democratic regimes (O ’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 19).
For these authors, what determines outcomes in the social realm are:
unexpected even ts (fortu n a), insufficient information, hurried and audacious
ch o ices, confusion about m otives and interests, plasticity, and even
indefinition o f political identities, as w ell as the talents o f sp ecific
indivuduals (virtu ) (Ibidem: 4-5).

It is theoretically and methodologically incoherent, to say the least, to try to explain
the breakdown o f democracy as the result of structural factors and its resumption as
the result of actors’ intentions or human agency. The same is true o f Malloy (1987:
239), who, in spite o f recognizing that the main structural problem of political
economy in Latin America is the contradiction between the need to accumulate
capital and the need to achieve political legitimacy by responding to the demands of
key social sectors, concludes that the solution to the dilemma lies in the governments'
capability to solve key public policy issues. Malloy's adherence to voluntarism
appears clearly when he asserts that
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changes in regim e are significantly influenced by the d ecisio n s o f the
political leaders w h o have frequently sought total control o f the state. I f this
assertion is correct, there is o b viou sly a key voluntary d im ension to the
process that not on ly m akes it difficult to formulate a general theory but also
precludes neat determ inistic theories based on general law s (ibidem : 237).

These authors’ theoretical turns exhibit methodological incoherence, given that a
single variable, i.e. regime change, is explained by structural factors in cases of
transition to authoritarianism and by human agency in instances o f transition to
democracy (Remmer, 1991).

Przeworski also develops an approach centered on human agency, in the
rational choice version, aimed to highlight the strategic character o f democracy. As
he points out,
I am con vin ced that arguments about w hether dem ocracies are supported by
acting out o f values or by strategic pursuit o f interests are not resolvab le by
direct reference to evidence. The tw o orientations have to and do com pete
w ith each other in m aking sen se o f the w orld around us. T he on ly claim I am
trying to substantiate is that a theory o f dem ocracy based on the assum ption
o f a self-interested strategic com pliance is plausible and su fficien t
(Przew orski, 1991: 24).

Therefore, this author defines democracy in very restrictive terms as a political
competition, organized by rules where there are periodic winners and losers and
contestation open to participation (ibidem: 10). If there are periodic winners and
losers in a democratic system, Przeworski asks himself why political actors accept
the rules of the game even when they do not benefit from them in the same way as
others? To answer this question, the author develops a preference model to conclude
that political actors accept short-term losses in the democratic game if they expect
some gains in the future. Thus, democratic consolidation occurs when, despite the
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fact that not ail political actors benefit from the democratic arrangements, no one can
imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, due to expectations of future
winnings, but especially due to the fact the costs o f failing to overthrow the
democratic regime are higher than those o f maintaining it (ibidem: 26),

Przeworski reduces democracy to mere game theortic dynamics,2 wherein the
democratic character o f institutions depends exclusively upon collective actors’ rational
preferences and choices and on the degree o f uncertainty in the correlation o f political
forces: i.e., the more unknown and uneven the correlation, the more democratic the
regime that arises from it will be (ibidem: 81-82). However, this perspective fails to
consider two aspects. The first is that individual behavior is ruled not only by rationality
but also by norms and institutions embedded in the culture of a given society (Elster,
1992). Secondly, regimes and institutions are also significantly influenced by changes
in international politics and economics, class structures, specific historical conjunctures,
and crises o f consent or legitimacy. This last aspect is expressly rejected by Przeworski
who considers that “explanations of regime breakdown in terms of legitimacy are either
false or tautological.” (ibidem: 54, fn. 2). He considers that legitimacy crises can best be
understood as the effect of the organization of “counter-hegemony”, but although he
recognizes the Gramscian inspiration of this hypothesis, which would therefore seem to
have a class character, he rejects the concept of hegemony due to Gramsci's framework

2 Although in these pages I use Przeworski's work as an example o f political analysis based on rational
choice theory, it is necessary to mention Youssef Cohen 's analysis o f the breakdown o f democracy in
Brazil and Chile (1994), and Barbara Gedddes study o f state reform in Latin America (1994).
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o f duality o f coercion and consent [which] is not sufficiently specific institutionally to
serve as a guide to the problem at hand (ibidem: 55, fn. 3).

Due to its lack of attention to structural factors, the democratization approach
also fails to recognize the fact that the transition to democracy in Latin America
occurred in a new context: the global processes of internationalization o f the
economy and the rise o f neo-liberalism, which synthesizes an array of structural
factors that are reshaping the relationship between the state, politics, economics, and
civil society, thus requiring a new theoretical framework to analyze the relationship
among them and the problem of fostering democracy. As Remmer points out,
every on e o f the regim e transitions that have occurred sin ce the late 1970s (...)
has taken place against a background o f major change in the international
econ om y, m ounting econ om ic d ifficu lties, and a pro-dem ocratic p o licy shift
on the part o f the region 's hegem onic pow er. Studies o f dem ocratization,
how ever, have characteristically denigrated the sign ifican ce o f ex o g en o u s
variables, leaving us w ith com p lex and idiosyncratic explanations o f
individual ca ses that establish no basis for understanding h ow and w h y such a
large and heterogeneous collection o f authoritarian regim es cam e to g iv e up
pow er at more or less the sam e point in tim e (1991: 486).

Thirdly, for the aforementioned reason, the democratization approach
neglects the role of the state as both subject and object of the process of transition to
democracy since its explanatory emphasis is placed primarily on the conjunctive
analysis of regime change.

For some authors of this current of analysis, Latin

American politics is seen to be the result of an eternal oscillation between democratic
and authoritarian regimes. It is illustrative in this respect to mention Mitchell
Seligson, who believes that the whole Latin American region undergoes cyclical
periods o f democracy and authoritarianism about every twenty years (Seligson, 1987:
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3-4). In a more recent work, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have recognized that the
democratization approach has paid virtually no attention to the problem o f stateness,
and they try to fill the gap by showing that no form of democracy is possible without
the existence o f a sovereign state (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 17).

Three exceptions to this tendency to concentrate exclusively on the rational
choices made by agents and regime change are the studies done by Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens (1992), Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung and Torres (1993), and Petras
and Leiva (1994), who, with a structural approach, place the emphasis on the
interplay between the capitalist economy, the state, social classes, and regime.
Rueschemeyer et.al., comparing historical tendencies of democratic development in
Latin America, the Caribbean, and Europe, maintain that the possibility of
democratization processes is determined by changes in class structure and the
autonomy of the state engendered by capitalism. Drawing from Barrington Moore
(1966), these authors define class structure as the specific historical articulation of
socioeconomic antagonisms that are embodied in different forms o f organization and
become actors o f social and political transformation. However, contrary to Moore,
the concept of class of Rueschemeyer et.al. encompasses not only traditional agrarian
class relations and landlord-bourgeoisie relations, but urban workers as well,
assigning the latter a decisive role in the democratization process (Rueschemeyer et.
al., 1992: 58-59 nad 271). Class struggle for participation and distribution of scarce
economic and social resources is mediated by the state, which must be autonomous
in the face o f diverse antagonistic interests. The relative autonomy of the state is
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another central condition for democratic development, which means that the state
must have sufficient margin for maneuverability with respect to the dominant classes
in order to allow for the expression of other non-dominant but competing interests.
As Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens point out,
if the state is sim ply a tool o f the dom inant classes, dem ocracy is either
im possible or mere form. Such autonom y o f the state is in fact but one aspect
o f the differentiation betw een political co llectiv e d ecision m aking and the
w ider structures o f inequality (1992: 64-65).

In synthesis, these authors maintain that capitalist development engenders
democracy because it weakens the agrarian dominant class and strengthens organized
labor, which in turn, shifts the balance o f class power. Indeed, urban workers as a
factor o f social transformation can explain the democratization process which
accompanied the industrialization of Latin America, precisely because the latter
process entailed a strengthening of the working class, a key social sector needed by
hegemonic classes to set the basis for the new social order, expressed in a “social
contract” between politics, capital and labor that gave rise to the welfare state.
However, there is a limitation in the framework that Rueschemeyer, Stephens and
Stephens propose for explaining the democratization processes of the 1980s and
1990s, since those decades were characterized by the adoption of a neo-liberal
development model based on a new relationship between state, economy, and society
that redefines the old class-coalitions in which workers played a key role. In the new
class arrangements, organized workers are no longer the agents of democratization.
Indeed,

neo-liberal

policies

such

deregulation

of

economic

process

and

"flexibilization" of the labor market, weaken workers' ability to respond forcefully
and to act collectively and organize in nationwide labor unions. Their negotiating
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power is reduced because it would otherwise interfere with the goal of reduced
public spending, which is another pillar o f the neo-liberal order.

More than forty years ago, Lipset considered that the level of socioeconomic
development determined the degree o f democracy. Comparing democratic and nondemocratic countries across four different indices (wealth, industrialization,
urbanization, and education), he found that democratic countries had the highest
levels in each variable (Lipset, 1959: 80). In 1993 Lipset, along with Kyoung-Ryung
and Torres, published the results of a study which basically confirmed Lipset’s 1959
conclusion, i.e., “economic development is the single most important predictor o f
political democracy when controlling for other variables” (Lipset,Kyoung and
Torres, 1993: 160). In order to reinforce their findings, these authors argue against
O ’Donnell's first analysis of the origin of authoritarian regimes in Latin America:
before the w ave o f transition to dem ocracy beginning in the m id -1970s, som e
argue that the relationships hypothesized in the 1950s did not hold. But the
subsequent record argues for the interconnections betw een dem ocratic
structures and rising lev els o f incom e, although econ om ic growth d oes not
determ ine political dem ocracy by itse lf (ibidem : 170).

Petras and Leiva depart from the idea that
d iscu ssion s o f political regim e, w hether electoral-civilian or m ilitary, need to
refer to the state-class relation upon w hich they depend. R egim es cannot
defend th em selves or promote the accum ulation process w hen they act
contrary to the state interest (1994: 9).

From this structural perspective, they analyze the Chilean transition to democracy
taking into account the contradictions that engender the change of ruling elites which
must act within a state and economy whose structures were transformed through
authoritarian rule. By the "state", these authors mean the permanent institutions that
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exert a monopoly over the means of coercion and those that control the economic
levers of the accumulation process, and “the concomitant ensemble of class relations
that have been embedded in these same institutions” (Petras and Leiva, 1994: 7).
The "regime," on the other hand, is constituted by the political officials who occupy
the executive and legislative branches along with the rules that determine the actions
of political forces.

According to these authors, the new Chilean civil regime

inherited an undemocratic state as a consequence of the authoritarian constitution of
1980, and the adoption of the neo-liberal model of economy. The result was the
centralization of capital and “the dramatic growth in social inequalities in income
and widespread conditions of poverty, conditions that both broadened and deepened
in the process of recovery and economic expansion" (ibidem: 38). Although the
conceptual distinction that Leiva and Petras make between "state" and "regime"
exhibits methodological problems and requires further theoretical elaboration, it may
prove useful in helping to understand the difficulties o f fostering democratic
development in countries like those of Latin America where states are weak and
regimes, owing to their exclusionary and patrimonial character, may counteract such
a process.

Fourth, the democratization approach fails to take into account the role
played in Latin American polities by societal factors such as the lack o f social
integration, the weakness o f both the state and civil society, and the persistence of
pre-modern forms o f social and political relations such as clienteslim and

patrimonialism3, and the consequent existence o f informal rules and non
institutionalized forms o f behavior (North, 1993; O’Donnell, 1996). In combination,
these factors generate hybrid societies and regimes in Latin America that perform in
ways notoriously different from what the formal societal norms prescribe, thus
affecting the possibility for political and economic reforms to produce the expected
results.

Due to its neglect o f this aspect, the democratization approach cannot

provide an adequate explanation, as Hagopian affirms, for “even after rotation of
office and partial economic recovery, many o f the region’s democracies barely
manage to limp in an unconsolidated state"4 Given this situation, O'Donnell (1996)
recognizes the ambiguity o f the concept o f democratic consolidation and suggests
that it should be abandoned in favor o f a more realistic approach which takes the
persistence o f clientelism and other informal rules into account. He therefore resorts
to Robert Dahl's concept o f polyarchy5 in order to identify different types o f political
institutional agreements in Latin America. Dahl, however, distinguishes between
democracy as an ideal type and polyarchy as
the institutional arrangem ents that have co m e to be regarded as a kind o f
im perfect approxim ation o f an ideal, and exp erience sh o w s, I b eliev e, that w hen
the sam e term is u sed for both, n eed less con fu sion and essen tially irrelevant
sem antic arguments get in the w ay o f analysis (1971: 9).

In spite o f this warning, Dahl's statement has a bearing on democracy studies,
generating a true explosion o f typologies o f democratic regimes which Collier and
Levitsky (1997) have termed “democracy with adjectives.” Nevertheless, scholars
3 Clientelismo is a political patronage system, whereas patrimonialismo refers to the use o f public
resources for private purposes.
4 Hagopian (1993), p. 465.
5 As in known, Dahl defines polyarchy as the political order that possesses the following seven attributes:
elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom o f
expression, alternative information, and associative autonomy (Dahl, 1971: 1; 1989: 220).
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do not seem to realize that the use o f qualifiers in terms such as "limited-suffrage
democracy", "one-party democracy", "illiberal democracy", "tutelary democracy",
"delegated democracy", "oligarchic democracy", "restricted democracy", "democracy
under siege", and so on, simply permit the creation o f euphemisms to refer to the
structural social problems o f the Third World and its lack o f the basic requisites that
characterize truly liberal democratic regimes.

Finally, the concept of democracy used in the democratization approach seems
very narrow since it is conceived strictly in terms o f its political dimension, i.e., as free
elections and representative government, while the social and economic dimensions are
overlooked precisely at a moment in which neo-liberal restructuring in Latin America is
negatively affecting the democratic goal o f distribution in the region. To quote just one
example, O ’Donnell maintains that all the polyarchies he has studied in Latin America
“are such because o f a simple but crucial fact: elections are institutionalized”
(O’Donnell, 1996: 36). This is a minimalist conception of democracy which reduces the
task o f constructing democracy to mere institutionalization o f a political system but
which does not take the ethical contents o f the resulting institutional order into account.
“In this conception, democracy a set o f abstract rules, can pose only ‘technical’
problems o f governance and administrative efficacy” (Boron, 1995: 190).

However,

beyond the electoral politics and instrumental problems o f governing are the problems
that constitute the very essence o f politics: collective deliberation about, among other
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things, the distribution of economic and social goods. Latin American countries
underwent (under the authoritarian regimes) or are undergoing (under the civilian
ones) a neo-liberal restructuring o f their states and economies, which is redefining
the concept of democracy and sketching an institutional framework which is
determining the conditions in which civilian governments have to act and thereby
reducing the spectrum o f social and economic policies from which they may choose.
Such restructuring is displacing the locus of social justice and distribution from the
state to the market, thus affecting the possibilities for the state to pursue a more
egalitarian order in societies like those of Latin America which are characterized by
extreme inequality.

For the above-mentioned reasons, it is necessary to celebrate the publication
of studies with a broader and more critical perspective. Such is the case o f the book
edited by Agiiero and Stark (1998) in which they call on comparative political
analysts, in the first place, to elaborate a more complex vision o f current Latin
American politics, that will take multiple aspects of the normative, historical,
cultural, and structural context of Latin American democracy into account, such as
gender, ethnicity, administration o f justice, “economic reforms, large-scale social
restructuring, changes in political practices, and the influence of globalization”
(ibidem: ii).

In the second place, they are called on to abandon minimalist

conceptions of democracy in favor of rethinking the “decoupling between procedural
and substantive versions of democracy” (ibidem: 373).
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1.2. The Transition to a Market Oriented Economy

The 1980s brought a profound economic crisis to Latin America, characterized by
high levels of foreign debt, fiscal deficit, hyperinflation, and low economic growth
rates.

This situation determined a shift in comparative political studies towards

political economy approaches. Initially, these studies, as well as the economic policy
measures taken by public policy makers, were of a conjunctural nature, oriented
towards generating domestic savings, reducing the fiscal deficit and equilibrating the
balance of payments.

But reality soon showed that those reforms were due to a

process o f a structural nature and a new international correlation o f forces, expressed
in the so-called “Washington consensus” (Williamson, 1990a and 1990b). The result
o f that process was an actual transition from the model of industrialization through
substitution o f imports to one of liberalization and internationalization o f the
economy.

This transition required the abandonment o f state intervention in the

economy along with profound market-oriented reforms. In other words, at the end of
the 1980s, Latin America faced a radical transformation in the political, economic
and social spheres.

Since the mid-1980s this process was articulated with the

tendency towards re-democratization of the region, which gave rise to another
theoretical approach to analyzing Latin American politics: i.e., that which places
emphasis on the transition to a market-oriented economy (the neo-liberal
restructuring) and its interplay with the transition to a democratic regime.

Initially, the analysts explored the relation between economic restructuring
programs and authoritarian and democratic regimes.
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Remmer (1990), Haggard

(1990), Haggard and Kaufman (1992), Bates and Kruger (1993), Przeworski and
Limogni (1993), Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995), and Geddes (1995), all reached
the conclusion that, to the contrary o f what had been held in the past, authoritarian
regimes do not possess any advantage over democratic ones in relation to the
performance of the economy and the possibility of adopting policies that altered the
economic and social well-being of the diverse social groups. Other analysts explored
the relation between that performance and the quality of the bureaucracy and state
institutions, and concluded that the role o f the public sector was o f vital importance
for developing successful processes o f economic restructuring, for which state
autonomy and bureaucratic capacity were required (Evans, 1995; Waterbury, 1992).

Przeworski (1991) examines the interplay between “marketization” and
democratization. He develops the argument that the temporary social and economic
deterioration

caused

by market-oriented

reform

can undermine

democratic

consolidation or vice versa (ibidem: 137). The costs of economic adjustment will be
high for weaker collective actors, especially labor unions.

In the face of this

situation, governments have two options to carry out the economic adjustment: either
to concert and negotiate with the negatively affected groups, which Przeworski
considers improbable in developing countries, or to insulate themselves from social
pressure, which undermines democracy.

Using rational choice theory, he focuses on the way and the opportunity to make
economic adjustments and asserts that political leaders, technocrats and voters all want
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the period of adoption of radical adjustment programs to be as short as possible. This is
so because of each actor’s pursuit o f its rational interest: “people want to eat, technocrats
want to succeed, and politicians want to enjoy support” (Przeworski, 1991: 163-164).
After having done a complex analysis of different actors' courses of action and their
corresponding expectations of maximized utility, Przeworski reaches a conclusion with
respect to the sake o f the economic reform, which reflects Latin American reality better
than other actor-centered analyses do: i.e., given the adoption o f radical economic
programs
that are eventually slow ed or partly reversed, initiated again in a more
gradual form w ith less popular confidence, and again slow ed or reversed,
until a new governm ent com es in and prom ises a clean break, and the cy cle
starts again ... [because political parties reject restructuring w h ile they are in
the opposition and pursue it w hen they are in o ffice], w e should exp ect
reforms neither to ‘su cceed ’ nor to ‘fa il’, but to proceed in spurts: advancing,
stum bling, retreating, and advancing again (ibidem: 179).

However, Przeworski's book does not deal with the question o f why politicians
in Latin America and Eastern Europe should adopt market-oriented reforms. He takes
the economic liberalization programs as a matter of fact, without considering the
national and international structural factors that engender the need to make the transition
from politically-regulated economic models to market-oriented ones. He does not take
into account the existence of an international economic and political system, or global
economic changes and transnational forces have produced a worldwide political and
economic restructuring, which in turn, internationalizes national decision-making and
determines the type o f reforms that governments can implement.
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Joan Nelson (1990), and

Haggard and Kaufman (1992) also emphasize

domestic factors in explaining the adoption o f economic restructuring programs and
relegate the role of external factors to a second plane, given the variation of national
cases o f econonic restructuring that can be observed within the framework formed by
international factors. However, exogenous factors are among the important constraints
that politicians and state agents face in elaborating public policy. The fact that there has
been notable coincidence in the adoption of neo-liberal reforms in most Third World
countries in recent years, has led some scholars to analyze the role o f external factors in
determining this policies. Barbara Stallings (1992), among others, analyzes the
conditions imposed by international financial agencies such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). In doing so, the author is inspired by
the relation among three factors used by dependency theory to elaborate its explanatory
framework: a) the dependency of Third World exports with respect to international
markets of goods and capital, b) the links between the economic elites o f the Third
World and the interests o f international actors, and c) international leverage, understood
as the direct use of the power that international financial agencies have over this
countries. This approach, however, does not take into account the fact that international
markets and actors are also undergoing a profound process of economic and political
restructuring. The actions of the international financial agencies in particular are the
expression of a new form of economic regulation generated by the globalization process.
From this viewpoint, it can be seen that, as structural adjustment deregulates national
economies, economic regulation is moved to the international plane, as a consequence of
worldwide political, economic and technological transformations that cause production

27

and trade to become “planetized”, and the regulatory capacity of states to be limited
since it was designed to function effectively only within national territories. From this
standpoint, the globalization process as a whole, even more than the international
financial agencies, acts as a constraint o f a truly structural nature.

Gamarra (1994) considers the processes o f international restructuring of
capital and globalization to be the main forces that have induced economic
restructuring in Latin America and reduced the margin of maneuverability on the part
of public policy makers, but he does not stop to analyze the relation between the
exogenous factors. He concentrates on domestic factors and considers the economic
crisis the region suffered to have served as a learning process for the new,
democratically elected leaders, based on the errors and experiences of their
authoritarian predecessors. This permitted democratically elected rulers to develop
more effective and successful policies and to create political coalitions to carry them
forward. Therefore, Gamarra (1994: 4-7) argues, solution of the economic crisis was
not simply a question of good faith, but also one of political capacity and leadership.
Nonetheless, the new democratically elected rulers maintained the exclusionist type
o f decision making as their authoritarian predecessors. This generated tensions
between democratization processes and economic restructuring processes since, on
the

one

hand,

Those

rulers

successfully

introduced

measures

to

reduce

hyperinflation, for which they had popular support, while on the other hand, they
adopted measures that led to deterioration of the social indicators, a fall in per capita
income, and an increase in social inequality (ibidem: 6). Thus, the democratization
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and economic restructuring processes not only did not reinforce each other but,
instead, the implementation o f the latter required strong executives with the capacity
to isolate themselves from diverse social demands and pressures which, in turn,
entered into contradiction with the need for broad participation and inclusion that are
essential to the democratization process. This same idea is expressed by Bresser
Perira, Maravall and Przeworski (1994), for whom the stabilization measures not
only aggravated the economic crisis but also “generates social costs that make the
continuation of reforms politically unpalatable under democratic conditions.
Moreover, the technocratic style in which these policies tend to be formulated and
implemented undermines the consolidation o f democratic institutions (ibidem: 182).
Therefore, far from having achieved the consolidation o f truly liberal democracies,
Latin America in the 1990s, was characterized by hybrid regimes (ibidem: 6, 12) that
combined, and still combine, authoritarian and technocratic decision-making
processes with weak democratic legitimization processes and judicial systems
(Acuna and Smith, 1994: 18). Acuna and Smith coincide with Gamarra in the idea
that economic restructuring led both to the exclusion o f the popular sectors from the
decision-making process and to concentration of political power in the executive.

In contrast with other simplified concepts of democracy, Gamarra considers
that neo-liberal reforms led to two different concepts of democracy in Latin America:
a technocratic one, on the part o f government officials and international credit and
economic regulation agencies, which consider democracy to be simply a question of
effective and efficient management of the economy, and another participatory one,
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held by most o f the social sectors, for whom democracy means broad access to
decision-making processes. From the viewpoint of the former, the legislative and the
judicial branches have both proved to be obstacles to the instutionalization of neo
liberal adjustment policies since their political demands have endangered fiscal
equilibrium (Gamarra, 1994: 11).

The hybrid nature o f Latin American political regimes also finds expression
in the fact that the new technocratic style o f politics induced by the neo-liberal model
is articulated with the traditional form of political action in Latin America, i.e.,
clientelism. According to Gamarra, “many analysts, especially economists, argue that
the distribution o f patronage undermines the logic o f a modem market economy.
However, the Latin American record o f the late 1980s (and the history o f most
regions o f the world) suggests that patronage was an important instrument in the
implementation of neo-liberalism and in securing political stability. It has always
been an important tool available to political leaders and the implementation of
‘modem’ economic reforms did not alter this historical reality” (1994: 7). Although
this affirmation is correct, while Latin American clientelism is being used by
technocratic decision-makers, it is also beginning to face its limits in economic
restructuring and in the new international conditions, as will be seen in the next
chapter.

Fiscal adjustments and public spending cuts deprive clientelist political

action of resources whereas the existence of international agencies like Transparency
International creates pressures to reduce political corruption and to establish more
direct, rational, impersonal relations between the state and civil society.
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In relation to the support for and the opposition to economic restructuring,
Gamarra holds that the former originated in the private sector, which supported the
privatization of public enterprises in exchange for beneficial tax reforms (1994: 10),
while the latter arose among public employees and social sectors that had previously
benefited from public social spending. However, a review o f the bibliography on
this topic makes it possible to conclude that the participation o f business interests has
been ambiguous and has not played a very active role in stimulating and orienting
economic restructuring policies, whereas the seriously weakened popular sectors are
hardly able to oppose the process. Conaghan y Malloy (1994) have expressed
themselves in this sense with respect to various countries of the Andean region, as
have Sola (1994) with respect to Brazil, and Geddes (1995) who, after analyzing
various studies on the subject, holds that
the case studies do not support the stylized v ie w that state p o licies reflect
straightforwardly the desires o f interest groups ... one encounters little ‘onthe-ground’ evid en ce that groups that have benefited from liberalization or
other major changes in econ om ic strategy lobbied for them. C on versely,
groups that have borne the costs, esp ecially organized urban labor, have
show n less capacity to exert political influence than observers expected
(G eddes, 1995: 196).

Mettenheim and Malloy (1998) share the idea that the convergence of
democratization and economic restructuring has led to a strengthening of the
executive branch in Latin America but, contrary to the authors mentioned
previously, they hold that rulers have avoided the extremes of both
authoritarianism and liberalism.

To the political capacity of the new

democratic leaders already dealt with by Gamarra, Mattenheim and Malloy add
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the factors of creativity and statecraft as crucial to the political, economic and
social development o f Latin America.

The optimism o f these two authors

contrasts with the realism of other scholars such as Vacs, Ai Camp, Gamarra
and Carrion, who collaborated on the edited volume and who point out, on the
one hand, the need of those strong executives

to isolate themselves from

different social sectors in order to successfully implement the neo-liberal
policies in open contradiction to the idea of democracy and, on the other hand,
the obstacles that political parties and interest groups constitute with respect to
the adoption o f said policies. Although these “personal characteristics- and
human agency-centered approaches" can make important contributions to an
understanding of the actors’ strategies, they fail to consider the role played by
structural factors. Furthermore, it can be argued that strong presidentialism is
not something new but rather a traditional characteristic of Latin American
political regimes. What is indeed a novelty, introduced by the neo-liberal
adjustment process, is the increased power o f technocrats and economists, to
the detriment o f parliamentary and judicial institutions.

The political economy approach presents theoretical and methodological
problems that have been analyzed by Acuna and Smith. For these authors, “inferring
politics from economics” as well as “divorcing politics from economics” is bad
methodology (1994: 23).

However, they hold that this relation should not be

established on the basis of transformations of the capitalist accumulation model, i.e.,
the transition from import substitution industrialization to a liberalized market
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economy (ibidem: 56, fn. 6) since, from the political viewpoint, different state
institutions, regimes and accords are combined in different ways, with the result that
diverse social forces, classes, actors, and groups find diverse ways to further their
interests and to achieve their objectives (ibidem: 19).

Despite the fact that these authors recognize that the state, the political regime
and the economy can mutually affect each other (Acuna and Smith, 1994: 21), their
analysis neglects the structural aspects of that relationship to concentrate on “the
logic of support and opposition”. For them, the impact of economics on politics
occurs in terms o f the formation o f coalitions that either prevent or facilitate
economic restructuring or adjustment. Although it is true that “the same economic
policies will determine divergent political outcomes in terms o f the level o f
sociopolitical conflict and opposition to economic reform,” (ibidem: 20). Acuna and
Smith do not take into account that these divergences conceal profound changes in
the relations between social classes, and between social classes and the state.
Contrary to what these authors hold, the transformation of these relations follow a
similar pattern throughout Latin America since the free-market economic model has
structural characteristics which, in articulating the region with the world economy,
necessarily lead to a similar redefinition of the relations between the state, the
economy, and society. Therefore, in certain historical conjunctures, politics can be
inferred from economics and vice versa.
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Contrary to the authors just mentioned, Barbara Geddes recognizes the fact that
economic liberalization involves the creation o f a new regime.

As she points out,

because incumbents have gained control over many of the rents created by state
intervention in the economy, which in turn plays a central role in attracting political
support, the biggest and certainly the most articulate and politically influential losers
from structural adjustment in many countries are government officials, cadres of the
ruling party and their closest allies. Consequently, regime or government change can
increase the likelihood of economic liberalization because it breaks the link between
incumbents and the main beneficiaries of statist policies by installing a new set of
incumbents (Geddes, 1995: 197). However, it can be argued that the rents and social
benefits o f the interventionist state not only benefit government officials and cadres o f
the ruling party but also organized labor, and middle and weaker sectors. The marketoriented reform redefines the relationship between the state, the economy, and civil
society. It is precisely this redefinition which implies that incumbents change, which in
turn, determines the need to redefine the regime or the rules o f the political and
economic game. This relationship between state, economic model, and regime will be
developed in the next chapter to construct a new framework in order to understand
current Latin American politics.

Two reasons impede Acuna and Smith, and Geddes, like many of the authors
who adhere to this current of analysis, from placing more emphasis on the structural
aspects of the economic, political, and social restructuring o f Latin America. In the
first place, there is their underlying rational-choice theoretical framework. For these
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authors, the theoretical framework that studies Latin America on the basis of its
structural conditions do not permit an understanding of the processes that are
presently occuring in the region (Acuna and Smith, 1994: 24). On the contrary, they
maintain that
political ch oices, strategies and con tin gen cies remain central determ inants o f
social and econ om ic processes, and their m eaning and con seq u en ces perhaps
gain even greater relevance in a conjuncture o f deep econ om ic crisis and
transformations (ibidem: 20).

For these authors,

the reasons that generate support or opposition to structural

adjustment are rooted in rationality and in the individual interests of the social actors
(ibidem: 53).

However, economic restructuring not only generates interests,

preferences and expectations of the individuals and groups that are affected by it, it
also transforms the rules of the game that regulate their social relations. In the second
place, Acuna and Smith, like many analysts of Latin American politics, frequently
fail to distinguish clearly between the economic crisis o f the 1980s and the structural
transformations o f the accumulation model (Acuna and Smith, 1994: 18-24),
probably due to the historical sequence and overlapping that existed between the two
phenomena. It is therefore necessary to make the following distinction:

the debt

crisis gave rise to short-term measures oriented to achieving economic stabilization
by correcting the negative balance of payments and reducing the fiscal deficit. For
this reason, the structural adjustment process has been defined by most analysts as a
set of conjunctural measures oriented to promoting long-term economic growth,
improving resource allocation, and opening up the national economy to the world
market. However, while the policies to confront the economic crisis do not imply a
substantial change in the relations between the state, society and the economy,
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economic liberalization does imply it to the degree that it constitutes a structural
transformation o f the accumulation model. Acuna and Smith both accept the fact that
the transformations induced by economic restructuring are not neutral with respect to
the class structure and that they can strengthen the power of national and
international capitalist interests, to the detriment of other sectors of society.
However, this affirmation is not developed in their study. Nonetheless, a profound
analysis o f the structural transformations o f the accumulation model is of great
importance at the moment o f evaluating the democratic development of Latin
America in political and social terms. For this reason, the economic reforms cannot
be judged only in terms o f resumed growth and consolidation of democracy as
maintained by Bresser Pereira, Maravall and Przeworski (1994: 182).

Haggard and Kaufman (1995) also deal with the theoretical framework of
political economy studies.

Their work constitutes a failed attempt to include the

consideration of structural factors in their analysis of the interplay between politics
and economics.

Their concern is with analyzing the impact of the handling of

macroeconomic policy on the withdrawal of authoritarian regimes from power and
the consolidation of democratic regimes. The starting point taken by these authors is
that the rational choice model used in most studies of the transition to democracy,
especially in the aforementioned study by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Przeworski, has
placed an exaggerated emphasis on the actors’ decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to
take into consideration the social and economic structures that determine who the
relevant political actors are and what their preferences are (Haggard and Kaufman:
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1995: 6). These authors begin by analyzing how the transitions from authoritarian
rule are produced. The conditions under which an authoritarian regime withdraws is
determined by two factors: a) the presence or absence of economic crisis and success
or failure in managing economic policy; and b) the degree of cohesion among the
ruling elite. From this perspective, the rise of economic crises and deficient
management o f economic policy on the one hand, and the fragmentation of
government coalitions on the other, makes authoritarian regimes unable to establish
and control the terms of their withdrawals (a prerogative that might otherwise be
feasible) and, consequently, makes it impossible to influence the political process in
the democratic regime. In contrast, good economic performance and a cohesive
ruling elite can better manage, and even avoid, economic crises, which in turn,
redounds in increasing the regime's capacity to withstand political opposition and to
determine and control the terms of their withdrawal from power. This enables them
to protect themselves and to retain their influence in the democratic regime.

However, despite Haggard and Kaufman’s rejection of the preponderant
emphasis on actors’ strategies and subjective factors to explain democratic
transitions, they eventually conclude that the determining factors o f changes of
regime change are not the structural ones, but rather the personal ability o f rulers to
manage the economy and to avoid internal divisions within their governments and
the coalition that supports them (1995: 12, 37). Haggar and Kaufman are therefore
open to the same criticism that they make of authors like O’Donnell, Schmitter,
Przeworski and Acuna and Smith: i.e., they neglect the crucial role that
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socioeconomic structures and international factors play in determining social
phenomena.

Haggard and Kaufman also analyze the effects o f inherited economic
conditions in new democracies. Their main argument is that the economic legacies of
the authoritarian regimes and o f the transition period determine the ability of new
democratic rulers to initiate economic “adjustments” and to manage economic
policy. For this reason, they distinguish between two types of democratic regimes: a)
those that inherit favorable economic conditions and whose task is to maintain the
previous economic model, and b) those that inherit an economic crisis situation and
must therefore initiate the “economic adjustment” process (1995: 159-163). In the
latter case, the initiation o f economic reforms requires a powerful, centralized
executive, capable o f achieving both autonomy and isolation from pressures arising
from representative institutions and social sectors negatively affected by such
reforms. However, quite to the contrary, the consolidation of economic reform and
democracy actually requires the reduction o f such autonomy, and a close relationship
between the executive and representative institutions since they are crucial in
structuring distributive outcomes (ibidem: 335-340).

Two critiques can be made of Haggard and Kaufman. First, their concept of
democracy seems very narrow since they consider it to be primarily an instrument to
advance the cause of neo-liberal adjustment but not as a means by which to
contribute to improving the standard of living of society. As they point out,
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new dem ocratic governm ents that cam e to pow er in the w ake o f crises had
incentives to undertake new policy initiatives, but im plem entation w as
difficult precisely because econ om ic problem s w ere more acute and dem ands
for short-term econ om ic r elief more widespread.
Incom ing dem ocratic
governm ents in the non-crisis cases faced a political and p o licy setting
shaped by the fact that authoritarian regim es had already undertaken
substantial econom ic reforms and built a coalition o f beneficiaries. In these
cases the major question w as w hether such p olicies w ould be sustained under
conditions o f more open political com petition (1995: 153).

Second, Haggard and Kaufman do not provide an explanation o f why the new
democratic regimes must adopt neo-liberal “economic adjustment,” or why its adoption
coincides with the emergence o f new democracies. To do so would have implied
considering structural economic factors from a broader scope rather than focusing only
on the short-term horizon o f economic performance, as they in fact did (ibidem: 28,
154).

The only relationship they establish between economic factors and social

transformation is that existing between economic deterioration, social mobilization, and
political instability (ibidem: 30-31). This connection can explain a change o f regime but
it cannot explain the change o f economic model. This neglect o f macro-structural factors
is a characteristic that Haggard and Kaufman’s analysis shares with most studies done
using the “transition and consolidation to democracy approach.” Like most authors of
this school, Haggard and Kaufman neglect the fact that the transition to democracy in
Latin America occurred within a new context: i.e., the global processes of
internationalization o f the economy and the rise of neo-liberalism as the structural
factors that are reshaping the relationship between the state, politics, the economy, and
civil society.

It is possible that this vacuum is being filled by more recent studies on the
political economy of Latin America, which show a tendency to reconsider structural
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factors of both an international and a domestic nature. The two books jointly edited
by Smith and Korzeniewicz (1996 and 1997) as well as the volume jointly edited by
Oxhom and Ducatenzeiler (1998) all seem to show this trend. The first two authors inspired by Karl Polanyi's holistic view in The Great Transformation - assume a
structural, macro-social, and long-lasting perspective of the economic restructuring
process in Latin America, which surpasses the view centered on the actor and its
agency at the micro-social level in the short term, that Acuna and Smith had posed in
1994. While these authors rejected the relationship between politics and economics
in terms o f the capital accumulation model at that time, three years later Smith and
Korzeniewicz affirmed that
the collision betw een m obile capital and globalization o f production on the
one hand, and national and local actors in Latin A m erica on the other,
appears to have resulted in a sharp erosion o f the capacity o f the national
state to m anage major m acroeconom ic variables... A more nuanced
understanding o f the recasting o f political pow er, how ever, calls attention to
new patterns in the relation betw een political rule and accum ulation. From
this point o f v iew , the boundaries o f political rule and regulation becom e
redefined, as traditional political institutions at the national level increasingly
negotiate and coordinate their operations with new agen cies o f political
regulations functioning at a supranational level (1997: 12).

Oxhom y Ducatenzeiler (1998) start with a double critique o f the
bibliography on Latin American political economy. In the first place, it tends to
ignore the organizations o f civil society as an explicative variable, and fails to give
due consideration to the fact that civil society has in fact been profoundly affected
and weakened by the economic restructuring, especially with respect to the labor
movement.

In the second place, as has already been mentioned in the case of

Haggard and Kaufman, that bibliography "ignores the increasing tendency within
Latin America for democratic institutions to become more authoritarian, or confuses
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the institutionalization o f authoritarian political practices with democratization"
(Oxhom and Ducatenzeiler, 1998: 7).

Consequently, Oxhom and Ducatenzeiler hold that insertion into the world
economy and the adoption o f neo-liberal restructuring policies have led in Latin
America to the establishment of “neo-pluralist” regimes, with highly authoritarian
features that strengthen the executive and limit the participation of political parties
and social organizations. The stability o f these regimes is obtained by means of the
fragmentation of grassroots organizations (ibidem: 215), which increases the
traditional weakness of civil society and affects its ability to pressure for structural
changes in its favor (ibidem: 233).

In synthesis, according to most studies under review in this chapter, the cause of
both regime change and economic policy making is ultimately determined by the
strategic choices o f key actors.

With the exception o f Smith, Acuna and Gamarra

(1994), Smith and Korzeniewicz (1997), Agiiero and Stark, and Oxhom and
Ducatenzeiler (1998), who emphasize international structural factors in determining the
economic restructuring of the Latin American region,

most of the studies fail to

consider structural elements; the contradictions existing between the requirements of the
democratization

process and those o f neo-liberal

economic

restructuring;

the

implications of the change of economic model for the transformation of the political
regime; and the decisive role of international factors. Most o f the studies explain the
rise of neo-liberal restructuring as a result o f the action and interests of public or private

sector elites and of the institutional limits within which said action is carried out, or
based on the influence, interests and demands o f other social actors, such as organized
grass-roots sectors. For this reason, the next chapter seeks to contribute, from a
structural perspective, to greater understanding of the effects that economic restructuring
has had on Latin American societies. Emphasis will be placed on the intensification of
the tendencies toward social fragmentation and disintegration that has resulted from the
transformation of the model of accumulation of capital.

Chapter 2
Theoretical Frame Work:
G lobalization, Economic Liberalization,
and the Problem o f Political and Social
Integration in Latin America

Contrary to the approaches of the previous chapter that emphasized the
strategic choices of economic and political actors, this chapter will develop a
structural perspective. Social phenomena are partly determined by structural factors,
and scientific research should assign them decisive importance, since a fundamental
basis for social action and transformation is to be found in the dynamics of
relationships

between

individuals

contradictions within structures.

and

structures

and

the

development

of

In this sense, individual action occurs within

frameworks shaped by structural factors and forces generated by individual and
collective interactions, and long-term tendencies.
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It is common practice to measure the success or failure o f political, economic and
social reforms by the degree to which they manage to achieve the purpose and
rationality o f their authors. Thus, for example, if the stated objective o f a given reform
was to shrink the size o f the state and it was not reduced, it is tipically considered that
this failure was due to the deficient or insufficient application o f the measure in
question. However, in this dissertation I assume a position that goes beyond this type of
analysis.

I consider that, the dynamics o f social processes often surpass actors’

intentions, or go even farther beyond, and social actors in conflict for advancing
differents societal projects imposes themselves mutual constraints which acts as a
structural force.

It is the context o f forces and social structures in which action is

inscribed what determines their destiny. Economic and political reforms, such as the
change o f accumulation model, or political constitution, are based on postulates of
rationality that are not necessarily fulfilled in social reality.

It is not possible to

anticipate the consequences that a decision will unleash. As Herbert Simon maintains,
in an important sen se, all d ecision is a matter o f com prom ise. T he alternative
that is finally selected never perm its a com p lete or perfect achievem ent o f
ob jectives, but is m erely the best solution that is available under the
circum stances. T he environm ental situation inevitably lim its the alternatives
that are available, and hence sets a m axim um to the le v e l o f attainment o f
purpose that is p o ssib le (1947: 6).

Individuals make decisions that may be rational, but society, understood not as
the sum o f the individuals but as the ensemble o f individuals’ interactions, generates
forces that wind up limiting the individual's field o f action. From this perspective, in the
Colombian case, the decisions made by actors involved in the economic liberalization
policy were constrained by policies concerning the Constitution of 1991, and viceversa.
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At the same time, the structural heterogeneity and fragmentation that characterize
Colombian society, coupled with globalization processes in which it is inscribed,
affected the course of both societal projects.

Analyses based on rational choice theory are, basically, equilibrium situations
carried out in static conditions, from the social point o f view (North, 1990: 19). These
studies assume that choice situations can arbitrarily be extracted from the historic
dynamics o f society. However, societies are constituted by continuous and contradictory
currents of historic events, and of the assembly o f situational consequences which flow
from those events.

Consequently, actors’ choices are always carried out within the

current of historic process, determining their options. According to Marx, “men make
their own history, but not of their own free will in circumstances they have chosen, but
in circumstances they encounter directly, that exist and are a legacy o f the past”(1973:
408).

The problem with rational choice theory is that it abstracts actors from their

historic process. Without the consideration of the impact of historic forces, the analyses
o f preferences, opportunities, and social action of actors, is inevitably arbitrary. It is
impossible to study empirical social processes ab initio, since there is always a prior
history that frames any social dynamic. This historic context should be also the subject
of analysis. The social process is diachronic. Actors are affected by parallel processes
which occur in different levels; there are multiple historic processes and times that
elapse in the macro, intermediate, and micro levels of society. Therefore, analyses of
the economic and political transformations in America Latina in the 1990s has to take
into account that historical context in which those process are inscribed.
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Finally, in an increasingly interconnected and globalized world, analyses o f
social phenomena should go beyond the relation between action and structure within
national societies. It is necessary to take account how the international system and
the effects it generates affect domestic domains.

It is precisely this complex

framework that enables analysts to make generalizations about Latin American
politics, since many o f the inquiries are very descriptive case studies which lack
sound theoretical bases. In the present chapter, I will attempt to develop this
interpretative framework.

After examining some theories o f social action (2.1), I will outline a theoretical
framework for analazing the economic and political reforms in Colombia in the nineties.
Examining reforms as the result o f the interaction o f exogenous and endogenous factors
provides a better understanding o f the current political, economic and social situation
not only o f Colombia but also in Latin America. Globalization and the generalized
diffusion of the neoliberal accumulation model form the exogenous factors (2.2).
Endogenous considerations are present to a greater or lesser degree in all Latin
American countries, including the precarious integration o f their societies and their
social heterogeneity (2.3.1); state weakness (2.3.2); the conflict between political and
economic restructurings as a societal projects (2.3.3);

the effects of neoliberal

restructuring on their political regimes (2.3.4); and finally, the contradiction between
the search for legitimacy and efficiency inherent in by both political and economic
restructuring (2.3.5).

The intersection o f exogenous and endogenous factors has
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aggravated o f the problems o f integration that have historically characterized the
region’s societies.

2.1 Social Action: Between the Structural Context and Individual Rationality

As the previous chapter illustrated, current political science tends to explain social
phenomena in terms of the intentional and rational actions o f actors. The dominance
of rational choice theory and its inscription within methodological individualism
accounts for this tendency. This position, take for granted that the central debate in
the social sciences is between methodologial individualism and methodological
structuralism, where social action is considered a result of a series o f constraints
imposed by the historic development of society, human interactions, conflict, norms
and

social

institutions,

technological

development,

and

environmental

and

international factors, among others.

In the last two decades, however, a school of thought has emerged that go
beyond the agent- structure debate by integrating both positions.

Among the most

representative authors of this school are Anthony Giddens (1984, 1997), Douglass North
(1990), and Jon Elster (1992).

Giddens’ point o f departure is his criticism of structural functionalism and of
structuralism (1997).

He criticizes the first perspective for

its reduction of human

action to a mere interiorization o f values, and its use of the concept of structure in purely
descriptive terms; the second is accused of structural determinism. For Giddens both
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approaches lead to denying the agency o f actors in the constituting society. For this
theorist society is in part a result o f the capabilities of social actors (1994), and in part a
result o f the social structures, which enable actors to perform.

Drawing on Marx,

Giddens affirms that though social actors generate society, they do not do it under
conditions of their own election (1997: 127-128), but rather this effort is structurally
determined.

The structures, nevertheless, should not be understood as mere constraints

on human action, but also as the factors that enable agency. Social structures, defined
by Giddens as a "recursively organized set of rules and resources" (1984: 25) arise from
a succession of repeated actions which through their repetition structure social life. In
such a way, actions generate structures and these, in turn, enable individuals to act.
Giddens refers to this condition of social structures as both originated and result from
human action as the “duality o f structure”:
“according to the notion o f the duality o f structure, the structural properties o f
social system s are both m edium and outcom e o f the practice they recursively
organize. Structure is not ‘external’ to individuals: as m em ory traces, and as
instantiated in social practices, it is in a certain sen se more ‘internal’ that
exterior to their activities in a Durkheimian sense. Structure in not to be
equated with constraint but is alw ays both constraining and enabling” (1984:
25).

North seeks to develop a institutional framework to oppose the idea of the
rational actor upon which the economic theory is based. For North, institutions are
the rules o f the social game which
“reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to every day life. T hey are a
guide to human interaction, so that w hen w e w ish to greet friends on the
street, drive an autom obile, buy oranges, borrow m oney, form a business,
bury our dead, or whatever, w e know (or can learn ea sily ) h ow to perform
this tasks” (North, 1990: 3-4).
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Institutions are thus the framework within which individual action and social
interactions are produced.

A theory o f institutions, argues North, requires the

separation of the analysis of the rules o f the game from that of actors’ strategies
(ibidem: 5-6), because institutions have their own logic and relative autonomy. At
the same time, however, North affirms that "institutions are a creation of human
beings. They evolve and are altered by human beings" (1990: 5). Therefore, there is
a relationship of mutual determination between human agency and institutional
constraints.

By the integrating individual’s strategic choices with institutional

constraints, North has taken a step toward the unification o f theory and methodology
in the social sciences. North also transcends the primacy o f individual action with
his conception of social change, starting from his distinction between formal and
informal institutions (1990: 73). Historic change is the result of the interplay between
formal institutions which can be modified by the intentional actions of actors, and the
resistance opposed by intentional modification by informal norms constituted by the
culture, which resists all attempts at intentional modification (ibidem: 16).

Elster (1998) also tries to establish a mutual relation between agent and
structure through his criticism o f the reduccionism rationalist and normativist
approaches. His central concern is the diverse dimensions of social action which is
guided by instrumental racionality in certain spheres, and by social norms in others.
As Elster has pointed out, human behavior is a result of the tension between homo
oeconomicus and homo sociologicus:
The former is supposed to be guided by an instrumental rationality, w h ile the
conduct o f the latter is dictated by social norms. T he former is "pulled" by
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perspectives o f future rew ard, w hile the latter is "pushed" from behind by
quasi-internal forces. T he form er adapts to changing circum stances ... the
latter adheres to prescribed conduct even when new and apparently better
options are available to it (Elster, 1992: 119).

The merit of these three perspectives is that they incorporate agency and
structure in their analysis of how social institutions are produced. Nonetheless, each
o f three theorists assume that the social actors converge around a single institutional
framework, ignoring that they are, in fact, in permanent conflict whit regard to
institucional arrangements. While some actors seek to maintain the statu quo, others
seek to reform or to transform social institutions.

This conflictual relationship

imposes mutual constraints which act as structural determinants of both collective
and individual actions.
determinant.

In certain moments structural constraints are even more

Junctures in which social structures are sharply redefined, such as

globalization, regime change, or a new model of accumulation, can alter the rules of
the game that govern social behavior.

2.2. Exogenous Factors: Globalization and Neoliberalism

Political, social and economic problems have traditionally been analyzed from two
different perspectives: the nation-state and the international system. This is the legacy
of the Westphalian order which consists basically of: a) the principle o f state
sovereignty, understood as the supreme and exclusive power of the state over the
population and the territory, and b) the search for nation-state autonomy in a world
characterized by rivalry among states. However, in recent decades a broad spectrum of
phenomena are causing globalization, which is altering the so-called Westphalian order.
By globalization is meant a broad and complex process that links technological.
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political, economic, cultural and institutional dimensions, by means o f which the
distances have been made “so much shorter, the movement o f ideas, pictures, currencies
[goods] and information so much faster, and thus the interdependence of peoples and
events so much greater” (Rosenau, 1990: 12).

Among the principal causes of

globalization is the development of micro-electronics and its application to practically
all spheres of human activity, but especially to production and communications. It has
generated the progressive interdependence o f different national societies, the spatial
reorganization o f production, the international integration of trade and financial markets,
and a profound transformation o f the international system. Globalization, however,
extends beyond the economic realm and promotes changes in political and cultural
concepts and practices as well, and reduces the time and space dimensions of social
relations (Mittelman,1996:3). From this perspective, one can say that globalization is
characterized by emerging patterns of universal interconnectedness and an increased
consciousness of the world as a unitary whole.

In particular, the application of micro-electronic technology to industry and
telecommunications has led to the exhaustion of traditional models of production and
management such as Taylorism and Fordism. This is expressed, among others things, in
the replacement of production of finished goods under one large roof of a single factory,
by the production of component parts which may be produced anywhere on the planet
and assembled directly in the final markets (Cox, 1987; Lipietz, 1988). From the
geographic

perspective,

these

new

production
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systems

generate

processes

of

flexibilization,

decentralization,

internationalization and

interdependence

among

national societies which multiply and decentralize the decision-making centers.

This process is also affecting the nation-state's capacity to regulate economy and
society for two reasons. First, the interdependence among states is a consequence of the
inability o f single and independent states, individually considered, to control and
regulate phenomena whose origins and effects transcend national borders (Keohane and
Nye, 1989).

Second, the increased flexibility of industrial production and the

internationalization of the economy collides with centralism, normative and institutional
complexity, and large public expenditures which are characteristic o f such a modality of
state action.

One important consequence of such a change is that the political and

economic arrangements among politics, capital and labor, which gave rise to the welfare
state after World War II, have broken down due to the reduction of social policies, the
tendency toward the “atomization” of productive units which hinders the organization of
workers in national labor unions, and the new scheme for relations between capital and
labor which operates on a world scale. As Vacs points out,
taken to its logical con clu sion , transnationalization and interdependence
w ould culm inate in the creation o f an integrated global political econ om y in
w hich the role o f states is severely limited by their grow ing incapacity to
control crucial variables that affect econ om ic, social and political
d evelopm ents within and across national boundaries (1994: 73).

Robert W. Cox affirms that globalization became ideology when it came to be
considered a finality or an inevitable culmination of the strong market tendencies at
work (1996: 23). Nevertheless, the ideological character o f globalization goes beyond
its inevitability. Globalization is embodied in neoliberalism as the new concept of the
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relationship between state, economy, and society. If the international system until the
1980s may be characterized as the era o f geopolitics in which anti-communist ideology
acted as the cohesive factor within the Western nation-states system, in the 1990s the
new international scenario may be characterized as the era o f geoeconomics in it anti
communism is replaced by neoliberalism as the cohesive factor, for it represents the
structural adjustment o f national economies and societies which corresponds to the new
tendencies o f liberalization, flexibility o f productive processes, deregulation o f
economies and integration o f local and regional markets6. However, in spite of its
apparent technocratic neutrality, neoliberalism, with its emphasis on values o f freedom
and individualism, is in fact the new ideology of the redefinition o f the relationship
between the state, the economy and civil society. Neoliberalism, as ideology, implies a
tendency to replace the logic o f politics for the logic o f the market as the principal
criterion for action in society. In other words, for neoliberals, decisions through public
institutions are less democratic than decisions through the market. In the words of one
o f the most representative ideologues o f neoliberalism,

the characteristic feature of action through political channels is that it tends to
require or enforce substantial conformity. The great advantage of the market,
on the other hand, is that it permits wide diversity. It is, in political terms, a
system of proportional representation (Friedman, 1982: 15).

6 I am drawing here from Richard Falk (1995) who characterizes the current restructuring o f the world
order as a transition from “geopolitics” to “geogovemance”, understanding the former as relations among
nation-states seeking “balance o f power, self-defence, spheres o f influence, and alliances”, and the latter
as a more integrated world in economic, political and cultural terms which weakens sovereign states (pp.
1, 2 ,9). But it is important to recall that the ideological confrontation between the eastern and western
hemispheres was fundamental in the constitution o f a world politics, and in the function o f agglutinating
states around one o f the two poles o f world power. Furthermore, given that globalization is basically a
globalization o f capital and that liberalization o f the market and the ideology that accompanies it are its
clearest expression, I have decided to change the term “geogovemance” for that “geoeconomics.”
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For neoliberals, the market reduces the need for political intervention. An important
characteristic o f political decisions is that they require deliberation, consensus and
submission. The market does not. Thus, for neoliberals the market is more democratic
than any political regime.

Notwithstanding this, political regulation o f the economy is far from
disappearing; the economy has become more regulated than it has ever been before.
What is happening is that the regulation is undergoing a process o f displacement from
the nation-state level to the supra-state or global level. This phenomenon has been
considered by scholars as a form o f “global governance” understood as the emergence of
common principles, norms and values to regulate and coordinate political and social
relations on a global scale (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Commission on Global
Governance, 1995), which constitute global power structures and enhance the scope o f
political authority and domination. The concept and practice o f “global governance”
have been fundamental in the constitution o f international regimes that demand
worldwide observance o f principles such as the free market, democracy, and human
rights. This is translated into political and economic conditioning that links the granting
o f loans or development aid to the adoption o f structural reforms in the Third World.
For this reason, one o f the institutional expressions o f globalization and global
governance of the economy is the strengthening o f the role of multilateral financial and
trade organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB),
and the World Trade Organization (WTO). For example, in the past twenty years, the
IMF has experienced a process of strengthening, in which it moved from performing
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a relatively low-profile role as coordinator o f the international monetary and exchange
system, which arose from the Bretton Woods agreements in 1945, to playing the role o f
a sort o f supra-state central bank, some of whose functions are supervision of the global
capital market and the demand for adjusting national economies to the principles of
globalization and the free market (James, 1996; Scholte, 2000). As Cox has pointed out,
“international finance is the preeminent agency o f conformity to world-hegemonic order
and the principal regulator o f the political and productive organization o f hegemonic
world economy (1987: 267).

Another expression o f globalization is the constitution o f regional blocs of
economic integration such as the European Community, Asean, Nafta, Mercosur, and
the Andean Community, which are a sort o f supra-national space in favor o f which the
nation-state is ceding functions in economic matters.

In other words, the state is

restructuring itself through its participation in the creation o f supra-territoriality, i.e., the
creation o f larger spaces and institutions needed to advance the globalization process.
This restructuring implies the broadening o f the geographical reference o f the state’s
regulatory capacity. The state is thus undergoing a process o f “partial denationalizing
o f national territory and a partial shift o f some components o f state sovereignty to other
institutions, from supranational entities to the global capital market” (Sassen, 1996: xii).

Simultaneously with the aforementioned process, there has been a process o f
“rebirth” o f civil society which is also undergoing

a process of breaking national

boundaries and redefining its role. Its protagonism in the international arena stems not
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only from individual and group actions but also from the fact that while the nation-state
is still significant as a reference point for the action of groups and individuals, it is no
longer the only referent for social action. Their existence has increasingly referred to
global processes and institutions.

They are in the middle o f a competition among

different power and decision-centers for their loyalty and support. As Rosenau points
out,
individuals have becom e, both as group m em bers and as citizens, a mayor
battleground on w hich states, governm ents, sub-national groups, international
organizations, regim es, and transnational associations com pete for their
support and loyalties, thereby posing for them ch o ices that can not be easily
ignored and that serve as both a measure o f global change and a challenge for
global stability (R osenau, 1990: 213).

However, the rebirth o f civil society is a paradoxical process.

In spite of the

globalization of individual and group frameworks for their actions, and the fact, noted by
Rosenau, that the awareness of their insertion in the world and their analytic skills have
increased considerably (1990: 13, 64), their influence in the national and international
agenda and decision-making seems to be more and more reduced. This is due to the fact
that while individuals and groups are locally based, the center of power and decisions
are moved away from local life due to the process of internationalization. Only a few
non-governmental organizations and social movements like Amnesty International and
Green Peace, may have the capacity to act transnationally.

Most movements and

individuals are circumscribed to the limits o f local life, thus confirming the irony
pointed out by Rosenau that “the abilities of individuals to connect to world politics and
cope with its complexity have reached new heights while their sense of control over the
complexity has fallen to new lows” (1990: 335). Nonetheless, in the past two years
"transnational" social protest movements have begun to arise which, conscious of the
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fact that the decisions o f the supranational institutions increasingly affect their living
conditions, have begun to question globalization.7 Nevertheless, these movements are
still very incipient and mainly link groups and individuals from the developed world.
The civil societies o f the Third World in general, and of Latin America in particular, are
still far from being able to effectively influence the global centers of decision-making.

That is the framework in which Latin America must act. The above-mentioned
globalization process acts as a constraining force and precludes the possibility o f
autonomous development.

Globalization can explain why some scholars consider it

“surprising” that one of the findings o f their research “is the degree to which interest
groups fail to account for the initiation... o f [market-oriented] policy reform” (Bates and
Krueger, 1993: 455).

This new array o f global conditions means that the economic

growth and social development o f the region’s countries depend on their competitive
insertion in the world market. As Morley points out, the region is “embedded in a
worldwide trading and financial system, from whose rigid rules there was no easy
escape” (1995: 5). Besides, in the age of globalization it is not enough to simply export;
it is also necessary to increase the technological content o f the exported goods and
services.

7 1 refer to the heterogeeneous ensemble o f personalities, political and social movements, and NGOs, o f
diverse regions o f the world, that have raised the banners o f antiglobalization, to demand everything from
control o f multinationals and global protection o f the environment, to equitable worldwide distribution o f
wealth, including the disappearance or democratization o f international financial agencies and condoning
o f the foreign debt o f Third World countries. Said groups have directed their protests, often violently,
against the summit meeting o f the World Trade Organization in Seattle, in December 1999; the Thirtieth
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 2000; the joint semi-annual assembly o f the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC in April 2000; the Third Summit o f
the Americas in Quebec, Canada in April 2001; and the meeting o f the G-8 in Genoa, Italy in July 2001.
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This situation has led since the 1980s to an exhaustion o f the import substitution
industrialization model (ISI) which was adopted by Latin American countries in the
second postwar period.

The type o f protected industrialization adopted by Latin

America, and the international division o f labor that predominated until the 1970s,
prevented the region from developing structural conditions for improving its
productivity by means o f technological development, in order to ensure competitiveness,
as o f the 1980s, in an increasingly technified and globalized world economy. This
situation has expressed itself in a weak interelationship between growth and work
productivity.

According to the Employment Program for Latin America and the

Caribbean, PREALC,
in the 1 9 50-1980 period, Latin A m erican industry expanded at a greater pace
than the average o f the O EC D and EEC countries; n on eth eless, the rate o f
increase in w ork productivity -about 2.9% - w as less than that achieved b y
those countries: 4.0% for the O EC D y 4.4% for the EEC. T he productivity
breach is even greater i f one com pares it w ith outstanding experiences, such
as the cases o f Italy (5.4% ), France (5.6% ) or Japan (8.1% )” . (PR EA LC,
1990: 7).

Therefore, according to the WB and the IMF, which are imposing globalization and
Neoliberalism in the region, the ISI produced, among other things, a loss o f international
competitiveness of national industries due to the excessive protectionism it implies.
Besides, according to those institutions, this strategy entailed “a serious misallocation of
resources, especially because o f the central role played by the public sector as an engine
of ‘growth’ ” (Fanelli and Frankel, 1994: 102). For those reasons the WB and the IMF
are imposing programs o f restructuring o f the public sector in Latin America, which
implies a change in the traditional emphasis o f public policy-making in order to achieve
a competitive insertion o f the region’s countries in the world market. Such restructuring
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consists principally o f : a) reducing the state’s size by reducing public expenditures and
privatizing public entreprises; b) decentralizing the state’s activity by translating the
responsibility of providing public services to local government; c) liberating prices and
interest rates from state control, and, in general, deregulating economic activities; d)
introducing regressive taxation; e) reducing tariffs and barriers to foreign trade and
flexibilizing the exchange rate; f) flexibilizing the labor market and atomizing labor
unions and social movements. This policy affects and reduces labor's negotiating power
because, otherwise, it could prevent achievement of the goal of reducing public
spending.

2.3. Endogenous Factors
2.3.1. Society: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Problem o f Integration

In modem social theory, society has been understood exclusively as conflict (Marx,
1987; Coser, 1964; Dahrendorf, 1973) or as cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Fukuyama,
1995). However, the purposes of this dissertation demand a concept that will combine
both of these dimensions.

Therefore, society can be defined as a set o f social

interactions resulting from the permanent tension between cooperation and conflict.
According to Rawls, social cooperation exists since it
m akes p ossib le a better life for all than any w ould have i f each w ere to live
so lely by his ow n efforts. There is a con flict o f interests since persons are
not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration
are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a
lesser share (1971: 4).
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The constitution of the social order has, thus, to do with opposing positions with
respect to how the basic structure of society is constructed, i.e., the way in which the
principal social institutions are linked in order to permit the allocation of freedoms,
goods and social opportunities. From this point of view, politics can be defined as that
collective and conflictive action oriented to the construction, maintenance or
transformation of a social order. Said confrontation requires society to reach an
agreement on the principles of justice that should regulate said construction. It is the
conflict, in a context of growing individual and social needs and scarce resources, that
obliges the members o f society to reach a consensus on the priority in the satisfaction o f
needs and the distribution of said resources.

Therefore, distribution is not only a

question of economics but one of politics as well. The re-distributive policies that are
carried out in society, are carried out not only through the markets but also through
institutions that, in theory, differ substantially from them.

It is not possible to

understand the nature and the diverse types of economic distribution without
understanding, at the same time, the functioning o f political institutions and examining
the axiological principle on which said distribution is based.

Jurgen Habermas' theory of communicative action can also provide conceptual
tools for dealing with the problem of the dual constitution of society and its crises. This
author considers society to be simultaneously “system” and “life world”, which makes it
possible to distinguish between systemic integration and social integration. The “life
world” is the concept that makes it possible to observe society from the viewpoint o f the
constitution of social relations on the basis of recognition o f mutual claims of validity

59

of the life plans of the actors that intervene in a situation, based on dialogue and
argumentation (Habermas, 1987: 167 ft). It is on the basis of the life world dynamics
that culture and society are generated and the personality o f individuals is formed.
These elements, which are closely linked in primitive and traditional societies, undergo a
process of increasing differentiation in modem and contemporary societies.

In

synthesis, social integration is produced in the life world and in the ways in which social
action is integrated by means of a normatively guaranteed consensus and achieved by
means of communication. Society as a system, is constituted by the relations among the
different subsystems that compose it (such as the family, the institutions o f secondary
socialization, the economy, and the State) and the needs for coordination among them
from a center of power or “self-government.” (Ibidem: 161 ff).

This need for

coordination or “systemic integration” is the result of a historical process o f progressive
institutional differentiation o f society. The factor of systemic integration in traditional
societies was the dynastic family, and it is the market and the State in modem and
contemporary societies.

In synthesis,

systemic integration is produced through the

exercise of an external control over social actions that are not coordinated intersubjectively.

After having developed

said concepts, Habermas points out that “the

fundamental problem o f social theory lies in finding the way to satisfactorily connect the
two conceptual strategies involving the ideas of system and life world” (Ibidem: 151),
since a concept of crisis appropriate for the social sciences has to be capable of
establishing the connection between social and systemic integration (Habermas, 1989:
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19). This connection can occur in two different ways. In the first place, the progressive
complexification and diversification o f modem societies has led to a primacy of
technical rationality and bureaucratic-organizative aspects to the detriment of
communicative rationality, which has been “colonized” by the former. The result is a
crisis of legitimacy in which technocracy displaces democracy as a form o f coordination
and adoption o f social decisions. For the purposes of this dissertation, I consider that
one of the manifestations o f this type of crisis is seen in the way the neoliberal
development model was adopted in Latin America in general, and in

Colombia in

particular. Its technical imperatives required that its adoption be done behind the back o f
the different social organizations and political institutions of negotiation and articulation
of interests. This can be interpreted as a divorce between mechanisms for the generation
of consensus and legitimacy and mechanisms for the elaboration and implementation of
macro-economic policies. Consequently, by excluding communicative reason and social
participation from the sphere of macro-economic decisions, which is precisely where the
firm foundations can be laid for a society that is not only democratic but just, a path is
being opened in Latin America to a type of instrumental and technocratic rationale that
is displacing political legitimacy. But, furthermore, the neoliberal model has contributed
to deepening the social inequalities in the region, thus exacerbating the problem of the
lack of social integration. In fact, the Gini coefficient in the region rose from 0.54 in
1982 to 0.58 in 1990 (Londono and Szekely, 1997); and despite the moderate
resumption of economic growth in the region in the mid-1990s, the number of poor
people increased to 210 million, 50 million more than in the critical years of the 1980s
(Korzeniewicz and Smith, 2000; 15). As Boron points out, an
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enduring legacy o f neoliberalism is a society w h o se social integration has
been debilitated by the upsetting im pacts o f unfettered market dynam ics; this
w eakening has crystallized the trem endous cleavages and inequities that
characterize our 'really existin g capitalism' ( . . . ) A 'society' o f this type is a
mere juxtaposition o f 'social universes' and Latin Am erican so cieties are
quickly approaching this. C lasses and social groupings m ay be alm ost
com p letely disconnected and (...) scarcely adequate for the sustenance o f a
dem ocratic order (1998: 57-58).

In the second place, from the viewpoint o f systemic integration, the State has the
responsibility o f articulating the economic, political and sociocultural system. However,
the development of contemporary societies tends toward progressive autonomization and
specialization of the different social systems, especially the economic system that seems
to be gaining ground with globalization in relation to the function of coordination and
social regulation. Given this tendency to autonomous development of the different
systems that make up society,
one can scarcely explain how the political system should be able to integrate
society as a w h ole, even though it is specialized for regulatory activities that
are m eant not on ly to rectify disturbances in functional system s but also to
ach ieve an ‘environm ent-friendly’ coordination am ong system s drifting apart
(H aberm as, 1996: 335-3 3 6 ).

This incapacity of the State to ensure inter-systemic cohesion appears not only as a crisis
of legitimacy but of the rationality of society as a whole as well. The crisis of integration
also occurs when profound political, economic and social changes, disarticulate the
relationships that constitute the societal pattern in such a way that the inter-systemic
coordination of society, and the constitution of intersubjectivity and meaning among the
actors, is made either difficult or impossible.

Finally, the sociocultural system contributes a "legacy of knowledge" to the
integration of society and a set of values and symbols so that the needs of understanding
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and identity o f individuals and groups are covered and ties of solidarity and motivations
for acting in conformity with social norms are produced, and it becomes possible “to
tune individual lives in with the collective forms of life” (Habermas, 1987; 201).
Disturbances of the social integration process translate into loss of meaning and identity
in the sphere of culture; and into anomie in the sphere of society (Ibidem: 203). These
reflections can prove illuminating for an understanding o f societies like those o f Latin
America that have presented tendencies toward social fragmentation since the nineteenth
century due to historical problems in the constitution of their social fabric, and to the
lack of what Gino Germani denominated “the minimum central prescriptive nucleus
sufficient for integration.” (Cordera, 1996:22).

In conclusion, every society presents a tendency to a certain degree of
disintegration, so that it is never possible to consider it absolutely integrated. Therefore,
social integration is a relative concept that has analytical purposes.

There will be

epochs in which the tendency toward social disintegration will be greater or will affect
significant institutional spheres, and others in which said tendency will remain within
restricted limits. Accepting that it is a relative concept, an integrated society can be
defined as one that presents the following characteristics: a) A State with sufficient
capacity to regulate social relations and produce the inter-systemic coordination of
society. Politics is thus the form the social conflict assumes and the role of the State is
to try to maintain the uneasy balance between cooperation and conflict, providing
society with the minimum degree of cohesion required for it to continue to exist. From
this perspective, it is possible to speak of the political integration of society, b) A culture
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consisting o f a set o f values, ideas, symbols and “images o f the world”, that permit
communicaction, intersubjectivity and the attribution o f meaning to social life, c) On the
basis o f said communication and intersubjectivity, a normative structure is produced that
is the result o f a consensus among its members. This consensus is the source o f
legitimacy and o f the binding force o f the norms. The attitudes and expectations o f the
members o f society correspond to the normative structure because they have internalized
or socialized it. From this perspective, it is possible to speak o f social integration, d) The
different elements o f state regulation, culture and the normative structure are articulated
and there is sufficient compatibility among them to ensure social coordination and the
peaceful solution o f social conflicts and tensions. Said articulation can be denominated
the societal pattern, defined as “a set of relations integrated into the state and the statist
historical cycle, and particularly the network o f political relations that organizes the style
of economic development and the cultural self-understanding o f the era and o f its social
potentialities for change” (Calderon and Dos Santos, 1995: 35).

The concepts o f society and social integration have traditionally referred,
explicitly or implicitly, to human groups or communities, considered from the cultural
viewpoint as nations, settled in spatially delimited territories, and
cohesion through the Nation-State8.

given political

Considering this, it is possible to affirm that

globalization redefines society and sharpens the tendencies to its disintegration, since it
implies a progressive expansion o f the forms o f social relation and organization, and the
8 Although this is the main meaning that has been given to the term society, I am aware that there are
“nation-societies" that struggle to become “nation-states”, as in the case o f the Palestinian people, or that
have no interest in doing so, as in the case o f the Gypsy people. However, both cases considered an
"exception to the rule".
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expansion o f the geographic spaces in which they take place. As Giddens states, it is a
question o f “the intensification of the social relations throughout the world by which
distant places are interconnected, in such a way that local events are configured by
events that occur at a distance o f many kilometers or vice versa” (1993. 68). All this
implies, in turn, a crisis o f politics, because if this is the form that the cohesion o f
modem societies assumes, upon expanding the geographical and cultural “coordinates”
o f society, the possibilities o f coordination and regulation o f social relations from a
spatially delimited political center, are seen to be seriously impaired.

2.3.2. The W eakness of the State
As has already been said, society is not only a cooperation network, as Axelrod supposes
(1984), but a network o f social conflicts and tensions as well, that need to be mediated by a
relatively autonomous power, in order to ensure the continued existence and reproduction
o f the society itself. From this perspective, the role o f the State is to maintain the uneasy
balance between cooperation and conflict, so that society achieves the minimum degree of
cohesion needed for its continuity. As Norbert Lechner states,
p o litics is a co n flict o f particularities, and the State is a form o f generality.
Said distinction d oes not im ply separation or absorption. W e cannot think o f
p olitics w ithout referring to a form that synth esizes so c iety, nor can w e think
o f the State w ithout referring to a d iv id e d so ciety (1 9 8 6 , p. 30).

Therefore, the State can be defined as the institution which, by means of a monopoly of
the use of legitimate force and o f the production o f regulations (Weber, 1968), integrates
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both the society and the national territory, mediates social conflicts, and ensures the
integration and systemic coordination o f society.

Many definitions o f the state reduce it to its material expression, i.e., to the state
apparatus, to a set of organizations and institutions such as the three branches of
government and administrative bureaucracy. However, the state is a specific form
assumed by social relations in modem societies; that form o f relationship that divides
society in both the public and the private sphere. This division, by placing the public
sphere above the private sphere, makes possible the cohesin of society.

Said social

relation crystalizes in specific institutions and organizations that, by means of a
monopoly on the legitimate use o f force and production o f regulations, (Weber, 1968),
integrates society and national territory, mediates social conflicts and ensures the
integration and systemic coordination of society. This fact generates a political culture that,
in general terms, is shared by all members of a cohesioned society (Elias, 1987).

To define the State in this way, i.e., as the cohesive factor in society, does not no
necessarily imply ignoring the role of the state in the constitution of social domination, and
more specifically in class domination. And it is precisely this domination, made possible,
among other things, by the splitting of society into the public and private sphere, that could
be considered a specific form assumed by social cohesion. In this respect, it is illustrative
to make a brief reference to the Marxist debate about the State. At the risk of simplifying
a complex debate, the multiple Marxist concepts of the state9 can be reduced to two

9 A good synthesis o f these concepts is found in Gold, Clarence and Wright (1975).
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major tendencies: a) that which conceives of the state as an instrument of class
domination, a reflection of the contradictions originating in the economic structure of
society, where classes are pre-constituted as social subjects (Marx, 1973; Lenin, 1978;
and Miliband, 1970; among others); b) that which considers the State to be an extraeconomic instance that makes it possible to constitute the economic and political
conditions, including among the constitution of classes as social subjects, necessary for
the production and reproduction o f capital (Poulantzas, 1969; and Offe, 1993; among
others). From the former perspective, politics, understood as the State, appears as a
mere reflection or epiphenomenon, as an “illusory community”, as a product of
alienation, of a “false consciousness,” that prevents class domination from being
perceived as such. From the latter perspective, the State is characterized by its “relative
autonomy” with respect to economic relations and as the necessarily political moment of
the constitution of class domination. The nature o f capitalist production and circulation,
and that of the social classes is affected by structural tendencies that impede their
reproduction, such as the tendency toward the fragmentation of the dominant class, and
toward the unity o f the dominated class (Poulantzas, 1979: 152-194), or the tendency
toward the “de-mercantilization” of social relations, especially, of the labor force (Offe,
1993: 35-64). Thus the need for State intervention to counteract said tendencies.

To these theoretical concepts of the State can be added the classic liberal and the
Hegelian models. For the former, the State arises from the consideration of a pre-social
situation, the state of nature, a situation of anarchy and lack of personal security, which
justifies the collective configuration of a regulatory power, the legitimacy o f which
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originates in a value judgment, according to which individuals accept the authority of
the State because it is the most rational institution possible for avoiding a social
condition o f non-regulated conflict, in which individual liberty, property, and
conservation would be impossible (Hobbes, 1987). From an anti-liberal perspective like
that o f Hegel, the State appears as “the moment of ethicity”. That is to say, the State is
the institution that returns the individual's collective dimension, social nature, broken by
the rise of civil society, i.e., the market economy, and liberal individualism. In this
respect Hegel states:
if the State is confused with C ivil Society and its determination is placed on
the security and protection o f property and personal liberty, it is done in the
in terest o f in dividu als as such, the ultimate end in w hich they are unified; and
in that case, to be a mem ber o f the State falls within individual caprice. But
the State has a very different relation with the individual; the individual as
such has objectivity, truth and ethics only as a m em ber o f the State, since the
State is objective spirit (H egel, 1955: 2 0 8 , § 258).

This brief account o f different conceptions o f the State, permits us to conclude that since
from Hobbes to Hegel to Poulantzas, from the right to the left, the State has been
considered an important factor in the constitution and cohesion o f society. Something
different is the value judgment that each theoretical current makes regarding this
function of the State, and from which political strategies tending to its preservation or
suppression can be derived.

Now, the State in the Third World in general and in Latin America in particular,
it does not have sufficient autonomy to constitute a generic form o f society, so as to
provide the minimum degree of cohesion and mediate its conflicts, which aggravates the
political integration crisis, the expressions of which are violence and anomie. Said
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debility refers to the incapacity o f the State to structure the social totality, monopolize the
use

o f violence, constitute social subjects, regulate their relations and mediatetheir

conflicts. With reason Habermas says that
the Third World is com posed nowadays o f territories where the state
infrastructure and the m onopoly o f violence have been so w eakly formed
(Som alia) or have crumbled so much (Y ugoslavia), where social tensions are so
strong and the thresholds o f tolerance in the political culture so low that indirect
powers o f a mafia type [as in Colombia, adds the author o f this dissertation] or
o f a fundamentalist nature shake the internal order.
These societies are
threatened by national, ethnic or religious processes o f decom position” (1999:
168).

Precisely because o f this situation, an extensive bibliography has appeared in the
last two decades, stemming mainly but not exclusively from the field of international
relations, and dedicated to analyzing the phenomenon of the weakness of the State in the
Third World.10 Joel S. Migdal, for example, has paradoxically characterized Third World
countries as “strong societies”, characterized as they are by the persistence of noncapitalistic forms of relation and social control, that have impeded the formation o f a
centralized state capable of achieving “the successful subordination of people’s own
inclinations of social behavior or behavior sought by other social organizations in favor of
the behavior prescribed by state rules” (1988: 22).

The result is a situation of social

fragmentation that impedes the rise of “strong states” with sufficient capacity to integrate
society and to centralize its regulatory function. Migdal argues that social fragmentation
and the primacy of local political bosses in turn impede the development of a rational
bureaucracy and facilitate the control of local public institutions by personal interests,
which leads to the displacement of general State policies by partial interests of society.

10 A good synthesis o f this bibliography can be found in Mason (2001).
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Barry Buzan (1991) considers the State to be constituted by the relation among
three elements: a) state institutions, composed by law,

government, and public

administration; b) the idea o f the State itself; and c) the physical base, composed o f the
population, understood as national community, the territory and natural resources.
According to Buzan, the strength or weakness of states, depends on the type and degree
o f cohesion among these elements (Ibidem: 65), which vary from State to State and from
region to region.

In the countries of the Third World, state institutions lack the

necessary capacity to establish legitimate authority and to provide safety and public
services for the population. In relation to the idea o f the State, Buzan defines it as “what
binds the people into a sociopolitical and territorial entity” (Ibidem:70), the main sources
o f which are found in the nation and the organizing ideologies. However, in Third World
countries, the unity o f the national community is often affected by ethnic confrontations
and the integrity of the territory threatened by secessionist movements or by territorial
conflicts with neighboring countries. In synthesis, according to Buzan, weak states are
characterized by the incapacity o f state institutions to provide safety and welfare for the
population, the lack o f an identity and national unity; the scarce legitimacy o f political
authority, and the lack of consensus with respect to the basic norms that regulate the
social process (1991: 97-110).

With certain exceptions, concern for the problem of the weakness of the state and
civil society in Latin America has been absent from comparative political studies.
Nevertheless, in recent studies, this topic has begun to encounter a certain space for
reflection. In this respect, Boron points out,
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the problem s o f governance within new dem ocracies and w eak states are
com pounded in Latin A m erica by the deep, long, and w ide ‘fault lin es’
running through the very fabric o f their civ il societies. A s w e have seen,
dem ocratic states have to face a w h ole series o f problem s that in th em selves
raise serious concerns regarding the possibilities o f effectiv e dem ocratic
governance. T he situation grow s w orse w hen these governm ents have to
deal with dual and fragmented civil societies— and with large m asses o f
marginal people unable to be incorporated by the capitalist econ om y” (1998:
59).

The Latin American State is one whose formative process combined traditional
and modem forms and institutions of social relation. This makes it possible to analyze
and understand the failures o f many of the policies developed by the States of the region,
especially those o f “Cepal” or o f “developmental" inspiration”, the purpose o f which
was to strengthen their interventionist or regulatory capacity to constitute integrated,
democratic, rational, and capitalistic societies. From this perspective, it is also possible
to understand patrimonialist and clintelist nature of the Latin American states, which has
led not only to the lack of autonomy with respect to civil society, but also to its true
privatization.

Thus, contrary to what many hold today, an urgent task that Latin

American societies should undertake, is not so much that o f privatizing their states, as
one of constituting their public character. In the face of this situation, the neoliberal
positions, that maintain that the social and economic problems of the region are due to
“a large, pachyidermous state”, must be taken with reservations. It is not a question of
whether the State should be large or small. The discussion in the region should not
revolve around the size of the state but rather the type o f state, i.e., a (relatively)
autonomous, effective, legitimate State, with the capacity to achieve social cohesion,
social and economic development, equity, and democratization of society. However, the
margin of maneuver within which to construct such a state in Latin America is limited, if
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one takes into account the fact that the forces arising from the globalization process
tend, as already mentioned, to transform the nature, scope, and functions o f the state, and
to debilitate its capacity to achieve the cohesion of society. Thus the crisis of integration
o f Latin American societies has tended to worsen with the economic restructuring
programs underway since the 1980s.

2.3.3. Social Democracy and M arket Economy:
Two Social Projects in Conflict

In the past decade Latin America has faced a crisis of political and social integration
caused by the impossibility o f reaching a consensus on the basic principles of social
order, among other things. In this respect, two different societal projects confront each
other: one which has arisen from the democratization processes the region has
experienced since the 1980s expressed in a series of constitutional reforms, and another,
based on the neoliberal model of opening and internationalizing the economy. There are
multiple clashes between these two projects, regarding both conceptualization and
implementation that will inevitably lead to crises soon or later.

As a consequence of the democratization processes, many Latin American
countries radically reformed their political constitutions: Ecuador did so in 1978, Chile
and Brazil in 1989, Colombia in 1991, Paraguay in 1992, Peru and Bolivia in 1993,
Argentina, Guatemala and Nicaragua in 1994, and Venezuela in 1999.

Although

Mexico did not have a radical constitutional reform, it did introduce some notable
reforms in its constitution.

These constitutional reforms share elements in common,

such as the recognition of new social rights; the expansion of political participation and
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the introduction o f mechanisms o f direct democracy, strengthening of the congress and
the systems of checks and balances among the branches of government, reforms of the
administration of justice and the central banks, etc. (Gargarella, 1997).
The inclusion o f new economic and social rights and the expansion of political
participation have been the most significant elements of said reforms. The Brazilian
Constitution includes among social and economic rights the establishment o f a detailed
series o f labor rights and guarantees, among which figure unemployment insurance,
workers' right to participate in the firm's profits, in determining the workday, etc. The
Constitution of Argentina, in addition to expressly establishing a series of economic and
social rights, incorporates into its text a series o f international treaties signed by this
country, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties o f Man, and the Convention on the Rights o f Children, among
others. But according to analysts, Colombia is the country that represents the greatest
advance in recognition of social rights (Dugas, 1993: 28). The Colombian Constitution
of 1991 not only establishes the traditional or "first generation" civil and political rights,
but also considerably increases the number of "second generation" or economic, social,
and cultural rights. Among these are the right to protection of the family, to social
security, to health services, to decent housing; to education and culture; the rights of
women, children, adolescents, the elderly, the handicapped, and workers. It also
recognizes collective or "third generation" rights, including the right to a healthy
environment, to public space and to quality in services the state offers to the community.
Finally, the new constitution established powerful judicial tools to enforce said rights,
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such as the right to judicial tutelage and to popular actions, that have had profound
repercussions on the social development o f Colombia.

In relation to the system of checks and balances, it is necessary to say that a
phenomenon characteristic of Latin American political regimes is their

accentuated

presidentialism (Linz and Valenzuela, 1994), due not only to a strong centralism
inherited from the era of Spanish colonization, but also to the legacy o f various decades
o f authoritarian governments.

Therefore, the Constitutional Reforms of recent years

were oriented to re-establishing the balance between the executive and the legislative
branches o f government, reducing the powers of the former and strengthening the
political control powers of the latter. With the exception of the constitutional reforms of
Ecuador y Peru, where the executive branch was strengthened, various South American
countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile introduced
measures that tend to re-establish the balance of powers. In the last country in mention,
for example, the president lost many o f faculties granted in Pinochet's Constitution.
With the constitutional reform of 1989 the Chilean president lost the power to dissolve
the parliament, to send whoever opposed the regime into exil, and to restrict liberties and
basic civil rights. In fact, even the institutions designed by the dictator to maintain the
power and influence of the armed forces after the transition to the democratic regime
lost part of their initial force. Likewise, the Constitutional Reform of 1992 in Paraguay
reduced the powers attributed to the executive during the dictatorship o f General
Stroessner.

In Colombia, the constitutional reform o f 1991, among other things,

strengthened the political control function of Congress by introducing the impeachment
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and granting the legislature certain powers o f control regarding states o f exception, as
well as in matters such as the economy. En Argentina, the Constitution o f 1994, reduced
the presidential term of office from six to four years.

In recent years, some analysts have begun to speak of the “crisis of
representativeness” of Latin American parliaments and political parties, due partly to the
transformations o f civil society and the rise of new social actors and movements and
partly to the clientelist nature of the political systems of the region. A study done by
Iberobarometro in 1993 and 1994 and analyzed by the Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research o f the University of Connecticut, concluded that in most Latin American
countries “more than 50% o f the population distrusts the congress (with figures close to
80% in Colombia); that 8 in 10 Argentines, Colombians, and Peruvians, and 7 out of
every 10 Mexicans distrust their political parties” (Gargarella, 1997: 986).

For this

reason, many o f the constitutional reforms in the region introduced a series of
dispositions tending to broaden political participation among the population by means of
the introduction o f mechanisms of direct democracy, the elimination of clientelism and
corruption, the improvement of electoral and the representativeness of the congress, and
the rationalization and legitimization of the legislative function (Ibidem: 983, 986-987).

Another important constitutional reform topic in Latin America has been
improvement of the administration of justice, to ensure its independence and increment
its efficacy. The lack of these two characteristics has become an obstacle to full
development of democracy in Latin America, since the State is impeded from
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guaranteeing citizens adequate exercise of their constitutional rights (Fruhling, 1997).
The independence o f judicial power had been lost due to the interference o f military
dictatorships or, in cases like Colombia and Venezuela, due to bipartisan political pacts
that, among other things, pre-established a parity-based distribution of judicial posts
among the two traditional political parties.

For this reason, various countries of the

region (among them, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, Argentina and Mexico)
constitutionally established an institution called the Superior Council o f the Judicature
which constitutes “an intermediate body between judicial power and political power, the
main purpose o f which is to restrict the executive discretionary power in the selection of
new judges” (Gargarella, 1997: 973).

In relation to the effectiveness o f justice,

constitutional reforms in the region introduced the accusatory system through the
creation of prosecutors' offices. This has been complemented through the development
of a series o f programs proposed and financed by international agencies like the World
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Organization o f American States,
as well as the adoption of a series of measures to improve access to justice, to facilitate
its application and reduce the degrees o f impunity (Fruhling, 1997: 242).

Finally, another important dimension of the recent constitutional reforms in Latin
America has been the creation of independent central banks, i.e., subject neither to the
authority of the government nor to the preferences of the voters. Between 1990 and 1995
more than thirty countries in diverse continents carried out constitutional or legal
reforms to increase the independence of said entities (Maxfield, 1999). Brazil inititiated
the process in Latin America in 1980; Chile followed in 1989, Colombia in 1991,
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Argentina and Venezuela in 1992, and Mexico in 1993. According to Maxfield (1997),
this worldwide tendency is due more to the links between the domestic and the
international economy than to strictly internal factors, to the extent that increasing flows
o f international capital have an impact on the public finances and the political and
economic stability of these countries which requires centralized control over the basic
instruments of macroeconomic policy.

Based on the assumption that institutions are crystallizations o f the relations of
force among social actors, it can be said that the reforms have had contradictory
dynamics to the extent that they represent different interests and societal projects, such
as that of social democracy on the one hand and that of neoliberalism on the other. For
example, reforms aimed at strengthening the legislative branch and the mechanisms of
checks and balances clash in many Latin Americans countries with those concerned with
the need to isolate the executive from social and political demands and pressures, in
order to implement economic restructuring policies. In the Colombian case, this
confrontation, among many others, has occurred between the Constitutional Court which has incarnated the aspirations o f social democracy - and the Banco de la
Republica (Colombia’s central bank), which epitomizes the tendencies toward an
autonomous economic system, and isolation of the technocracy from social pressures
and control over macroeconomic policy. As Maxfield, quoting John Freedman, asserts,
the current trend toward CBI [central bank independence] ‘is antithetical to
popular sovereign ty’ because independent central banks and the ow ners o f
m obile capital they essen tially ‘represent’ are usurping national pow er to
‘decide the distribution o f pow er and w ealth .’ ”(1999: 290).
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As will be shown below for the Colombian case, the confrontation between the
institutions mentioned above, has been one o f the most significant expressions o f those
occurring between the two types of societal projects o f contending with each other in
Latin America.

Another point of confrontation is presented in relation to the constitutional
recognition of economic, social and cultural rights o f the population. The effective
exercise of these rights does not depend on their simply being mentioned in a
constitutional charter, but on the establishment of a social order based on distributive
justice, which is opposed by a neoliberal order based on commutative or market-based
justice. Thus it seems that the history of the relations between the state, society, and the
economy, develop in a pendular movement, in which progressive epochs, of greater
displays of public activity in search of a distributive justice, alternates with conservative
periods characterized by inhibition of activity of the State, which becomes a mere
guardian o f order and arbiter of economic activity, so that individuals seek retributive
justice for themselves, through the market. In the period between the post-war and the
early 1970s, the Keynesian model which prevailed in the industrialized countries of the
west, as has already been mentioned, assumed an increase in public function and in the
regulation o f the economic process on the part of the State. In contrast, since the mid1970s, said paradigm entered into a process o f crisis, provoked, according to some
analysts, by the “excesses” committed by the intervention o f the welfare State, the mare
magnum of state regulations and bureaucratization inherent to public activity. These
factors combined to generate the effect of loss of global efficience of the economy.
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For this reason, another paradigm - the neoliberal one - has arisen recent years. In
the economic sphere it postulates reducing state action o f by dismounting the
institutional and productive apparatuses o f the public sector and confiding in the signals
of the market to orient private activity and achieve the optimum allocation o f resources.
Neoliberals thus leave the solution to problems of development and distribution of
income and wealth to the free will o f the market place. In the political sphere, they pose
the need to put limits to the so-called “excesses” of democracy, to the degree in which
political participation and democratic demands have generated an “overload” for
governments, which have led to an "unbalanced" expansion o f public activities to the
detriment o f private initiative, to a disaggregation o f interests, and to the loss o f
governmental authority (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975).

From this perspective, politics is circumscribed to the field of public
management, in which the legitimacy o f the State is understood, once again, strictly in
terms of effectiveness. But it is not enough for state action to be merely effective. For it
to be legitimate, it must also be just - in terms of equity. From this it follows, as Van
Parijs (1992) maintains, that what makes a society just, is, to a great degree, a matter of
distribution: if politics is understood, among other things, as a struggle over the
distribution o f social resources, the market should give way to deliberation, since what it
deals with is the collective and conflictive construction o f order. The main problem that
said construction has to face, although not the only one, is that of the material
reproduction o f society and the participation o f the diverse actors in the social product;
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“therefore the problem is just that political decision on the economic process. It is
precisely that deliberate creation o f the development of society that should be the object
o f a theory o f democracy." (Lechner, 1982: 41-42)

To this notion of politics as deliberation, the neoliberals oppose the idea of the
market as a factor of social integration, to the extent that society is considered the whole
set of acts of exchange, which actually leaves the idea of politics void of content. In
fact, in the opinion of the neoliberals, it is not the democratic decision-making process,
but the market that guarantees good government. They propose, therefore, to increase
the efficience of the system and to substitute politics with economics, or at least to
reduce the field of action of the former. In this way, efficience arises from the need to
reduce the number of decisions of a collective nature regarding the allocation of
resources in society, so that they can instead be made according to the objective and
rational principles that are released through the full force of the laws o f the market.

The appeal to the virtues of the market as a factor of social cohesion, and the
exaltation of economic freedom in opposition to political regulation of the economy,
both basic characteristics of neoliberalism that can hardly be conjugated with the idea of
a more equitable society, have resurrected the topic of justice as a nodal point of
contemporary philosophy and political science. Despite a certain pragmatic trend in
economics and political science, the most fundamental concern o f neoliberals is not
efficience, but freedom. In this respect, it is illustrative to quote Milton Friedman, who
affirms that
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w hat w e have spoken o f from the beginning is freedom. A lthough a certain
num ber o f my propositions had the imm ediate effect o f improving our
econom ic welfare, this is not, to tell the truth, m ore than a secondary
objective in relation to the preservation o f individual liberty (quoted by Van
Parijs, 1992: 187).

Thus, in the present discussion regarding redefinition of the concept o f the
political, a broad range o f positions, from the egalitarianism of Rawls (1971) to the
anarcho-individualism of Nozick are confronted (1990).

The latter, adheres to

libertarianism which affirms the supremacy of particular interests of individuals that owe
nothing to society, since they are considered separately existing realities (Ibidem: 45),
dismissing the fact that what defines society is the interaction among its members. In his
attempt to determine how much space individual rights concede to the State, Nozick
reached the conclusion that anything more than a minimal State, i.e., anything that goes
beyond the simple functions of protection, is an illegitimate State (Ibidem: 287). On the
basis of these affirmations and a concept of retributive justice, Nozick rejects outright
the political nature of the distribution o f social resources and thoroughly disqualifies
collective decision-making regarding the material reproduction of society. For Nozick,
in society
there is no central distribution, no person or group authorized to control all
resources, to jo in tly d ecide h ow they should be distributed. W hat each one
obtains is obtained from others, w ho g ive it in exchange for som eth in g else
or as a gift. In a free society diverse persons control different resources and
new ow nership o f new assets arise from the voluntary actions and exchanges
am ong persons (Ibidem: 153).

Consequently, Nozick does not accept the distributive fiscal policy typical o f the welfare
state, since for him all taxation is equivalent to a system of forced labor. All distribution
that does not adjust to the principle of "to each as he/she chooses and from each as
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chosen" (Ibidem: 163), threatens the freedom o f individuals and affects the efficience of
the exchange o f goods.

Against Nozick and the Neoliberals, it can be argued that the public sphere is
not just the ambit of mercantile exchanges, nor is it reduced to the production of security
and technical decisions. It is also the space of confrontation of diverse social interests, of
state mediation o f conflicts arising there and, therefore, of the construction o f consensus.
The market, per se, does not produce nor does it sustain a social order and, on the
contrary, it presumes a policy o f ordering.

From the other current, Rawls, in his search for a more egalitarian liberalism,
expresses his concern for social and economic inequalities. He maintains that the main
objective o f justice is to constitute the basic structure of society, with which distributive
justice becomes one o f the most important objects of political reflection, since it is
the first virtue o f social institutions, as truth is o f system s o f thought. A
theory, h ow ever elegant and econ om ical, must be rejected or revised if it is
untrue; lik ew ise, laws and institutions, no matter how efficien t and w ellarranged, must be reformed or abolished i f they are unjust (1971: 3).

On the basis o f a complex conceptual and methodological apparatus, framed
within the contractualist tradition, which is not of interest to us here, Rawls elaborates a
notion of justice based on two principles: the first affirms a freedom o f equal citizenship
for all, and predominates over the second, which should inspire the distribution of the
social product. This poses the equality of opportunities and only permits economic and
social inequalities to the extent that they are based on institutions established in such a
way as to achieve the maximization welfare of the least favored
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From this perspective, contrary to that o f Nozick, the political sphere is
converted into the space where distinct concepts o f man and society "intertwine" to
produce a consensus regarding the principles o f justice on the basis o f which the basic
structure

o f society is constituted or reformed (Rawls, 1993). In this way, citizen

participation in the definition o f order generates a political concept o f justice centered on
the problem o f the distribution of goods, which constitutes the only possibility that the
social organization can signify a rational advantage or good for each of its members.

The above references to the positions o f Rawls and Nozick are intended to serve as the
basis for showing the present conflict that the introduction o f neoliberal models produce
in matters o f equity. On the one hand, the degree o f social development in the region
leaves much to be desired and on the other hand, the neoliberals maintain that normative
intervention by the State generates inefficiencies and inhibits the exercise o f individual
liberties. Nonetheless, the construction o f a legitimate and democratic State in Latin
America requires the introduction of policies aimed at the redistribution o f income, for
which the neoliberal adjustments leave little margin for maneuver. Paradoxically,
together with the implantation of neoliberal models, or because of it, a concern for
equity has awakened in the region. The ECLAC, for example, has placed at the
consideration o f its member countries a proposal for the development o f the region in
the 1990s, which, given the painful experiences of the previous decade, attempts to
conjugate “the transformation o f the productive structures o f the region within a
framework of progressive social equity ” (Cepal, 1990: 12). The starting point of said
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proposal is recognition of the fact that the social cost o f the neoliberal adjustments
dramatically affected the most vulnerable strata of the population and, therefore, the
achievement o f solid political, economic and social development of Latin America
demands fulfillment of minimum requirements of equity (Boron, 1998; Cepal, 1994).
For the Colombian case, the concern for equity appears incorporated in the political
Constitution of 1991 (articiles 1 and 334, among others) as one of the principal objetives
of public action. Nonetheless, a neoliberal spirit also impregnates large part o f the
document (articles 333 and 336, among others) as a result of the confrontation between
the social democracy and free market models.

2.3.4. The Neoliberal M odel and its Effects on the Political Regime

The adoption of the neoliberal model o f accumulation in Latin America has also implied
a recomposition of the relations between social classes. To analyze this phenomenon
requires considering this model as something more than a series o f macroeconomic
policy measures, to consider it as a societal project. By a societal project is meant the
concept that the social sectors that aspire to lead the social transformation process have
of the relations between the state, civil society and the economy.

This redefinition of the relations between the different social classes, and
between them,

the State and the economy, implies, in turn, a modification of the

political regime. Most comparative political scientists, consider the regime, i.e., as the
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rules o f the political game, to be separate and distinct from the rules of the economic
game. However, it is possible to consider the regime to be an integral set of rules that
regulate the relations between the state, society, and the economy. The economy and
politics are both social institutions, sets of rules of the game, as North defines them
(1990: 3-4), that shape social interaction, provide a structure for daily life and, therefore,
define and limit the range of actions and choices open to individuals. Profound changes
in the economy or in politics may induce mutual transformations that profoundly alter
social relations and therefore require new rules to regulate them.

Changes in the

accumulation model transform the political regime and generate new rules o f the game
that produce societal transformations and redefine the social actors, their relationships,
and their fields o f action and choice.

Traditionally, the political regime has been defined, in strict terms, as the set of
rules and institutions that regulate the type and number of political actors (generally
political parties), the forms of access to political power (generally competitive
elections), the relations among the branches of government (system o f checks and
balances), and the process of binding public decision-making (Munck, 1996: 3-4). This
definition excludes elements such as non-partisan actors, social classes, economic
interests, and the ideologies o f the actors.

Furthermore, it does not pay sufficient

attention to the “rules o f the game”, i.e., the negotiations or alliances between the actors
and the conditions that facilitate or impede them. Munck excludes, explicitly, from the
concept of regime this type of considerations and rejects alternative definitions, like that
of Michael Mann, that considers the regime as having originated in “an alliance of the
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actors o f ideological, economic and military power, coordinated by the rulers o f the
state” (Mann, 1993: 18-19).

Definitions like the above are reductionist, maintains

Munck, because they conceive of the regime “in terms of its actors and deal with the
institutional rules as epiphenomena.” (1996: 20).

The concept o f regime used in thisw dissertation is closer to that of Mann, since I
consider the rules to originate in an alliance not only among political actors but with
social and economic actors as well. Therefore, I define the political regime as the set of
rules that regulate the relations between social classes and their organizational
expressions and among these and the political parties and the State. The principal
function o f the political regime is to act as a junction between the State and the
economic model, in order to constitute an organizing principle of society, i.e., to act as a
base for undertaking alliances between different social sectors in order to provide
orientation for the social process. The idea of the accumulation model as societal project
and as the set o f rules that regulates the relations between social classes and political
actors, produces consequences for the concept o f “autonomy of the State.” As
traditionally conceived (Poulantzas, 1969; Skocpol, 1985), said autonomy has been
understood as the capacity of the State to distance itself with respect to the partial
interests of civil society. On the contrary, the existence of a societal project requires that
state action be the result of a combination of the internal strength of state institutions and
their articulation with key sectors of civil society that aspire to lead the process o f social
transformation (Evans, 1995). In this sense, the political regime is the link of union
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between the State and the economic development model, and makes it possible either to
undertake the latter as a societal project or to impede its implementation.

To elaborate said conception of the political regime as an organizing principle
of society, it is necessary to draw from Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony. From
his perspective, the ruling class not only exercises domination but also “moral and
intellectual leadership” in society (1971: 57), i.e.,

it is a question of exercising

domination not only by means of force but also by consensus. The contributions of Max
Weber (1968) also help to structure the concept of political regime proposed here, to
the degree that, for said author, the processes of capitalist accumulation require a series
o f cultural conditions relating to the existemce of an ethic of the ruling class, without
which no development is possible. Said leadership and consensus should be obtained
through commitments and reforms in which the interests of different social groups
should be taken into account.

The political regime and the model of accumulation are mutually conditioned.
For this reason, the type of economic model is not neutral with respect to democracy and
respect to the type and the participation of political and economic actors. The model
itself possesses characteristics which generate inclusionary or exclusionary processes.
The ISI was an inclusionary model since it required suitable working and middle classes
not only with technical skills but also with increasing purchasing capacity. For this
reason the institutional expression of such a model was the inclusivionary welfare state
that acted through a series of distributive policies like: a) public health system, b) the
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unemployment insurance system, c) the provision o f financial aid to

low-income

families with dependent children, and d) government promotion o f trade union
organization, among other things. It might be said that these and other related measures
constituted a “social contract” among capital, the State, workers and other social
movements, over wages, working conditions, social benefits and political participation.
To the contrary, the neoliberal model is exclusionary, since it makes it more difficult to
devise and enact a distributive policy. Those tendencies undermine the possibility for
the action of workers and other organized social actors.

Their participation in the

economic process and in the distribution of its benefits progressively loses legitimacy.

The change of economic model invalidates the old agreements between the elites
and the social classes that sustain and make possible the functioning o f the above model of
industrialization by substitution of imports, and imposes the need to generate new
agreements to fit the new correlation of social forces. Nonetheless, the neoliberal model
limits or prevents the possibility of achieving these new agreements among the different
social actors or establishing the leadership of the economic and political elites. This
contradictory dynamics between the lack of functionality of the old agreements and the
structual impossibility o f achieving new ones, aggravates the society's tendency towards
disintegration. This is due to two reasons. In the first place, to the division among the
economic elites due to the opening and internationalization of the economy. The elites
are divided into those who have incorporated technological advances and have
connected to the world's productive and financial circuits, and those less competitive
ones that act on the basis of the national market. While the former advocate free trade
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and the internationalization of the economy, the latter advocate protectionism or gradual
liberalization o f the economy. In the second place, it is to the exclusion of subordinate
social sectors because, among other reasons, o f the reduction of public social spending
and state subsidies and the generation of unemployment. Both dimensions of the
economic restructuring process limit the possibilities o f the elites to form alliances
among themselves and with other social sectors, in order to democratically construct
new rules o f the game to regulate the relations among the economic, social, and political
actors.

2.3.5. Legitimacy Versus Efficiency

The simultaneous processes of democratization and change of the accumulation model
in Latin America engenders a contradiction between legitimacy and economic
efficiency.

Indeed, legitimacy and efficiency are the most important factors of state

activity (O’Connor, 1973; Offe, 1993) and they determine its capacity to integrate
society and distribute its resources. The contradiction lies in the fact that the state must
try simultaneously to fulfill
the conditions in w hich profitable capital accum ulation is possible [and] to
maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that
op en ly uses its coercive forces to help one class accum ulate capital at the
expense o f the other classes loses its legitim acy and hence underm ines the
basis o f its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the n ecessity o f
assisting the process o f capital accum ulation risks drying up the source o f its
ow n pow er, the eco n o m y ’s surplus production capacity and the taxes drawn
for this surplus (Ibidem: 6).

Legitimacy and efficiency determine also the twofold nature of the state’s expenditures,
which may be divided into social capital and social expenses: the former is constituted
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for expenditures required for profitable private accumulation while the latter is
constituted for projects and services
w hich are required to maintain social harmony to fulfill the state’s
‘legitim ization’ function. {. . .) B ecause o f the dual and contradictory
character o f the capitalist state, nearly every state agency is involved in the
accum ulation and legitim ization functions, and nearly every state expenditure
has this tw ofold character (Ibidem: 7).

Adapting O ’Connor’s premises to the Latin American case, the contradiction
between legitimacy and efficiency stems from a democratization process and a new
constitutional order which claims “more state” as a condition to overcome the legitimacy
crisis, and an accumulation model which requires “less state” in order to allow the free
allocation of society’s resources by the market. While neoliberal governments privatize
public enterprises and reduce the public expenditures, the new constitutions increased
the number of public institutions and erected fairness and redistribution as the
cornerstones of the new political and economic order.

However, the final balance

affected this last objective owing to the greater importance attributed to the policy of
recovering the legitimate monopoly on force by the state.

Additionally, an alternative

diagnosis of the efficiency of the Latin American state lies in the fact that, no matter
what its size, its inefficiency originates in the politicians' tendency to take possession of
public resources and offices for their own benefit, owing to the clientelist and
patrimonialist character of the political regime. Rather than be privatized, the Latin
American state should be become “public”.

The contradiction between legitimacy and efficiency is also expressed in the
tension between fiscal policy and social policy, which has the following dynamics: the
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neoliheral adjustments pursue the efficiency o f the state for achieving macroeconomic
equilibrium, specifically for reducing inflation and the fiscal deficit. The search for
those goals implies, among other things, the decrease o f public expenditures, the
introduction of regressive taxation, and the reduction of the real wage. With these
policies the distributive function of the state is severely affected which also affects its
capacity to conciliate the interests of different social actors. This situation engenders a
struggle over distribution and a increasing social polarization o f the population. The
state, with diminished resources, has less capacity to respond to pressure which leads to
the loss o f the state’s legitimacy and the need to

resort to repression and

authoritarianism. Thus, the abandonment o f the interventionist concept in Latin America
has occurred at the expense o f civil rights and democratic warranties. For this reason,
current political-econom ic trends have heightened the importance o f the
so cioecon om ic com ponents o f the equation -market structures- over the
political on es-d em ocratic procedures. This raises the possib ility o f
con flictive situations where the preservation o f market structures is secured
at the expense o f dem ocratic procedures
(V acs, 1994: 68).

In synthesis, I have developed a structural perspective in this chapter. I have
maintained that rational choice theory assumes that choice situations can be extracted
from the historical dynamics of society.

Consequently, actors’ choices are always

implemented within the context o f historic processes which determine their options.
Therefore, analyses o f economic and political transformations in America Latina in the
1990s have to take into account the historical context in which those processes are
embedded.
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I also have maintained that although there is a mutual interaction between agent
and structure at certain junctures the dynamics of social processes surpass actors’
intentions, and that social actors seeking to advance differents societal projects imposes
upon themselves mutual constraints which act as a structural force.

From this

perspective, I showed that in Latin America the decisions made by actors involved in the
economic

liberalization

policy

were

constrained

by

decisions

concerning

democratization policies, and vice versa. At the same time, the structural heterogeneity
and fragmentation that characterize Latin American societies, coupled with globalization
processes in which it is inscribed, affected the course of both societal projects.

I have argued that the structural context of political and economic reforms is
shaped by the interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors. Globalization and the
generalized diffusion of the neoliberal accumulation model were analyzed as exogenous
factors. As endogenous factors, the precarious integration of the Latin American
societies was analyzed, along with their social heterogeneity, state weakness, the conflict
between political and economic restructurings as a societal projects,

the effects of

neoliberal restructuring on their political regimes and finally, the contradiction between
the search for legitimacy and efficiency inherent in both political and economic
restructuring. The interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors has aggravated the
problems o f integration that have historically characterized the region’s societies.
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In the following chapters I will apply such a structural framework to the
Colombian case for analyzing the contradictory dynamics o f political and economic
reforms in the 1990s.

Chapter 3
State, Society, and Political Regime in Colombia

Colombia, like most Latin American countries, is characterized by a weak state and a
fragmented civil society. These historical traits have become even more pronounced
during the 1990s as a consequence of political and economic transformations in the
country. On the one hand, the political system experienced a traumatic process of
constitutional reform designed both to strengthen the state and increase its legitimacy, as
well as to overcome the exclusionary nature of the political regime. On the other hand,
the national economy also made the transition from an import substitution model of
industrialization to a neoliberal model o f economic opening and internationalization of
the economy. The aim o f this process was to increase economic efficiency by reducing
the size of the state and its regulatory function. Regarding this restructuring process, it
is worth asking whether the adoption of the neoliberal has deepened the fragmentation of
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the Colombian society and whether reducing the scope of its intervention works against
the objectives o f strengthening and legitimizing the state.

This two-track restructuring is based upon a contradictory relationship. While
“political opening,” as a result o f the adoption of a new Constitution, has produced
favorable conditions for fostering policies of democratization and social integration,
“economic opening” has counteracted that possibility. This economic process is
exclusionary in social terms, owing to the privatization of state enterprises; bankruptcy
of private enterprises that cannot compete in the international arena; unemployment;
and, the reduction of public social expenditures, among other things.

Furthermore,

these two structural political and economic reform processes, constitute, in turn, two
societal projects promoted by diverse actors and interests. These two societal projects
have confronted each other in Colombia since the early nineties, and neither o f the two
has achieved legitimacy and the political agreements needed to impose themselves and
to promote diverse social interests.

The economic and political restructuring has been accompanied by the severe
crisis of legitimacy and hegemony the Colombian political system has suffered in the
last three decades, as manifested by high levels of violence, a lack of trust in public and
political institutions, and the lack of a ruling class with a societal project comprehensive
enough to integrate the national territory and different social interests. This situation
stems from three factors: the weakness of the state (3.1), a political regime that
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amalgamates premodemity and modernity, which confronts domestic and external forces
towards its full modernizations (3.2), and the fragmentation o f the Colombian elite (3.3).

3.1. The W eakness o f the Colombian State

Colombia's current political crisis is a consequence, among other things, of the
weakness of the state, which can be traced to its historical inability to integrate territory,
establish a legitimate monopoly o f force and production of regulations. If the state is, as
defined in the theoretical framework presented above, the main cohesive factor of
society, it can be said that the Colombian state has failed both to monopolize the use of
force and to integrate the nation's society and territory, thus reducing its possibilities for
mediating and channeling social conflicts and tensions. Said conflicts are therefore
resolved at the margins of public institutions, a situation which gives rise to parainstitutional expressions of power such as paramilitary groups, drug-trafficking mafias,
and guerrilla movements.

As has been established in the theoretical framework, the state is a social
relationship that divides society into a public and a private sphere. Said division is what
makes it possible to establish and exercise domination in society. In turn, a system of
domination presupposes a material basis (territory and economy), an institutional base
(state apparatus), and a symbolic base (national culture).

This triple base forms a

structure capable of building and reproducing the network of modem social
relationships.
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The equivalent of the symbolic element, the concept o f the nation, in classic and
traditional societies was the ethnic group. Nevertheless, the modem concept o f the
nation links ethnic elements to the idea o f a political community whose unity is based on
the integrating function o f an internal market as well as on basic social solidarity. The
modem concept of the nation also supposes the existence of a ruling class that needs to
organize its preponderant role in society on a universal plane, i.e., it has to give its
domination a general form, which implies articulating its own interests with those of
other subordinated social sectors, which is what Gramsci (1971) denominates
hegemony.

Historically, the formation o f the state has been a gradual process of construction
or acquisition of the above-mentioned attributes, in order to exercise domination over
society and the territory in which it is setttled.

These attributes generate the state's

capacity to integrate regions and populations and to create and reproduce certain patterns
of social relations.

This process of state formation has not been free from violence. Nevertheless, it
is necessary to distinguish between two types of violence: that which is exercised in the
process o f constituting the state, and that which arises from precarious constitution of
the state or from the absence of the same in different regions of the national territory. In
relation to the former, authors like Tilly (1992) and Elias (1998) have pointed out that
the process of integrating territories and societies necessarily passes through a periods of
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exercising rough coercion and violence. Elias holds that the processes o f formation o f
the state and construction o f the nation show that
every effort towards greater interdependence, towards closer integration o f
previously independent or less reciprocally dependent human groups,
undergoes a series o f sp ecific conflicts and tensions o f integration, o f
balances, o f pow er struggles that are not accidental but structural
concom itants o f these efforts to achieve greater functional interdependence o f
the ‘parts’ within the w hole (E lias, 1998: 106-107).

The integration achieved by the State (which is basically the triumph of a strong power
over its rivals and the imposition of its own legality as the victor's legality) absorbs
violence or the power to use violence to solve social conflicts, that was diffuse in the
society, and creates an institutionalized, legitimized, centralized and legally regulated
power. Thus there arose a public space that serves as a form of mediation and resolution
of social conflicts and tensions.

Failure to firmly constitute this integration, or to

legitimate it, leaves power in the private sphere, which means that members of society
may resort to the use of force and violence for the solution of conflicts, to the detriment
of basic social cohesion.

In general terms, this has been the process of constitution of the state as an “ideal
type”, based on the European experience of historic formation of the nation-state (Tilly,
1992). Although the formation of the state in Latin America in general, and in Colombia
in particular, has followed a similar pattern, the process has been conditioned by three
factors. In the first place, the legacy o f a colonial past marked by Spanish influence.
From the cultural point of view, this legacy is expressed in the survival of particularism,
localism, nepotism and generally anti-capitalistic values and codes of behavior (Oslak,
1981), i.e., a legacy associated with the survival of a traditional political and social
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order. The successive processes o f capitalist modernization that developed after
independence and until well into the twentieth century became hybridized with these
traditional institutions. In the second place, the process of settlement that originated in
the colony, characterized by the development of enclave economies which made it
possible to link each population to the metropolis through commerce but also resulted in
isolation and the lack of a communications infrastructure among them. Thus, when the
links to the metropolis were interrupted after independence, territorial fragmentation
became even more acute and further hindered the formation of a national market. The
weakness of the Colombian state is partially due to its limited territorial integration that,
even today, characterizes various regions of the country. Thirdly, the lack o f articulation
among the different sectors o f the ruling class, i.e., their inability to constitute a
hegemony. This aspect will be dealt with in section 3.2.1

The regional, political, and social fragmentation of the ruling clase has impeded
the structuring of an effective system o f power and has been one of the causes of its
weak centralization. But this fragmentation has especially contributed to the lack of
leadership and capacity of the elites to “envision” an integrated society, territory, and
economy, i.e., to construct

a real nation-state. This situation is manifest, among other

things, in the elite's incapacity to elaborate a policy o f broadening the internal market, by
means of colonization processes that integrate marginal territories and populations that,
unfortunately, constitute more than half the country.

Those marginal territories,

colonization zones o f the agricultural frontier, are concentrated in the region of
Orinoquia in the eastern part o f the country, with an extension of 310,000 km2 , and in
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the region o f Amazonia, in the southeast, with an extension of 315,000 km2. These
regions are characterized by low agricultural productivity, lack of infrastructure in terms
o f roads and basic services, no integration into national or regional markets, and a
precarious presence of the state. The towns of these regions have a population o f less
than 10,000 inhabitants each and less than one-third reside in the municipal seat. Of the
population of these regions, 75% live in poverty and 40% of the same live in conditions
of misery. The two regions add up to a total extension of 625,000 km2, i.e., 54.7% of the
nation's 1.141.748 km2 surface area.

If other minor zones of internal colonization,

situated in the central and northern regions o f the country, are added, it is no
exaggeration to say that almost 60% of Colombian territory is composed of zones that
are either not integrated or precariously integrated into the economic, political and social
development of the country (Instituto Geografico Agustin Coddazzi, 1996; Echandia
Castilla, 1999).

As one author has pointed out, “Colombia is a country o f permanent
colonization” (Bolivar, 1999:34), but in the twentieth century this has been more the
result of spontaneous uprooting of populations from the different regions, for political or
economic reasons, than the product of any deliberate territorial and socioeconomic
development policy on the part of the state and the ruling class.

It is precisely this

circumstance and the failure to carry out an agrarian reform, which has been postponed
ever since 1936 because of the lack o f political will among the elites, that have
generated "empty spaces" in Colombia.

These prove to be fertile ground for armed

violence, since within them
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there exists a population ready to resort to armed opposition, produced by a
flood o f heterogeneous colonization in which very different regional and
ethnic groups converge (...) that constitute very diverse subcultures.
Furthermore, the presence o f the state is precarious and alm ost entirely
limited to repressive control o f conflicts due to the fact that the traditional
bipartisan system never managed to monopolize the expression o f political
and social struggles in these areas as it did elsewhere. On the contrary, these
regions have been the scenario o f a tradition o f protest dating back to the
beginning o f the 20th century that has led the population to identify with
groups that confront both the State and the traditional bipartisan system.
(Gonzalez, Fernan, 1997:93).

The lack of effective institutional presence of the state in the different regions of
the country contradicts the vision of the Colombian state as a monolithic entity, the
product “of a globalizing and totalizing national history, whose validity collapses when
one takes into account the particularity of a regional life” (Uribe de Hincapie and
Alvarez, 1987: 13). As an indicator o f such a lack of state presence, it can be mentioned
that 86% of total public expenditures in 1995 was spent by the central government and
only 14% by departmental and local governments. Of the total amount spent by the
central government, more than 38% was invested in Bogota and only 5.8% in Orinoquia
and Amazonia (Fundacion Social, 1998, p. 155), which are colonization areas that are
totally marginalized from socioeconomic development efforts and plagued by social
conflict and by a high degree of guerrilla, paramilitary and drug-trafficking activities. In
addition, one might note that 39% of the Colombian population inhabits 808
municipalities which represent 77% of the total number of Colombian municipalities,
and are in turn classified from a socioeconomic development point of view, as
precarious, fragile or incipient (Ibidem, p. 395).

The incapacity of the present ruling class to carry out a policy of national
integration contrasts with the successful processes of territorial integration and social
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cohesion developed during the second half o f the 19th and beginning of the 20th century,
as a product o f a vision of the elite. I refer to the Antioquefio colonization that was
fundamental in the constitution of the culture and the economy of the coffee-growing
region which, until just recently, was the motor force o f the Colombian economy since it
permitted the accumulation o f capital needed for the industrialization of the country. In
the mid-19th century, the present coffee-growing region was an uncultivated jungle area
in the southwestern portion of the country. Although its colonization was not free of
violence and unexpected events, the decided support of the Antioquia’s commercial and
political elite, facilitated a significant agricultural, commercial and demographic
development of the coffee-growing region (Brew, 1977; Palacios, 1980b). In the second
half of the nineteenth century, the merchants of Medellin (the state of Antioquia’s
capital) acquired large extensions of land in the southwestern part of the state, fomented
immigration, and donated lands to those who were willing to work on the construction of
roads to connect this region with the capital of the department, to work in agriculture
and mining, or to found settlements (Brew, 1977: 176-177).

The leadership of the elite and the importance that coffee acquired as an export
product made this one of the most highly integrated regions of the country from the
economic, political, and social points of view. This integration was expressed in a series
of

organizations and institutions, such as the coffee-growers committees that

coordinated and promoted coffee-growing activity at the local, departmental and
national levels through the powerful Federation National de Cafeteros.

This

integration established ties of solidarity, symbols and ways of life that produced the

101

“coffee culture,"

which has played a key role in creating a sense o f a Colombian

nationality (the national pride associated with the idea that Colombia produces the best
coffee in the world, the internationally projected image o f the Colombian peasant in the
figure of “Juan Valdes”). However, it is necessary to say that this integration has begun
to erode recently because of the crisis of the coffee economy induced by the opening of
the economy and the global economic conditions. These developments no longer favor
worldwide pacts and producers' cartels regarding the commercialization of primary
products, which had been crucial to the success of Colombian coffee-growing activity.
That crisis has eroded the quality of life of coffee-growing peasants and coffee-growers
institutions' chances of maintaining this model of integration.

This situation has

expelled peasants towards the current areas of spontaneous colonization, where social
cohesion is either lax or non-existent and plantations of coca and poppy abound in a
generally illegal economy.

If the state is defined as a social relationship and as a set of institutions and
mechanisms that make it possible, one could say that to a certain extent the Federation
de Cafeteros and its coffee-society project has been a state. In fact, there are authors
who consider it to be a para-state (Escobar, 1995). Although there are those who adduce
that precisely because of this the Federation de Cafeteros has helped to impede the
formation of a true state in Colombia, the purpose of these reflections is to illustrate how
the current ruling class has failed to construct a nation-state in the current colonization
zones, due to its lack of long-term vision and its inability to integrate society and
territory.
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The Colombian bipartisan regime has also contributed to the weakness o f the
state.

In this respect, Fem&n Gonzalez (1997) maintains that the weakness o f the

Colombian state is due to the early rise o f traditional political parties at the end of the
first half o f the 19,h century", a very difficult initial period in the process o f forming the
Colombian state.

Parties, the Conservative and Liberal, acted as a factor o f social

integration at that time and promoted the formation o f social identity on the basis of
patronage and personal loyalties, thus preventing the establishment o f a direct
relationship between state and citizens. The weakness of the state became even more
visible during the second half o f the twentieth century, as a result of the crisis o f parties
and the erosion of their central role in Colombia's political and social life after the end o f
the National Front12 (1958-1974).

Paul Oquist (1978) maintained that throughout the nineteenth century the
Colombian state was very weak and social integration was achieved through strong noncapitalistic social structures and non-state forms o f social control.

This situation

changed during the first four decades o f the twentieth century when, according to
Oquist, the Colombian state achieved a considerable degree of strength and ability to
integrate and regulate society.

However, during the 1940s and 1950s, the political

struggle between Liberals and Conservatives for control o f exclusive access to state
power, along with profound changes in the structure of classes and emergence o f social

11 The Liberal and Conservatives parties were founded in Colombia in 1848 y 1849 respectively
12 The National Front was an agreement made in 1957 between the Liberal and Conservative parties to
bring an end to a long period o f extremely violent confrontations (1946-1957) for the control o f the state
apparatus. The agreement provided for the two parties' alternation in power and equal distribution o f
government jobs between them over a period o f sixteen years. See Hartlyn , 1988; Leal, 1986).
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conflicts, generated a situation o f violence which undermined the previous strengthening
o f the state to the point o f partial collapse, especially in regions with the most acute
social contradictions.

Contrary to Oquist, Bejarano and Segura (1996) consider that the state underwent
selective strengthening during the National Front period due to increased public
spending in three sectors o f the executive branch. The average percentage o f total public
spending from 1957 to 1974 was 28.6% in the social sector, 25.9% in justice and
security, 20.3% in infrastructure, and 20.88% in public administration (Ibidem: 14).
According to those authors, the process consolidated the executive branch and public
administration at the expense o f the legislative branch, whose functions and controls
were clearly diminished vis a vis the former. Nonetheless, this selective strengthening
does not seem so clear, as these same authors recognize, if various aspects are taken into
account. In the first place, the growth o f social spending (education, health, housing,
and agriculture), contrasts with the marginality and extreme poverty o f large sectors of
the Colombian population during the period considered, as pointed out by various
analysts (Urrutia, 1984). At the same time, that increase coincided with increased social
protests during the National Front, which rose from 46 in 1958 to a total of 295 in 1974,
with a notorious rise to 539 in 1971 (Archila, 1997:16). This would suggest that the
increased spending was due more to the pressure exerted by these social struggles than
to a deliberate policy oriented to strengthen the state and social integration, or that social
spending was diverted to other sectors, inefficiently allocated or that it “did not grow at
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the rhythm o f the social needs o f a country that was growing and becoming transformed
at dizzying speed” (Bejarano and Segura, 1997: 16). In the second place, increased
public spending in the areas of justice and security does not seem to have been as clear
as the authors hold, since public spending in those sectors declined from 28% in 1958 to
20.57% in 1974. The administration o f justice was the “Cinderella” o f the state for a
long time, a fact that has contributed significantly to the deterioration o f public order
ever since the National Front period. This situation is reflected in an increased rate of
impunity that rose from 84% en 1975 to 95% in 1992 (Montenegro, Posada y Piraquive,
2000: 99).

Investment in justice only began to increase in the early nineties when

aggravated violence and profound deterioration of public order made it imperative to do
so. In the third place, public spending on infrastructure does not seem to sustain the idea
o f selective strengthening of the state. That spending also diminished throughout the
period studies by Bejarano and Segura, since it fell from 28.3% in 1958 to 13.12% in
1974. This situation is grave if one considers the fact that Colombia is a country with
serious deficiencies regarding the integration o f its territory and its national market,
precisely because o f the weakness o f the state.

Although there is no sound empirical evidence for Bejarano and Segura's
argument and despite the fact that they do not consider other important dimensions of
the concept o f the state such as the cultural, political, economic, and territorial ones, one
can accept for the sake o f the discussion that a certain increase in public spending and
rationalization of public administration implies a partial strengthening of the state.
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Indeed, during the 1960s and 1970s the National Front governments revitalized the
policies o f modernization and rationalization of state and public administration which
had been interrupted during the violent period of the 1940s and 1950s. However, this
process was undermined by a series o f other factors such as the exacerbation of
clientelism and patrimonial ism as a consequence of the exclusionary power-sharing
arrangement between the Liberal and Conservative parties, the rise and entrenchment of
drug-trafficking, the strengthening of guerrilla groups and organized crime, the growth
of informality and illegal forms of capital accumulation, and increasing colonization of
agricultural and economic frontier zones without due planning, orientation and
integation into the national market and institutions. Therefore, the relative advances
achieved in terms of the state’s capacity to regulate society, and to mobilize and allocate
resources practically collapsed during the 1980s and 1990s.

In addition to the Colombian state's inability to integrate the territory, another
important aspect of its weakness is its inability to administer justice and provide security
for its citizens. The judicial system's capacity to resolve conflicts among citizens is
very limited. According to the Colombian Department of Planning the rate of impunity
in 1994 was 97%, while a criminal court judge produces only 15 sentences per year, i.e.
little more than one a month (Montenegro, 1994: 38). That year there was a backlog of
2,000,000 cases in criminal matters and 1,800,000 cases in civil and economic matters
without solution (ibidem). For the same year, there were 196 police for every 100,000
inhabitants in Colombia, while smaller countries like Uruguay and Peru had 767 and 350
respectively (Ibidem: 41). Social conflicts thus tend to be solved at the margin of public
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institutions by the guerrilla, paramilitaries, drug trafficking mafias and other forms o f
private justice and defense.

Economic studies have appeared recently on the situation o f justice and violence
in Colombia, that reject the weakness o f the state as an explanatory variable, considering
it a vague concept that does not withstand “either a serious empirical analysis or a
minimimum contrast with reality” (Montenegro, Posada and Piraquive, 2000: 85 and
93). Instead, they consider the causes of violence in Colombia to be associated with the
rise and strengthening o f drug-trafficking and organized crime, the expansion o f the
illegal economy, and the existence o f areas o f colonization with abundant economic
resources such as oil, bananas, gold, and emeralds.

All o f this made possible and

increased criminality, which, in turn, led to the collapse o f criminal justice (Gaitan,
1995; Rubio, 1999; Montenergo, et. al., 2000). Although these authors are correct in
pointing to the above-mentioned factors as causes o f violence, the strictly quantitative
view of the phenomenon, typical o f the economic bias, leads them to underestimate the
institutional, political and cultural dimensions. They do not consider the fact that the
administration o f justice is a function of the state that has traditionally been neglected in
Colombia, and that the economic and social exclusion, the lack o f territorial integration
and development of the internal market (fundamental elements of the state), propitiate
processes of spontaneous and disordered colonization, with uprooted populations, in
which the exploitation o f natural resources foments and strengthens criminality.
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By and large, the development o f para-institutionality is a result o f the weakness
o f the state that is facilitated by geographic complexity o f territory; scarce or non
existent communication, transportation, education and health infrastructure, and the
limited presence o f administrative, police and judicial authorities. The gap left by the
state is filled by clientelism, drug-trafficking mafias, guerrilla movements, and groups
dedicated to private justice and defense.

The last of these constitute an interesting

symbiosis of social relations: powerful regional interests in search o f the security the
state fails to provide as protection against delinquency or guerrilla excesses, ally
themselves with some sectors o f the military and drug-traffickers to fight a common
enemy. It is the guerrilla itself and its supposed sympathizers or supporters which are
defined ambiguously to encompass intellectuals, teachers and professors, human rights
defenders, and civic leaders.

Such a strategic alliance has engendered a spiral o f war,

terror, massacres and social uprooting, and a “culture” o f intolerance, violence and
exclusion. This “culture” pervades the ways in which the population o f a weak state and
a fragmented civil society solves its conflicts.

Since the 1980s all those factors have created a situation o f social anomie
characterized by violence and the systematic violation o f almost all norms o f social
coexistence. As I have argued (Oijuela, 1990), the catalyst of this crisis has been drugtrafficking, which has exacerbated all its dimensions. The weakness o f the state and the
absence of public authorities and development policies in much o f Colombian territory
have spurred the expansion of the drug-trafficking cartels.

Supported by unlawful

forms of capital accumulation, they challenge the precariou s institutional order and
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through corruption and violence they seek political, economic, and social insertion into
Colombian society.

In their struggle against legality they contribute to the

decomposition of the state and society.

The incapacity of the elites to integrate the national territory and to assume
leadership in society, the state's inability to administer justice, the increasing weight of
the economy and illegal activities in Colombian society and culture, the anomie and
deterioration of the social fabric, have given certain authors grounds on which to
characterize Colombian culture as a “mafia culture” (Garay, 1999). This culture has
displaced the culture of work and productive investment, which has led to the “deindustrializacion” of the country.

According to Gomez Buendia, one of the

characteristics of Colombian society is the weakness of public rationality, which is
topped by private rationality, understood as
individual creativity, diversity, imagination, ingenuity, the inexhaustible
tenacity o f Colom bians; but also their difficulty in organizing th em selves to
undertake co llective projects so as to resolve the m ost essential public
problems, (beginning with peaceful coexisten ce and respect for the country's
institutions - first and forem ost, the la w -) (1999: 19).

3.2. Political Regime as an Amalgam of Prem odernity and M odernity
and its Limits in a Global W orld
According to Weber, historically the development of the modem state began at the
moment in which the prince expropriated the bearers of administrative, fiscal and war
mechanisms and concentrated all power in himself (1997: 1059-1060).

If, as Weber

says, a characteristic of political modernity is the separation of state officials from the
resources with which they administer society, then we can say that in the Third World in
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general, and in Colombia in particular, that separation and, therefore, modernity, has
only been produced partially and, in any case, not fully produced. This can lead as to
affirm that patrimonialism and clientelism are typical o f Third World regimes.

Furthermore, as mentioned above in the theoretical framework, the legacy o f “the
colonial and traditional past in Third World societies reinforced non-capitalistic forms of
social control and socio-political relations, impeding the formation of a centralized state
able to achieve “successful subordination of the people's own inclinations of social
behavior. . . in favor of behavior prescribed . . . by rules” (Migdal, 1988: 22). The result
is a social fragmentation that impedes the emergence of “strong states” with sufficient
capability to integrate society and centralize its regulatory function.

This social

fragmentation and the political primacy of local and regional strongmen prevent, in turn,
the development of a rational bureaucracy and facilitate the control of local institutions
by personal interests, which leads to the displacement o f general state policies by partial
interests. From this perspective, it can be said that Colombia’s armed conflict has to do,
in large part, with the state’s incapacity to predominate over local interests in order to
address historical problems related to the redistribution of land an the integration of
territory. These ideas from Migdal must be complemented with those o f Gamarra
(1994), who has referred to the contemporary Latin American regime as a hybrid given
that it combines, on the one hand, democracy and authoritarianism, and on the other
hand, neo-liberal technocracy and “patronage” in the decision-making process.

Drawing on Weber, Migdal, and Gamarra, one can say that the modernization of
Colombian society can be viewed as an unfinished process if one takes into account that
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both the legacy o f social and territorial fragmentation of the colonial past (Palacios,
1986; Pecaut, 1987), the process o f industrialization that occurred during the first half of
the twentieth century, and the National Front pact from 1958 to 1974, generated a social
and political hybrid of modernity and premodemity. Indeed, the old and bloody struggle
over hegemony from the 1940s to 1950s, between the conservative agrarian-based
faction of the elite, and the liberal pro-modernization faction, was solved by means o f a
mutually beneficial covenant that appeased both sides. Although priority was given to
the modernization and industrialization of Colombian society, the traditional sector was
able to maintain some privileges based on a partial continuity of traditional society.
That situation helps to explain the persistent failure of attempts at agrarian reform, why
the large rural landowners have paid low taxes, and why many o f the political
relationships in Colombia have a clientelistic character. Politically, the pact included the
alternation of Liberal and Conservative Parties in government, and equal distribution of
positions in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches (Leal, 1984). The
arrangement has consequently been labeled as a “consociational regime” (Hartlyn,
1988). Although the National Front marked an end to the political violence o f the 1940s
and 1950s, and for some years promoted stability of the political regime, it established
the basis for yet another crisis whose principal effects were: a) exclusion of new social
and political

forces which arose due to the process o f modernization and

industrialization, b) exacerbation of clientelism, c) blurring of ideological and
programmatic boundaries between the two parties, d) incapacity to implement social
reforms, e) lack of representation, and d) rupture between political and economic elites.

Clientelism is the premodem legacy of an agrarian and traditional society that
has served as a cohesive force for socio-political integration for a large portion o f the
Colombian population, especially the rural one. Indeed, the lack o f both a broad and
effective infrastructural and social policy and of a state presence in a large portion o f the
national territory is the essence of clientelism.

Clientelism is a personalized and

hierarchical system of socio-political relations, and a sort of private social security
system, in which regional and local politicians (electoral barons, in the Colombian
jargon) substitute for the state action. They satisfy the particular needs of their clients
by means of the private use of state resources and funds, and controlling access to public
services, in exchange for their clients’ political loyalty. This undermines the state’s
effectiveness in providing Colombians with adequate public services in matters that
encompass everything from water and sewerage to the administration of justice.

The exacerbation of clientelism and patrimonialism has reduced the relative
autonomy of the state in Colombia and negatively affected its legitimacy for two
reasons. First, the private use of public resources impedes state efforts to direct such
resources towards state priorities or the common good. Second, political relations based
on personal loyalties impede the state’s capacity to act as a general cohesive factor of
society that, in turn, limits its possibilities for leading the modernization process.
Therefore, the Colombian political crisis engenders, among other reasons, the
delegitimation o f the state due to the lack of generalization of the benefits derived from
its action.

112

According to some authors, clientelism has proved functional for the different
social classes, the political system, and the economy in general, since it has provided
stability and integration for Colombian society (Leal and Davila, 1991: 97). However,
one must to accept this affirmation with some reservations, since the political stability
has been very fragile and social integration has been partial at best. However,
clientelism, patrimonialism, and hybridation that have characterized the Colombian
political regime until now have begun to find their limits and have ceased to be
functional to Colombian society.

One of the limitations confronted by the Colombian hybrid political regime is the
current national and international concern for corruption. This has been defined, from a
moral and juridical perspective, as the undue and illegal appropriation o f public money
or goods for private ends. However, for the purposes of my analysis, I will approach the
issue of corruption from a Weberian sociological perspective. From this point o f view,
corruption is one o f the expressions of clientelism and patrimonialism that, in turn, are
expressions of a premodern political culture. According to Weber, patrimonialism is a
traditional form of domination, in which political control is exercised by means of a
bureaucratic apparatus integrated by the sovereign’s friends or favorites.

When such

domination is exercised in polities it is called patrimonial state, and its form is similar to
the domination established in the domestic community (Weber, 1997: 184-187). The
types of retribution of the "patrimonial servants" are called by Weber "prebends", which
consist of the sovereign’s personal patrimony assignments in money, goods, granting of
land or of incomes, rights or tributes. Weber calls "prebendary" the existence o f a public
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administration maintained in such a way (ibidem: 187-189). This form of patrimonial
exercise o f authority implies a political relationship based primarily on personal loyalty,
which represents a strong obstacle for the rise o f economic and political modem
rationality (ibidem: 191). This, as mentioned above, impedes the complete separation of
the private and public spheres, and the appearance o f the rational legality. As Weber
points out, "the patrimonial state assures that the sphere of favors granted by the
sovereign can be converted in to a mechanism for the formation of fortunes, and clears
the path (. . .) to the enrichment of the sovereign himself, o f his favorites, courteous
officials, governors, mandarins, taxgatherers, state attomies, sellers o f all kinds of
graces, large merchants and capitalists. . ." (Ibidem: 837).

According to this Weberian characterization, it can be said that in Latina
America, patrimonialist political domination manifests itself in two institutions:
clientelism and prebendarianism.

From this perspective, corruption is not a moral

deviation of behavior but a form of prebendary relationship, which characterizes Latin
America’s political regimes.

Corruption thus be understood as a remnant of

patrimonialism hybridized with the modern bureaucratic rationality. Patrimonial regimes
constantly generate clientelist and prebendary relations, reproducing a traditional
political culture. In such regimes those practices are not only apparent in pre-electoral
periods (although they intensify in such periods) but also constitute the fundamental and
core praxis that generates stable bonds of domination which, in turn, reproduce practical
clientelist and prebendary relations.

Practices of this kind include: the delivery of

money in exchange for votes or recommendations to obtain official posts ; favoritism in
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granting public contracts; monopolies offered to friends o f the state; tolerance o f the
infractions of the law, incompatible accumulations of officials posts, etc. All of these
cases refer to political practices that blur the crucial distinction between the public and
private spheres.

The new limits confronted by the Colombian hybrid political regime are thus
manifested in greater national and international concern regarding corruption and they
are being replaced by the new public institutions that arose from the new

political

Constitution of 1991, which will be analyzed below, and by the globalization process.
Both these phenomena are forcing full modernization of social relations, in the sense of
the establishment o f more rationalized and transparent relations between the state and
civil society, in order to make the economy more effective.

But it is not simply a

question of seeking greater transparency and effectiveness in the allocation of social
resources at the national level, but also of seeking greater security for capital at the
international level, threatened by the insecurity of the regulative framework o f Third
World societies and the fragility of the new electronic technologies of transmission of
information at the global level. In this respect, Wang and Rosenau point out that
as grow ing numbers o f com panies from northern industrialized countries
expand their operations into developing countries, where the m onitoring and
regulative framework tends to be less developed, they are subject to greater
tem ptations to engage in practices not allow ed at hom e. The digitalization o f
international finance and the proliferation o f strategic business alliances
accom panying globalization are other reasons w hy corruption m ay be
increasing: it is technically much easier than ever before to launder and
dispose o f the gains harvested through corrupt practices (2001: 30).

Furthermore, the international political changes have contributed to generating a new
anti-corruption environment, since with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the
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Soviet Union and crisis o f communism, the great economic powers are no longer willing
to support and tolerate corrupt, undemocratic governments or those that do not respect
human rights.

Thus, corruption has become a topic on the new international agenda. The new
sensitivity in the face of this phenomenon and the need to design new policies to combat
it have been warned by various international analysts. In this respect, Glym, Kobrin,
and Naim say the following:
in less than a half-decade, the w orldw ide backlash against corruption has
sw ept like a firestorm across the global political landscape. G overnm ents
have fallen. Longtim e ruling parties have been hounded from office.
Presidents, prime ministers, parliamentarians, and once mighty corporate
chieftains have been grilled by prosecutors and herded into the docket. Italy,
France, Japan, South Korea, India, M exico, Colom bia, Brazil, South Africa:
no region, and hardly any country, has been immune (quoted by W ang and
Rosenau, 2 0 0 1 :2 7 ).

The new global anti-corruption attitude has also been expressed in countless
international conferences and institutions.

Among them, it is worth mentioning the

International Anti-corruption Conference, IACC, which has been meeting every two
years since 1983. In its ninth meeting, held in 1999 in Durban, Surafrica, the IACC
considered that corruption is “one of the most debilitating legacies of the twentieth
century” (Ibidem). International multilateral organizations like the United Nations, the
World Bank, the International have also redoubled their efforts in the struggle against
corruption. In 1999 James Wolfesohn, president of the World Bank, emphasized the
importance of the policy of combating the phenomenon in the following way:
w h ile building an effective governm ent framework is difficult, it w ill becom e
im possible if there is corruption w hich is the single most corrosive aspect o f
developm ent and must be fought system atically at all levels. Particularly it
must start with a vigorous com m itm ent from the leadership to fight
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corruption on all levels, with initiative both to prevent it from happening and
a system for finding and punishing w rongdoers where corruption exists. The
lead m ust come from the top and efforts must be persistent and unyielding
(W ang and Rosenau, 2001: 28).

But perhaps the maximum expression o f the new global order against corruption
has been the rise o f “Transparency International”, founded in 1993 as a non
governmental organization, specialized in anti- corruption matters. Transparency
International states that its mission is “to curb corruption by mobilizing a global
coalition to promote and strengthen international and national integrity systems”
(Galtung and Pope,1999: 260; emphasis added). This NGO is constituted by a general
secretariat, located in Berlin, and a large number of national chapters, which have
increased from 50 in 1995 to 100 in 2000 (Ibidem).

In 1996, the Latin American

chapters constituted a regional chapter to strengthen cooperation in the struggle against
corruption.

In Colombia, it can also be said that the sensitivity of civil society in the face of
corruption has increased.

A survey done in the year 2000 by the Confederation of

Chambers of Commerce and the Fundacion Corona on the perception o f Colombian
entrepreneurs regarding the phenomenon, showed that the majority believes that
corruption has increased. Of those who have contracts with the state, 95% recognize
that they have accepted paying a percentage o f the total amount o f the contract to
functionaries of the state entity that should ganted it; and 37.8% affirm that they know
the amount o f the bribe that they must pay in advance, 44.2% affirm the bribe is
solicited by the public official (Confecamaras, Fundacion Corona y Cipe, 2000: 21 and
29). According to the business sector the more corrupt state entities are the Congress,
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the Social Security System, the Public Finance System, and the Public Sector Unions.
The entrepreneurs think the Colombian Government should consider the fight againts
corruption as one o f its more important priorities (ibidem: 44).

The Colombian General Comptroller's Office was strengthened by the 1991
Constitution.

In consequence, in the last years its investigations have increased

notoriously, from less than 1000 in 1990, to 1229 in 1998, and 1751 in 1999. Moreover,
in the last decade in Colombia there has been a proliferation of civil society’s
organizations known as veedurias ciudadanas, a kind of citizens’s comptrollerships
whose function is to oversee politicians and public employees’ behavior, as well as the
correct allocation of state funds and the execution of public works. These organizations
have created a network in order to coordinate their actions.

In synthesis, at the beginning of the 1990s, “global coalition” arose against
corruption as an expression of global governance.” This fact, along with the political
changes occurring in Colombia during the same period, have contributed to the
generation a domestic public conciousness against corruption and the development of
national and international strategies for fighting it. In turn, the above processes have
created a pressure toward rationalizing and increasing transparency in the allocation of
state resources that constitute a force against the continuity of clientelism and the hybrid
nature of the Colombian political regime.

3.3 The Fragmentation o f the Colombian Elite

The clientelistic socio-political relations, that are one of the characteristics of the
Colombian political regime, are articulated with another of its characteristics that, as has
already been mentioned, is the ruling class' inability to integrate its different sectors.
This has been one of the traits of the Colombian elite from the era o f independence to
the present day (Palacios, 1980a).

During the nineteenth century, this incapacity of the ruling class to organize its
interests on the general plane of society, appears as disarticulation among the
landowners, and between them and the commercial sector. During the first half of the
twentieth century, this disarticulation appeared as a confrontation among the rural
landholding elite, and the industrial urban elite, which became clearer after 1930, when
the liberal governments assumed power and laid the political and institutional bases for
the process and the formation of a working class (Pecaut, 1987). At the end o f the
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, this fragmentation is manifested
in over-representation of the rural sector in the Congress13, in disarticulation between the
political elite and the economic elite14, and in fragmentation of the latter between the
sector that produces mainly for the internal market, and that which, by taking advantage

13 T h is o v e r-re p re se n ta tio n p e rsists d e s p ite th e fa c t th a t th e la te s t c e n su s, d o n e in 1993, sh o w e d su b sta n tia l
c h a n g e s in th e c o m p o s itio n o f the C o lo m b ia n p o p u la tio n , in c lu d in g th e fact th a t 7 4 % o f th e p o p u la tio n
lives in u rb a n are a s, w h ile 2 6 % liv es in ru ra l areas. N e v e rth e le s s, th a t c e n s u s h a s n o t b e e n a p p ro v e d by
C o n g re s s, a d d u c in g su p p o s e d te c h n ic a l d e fe c ts in its e x e c u tio n , sin c e re p re se n ta tio n o f th e re g io n s in
th is in stitu tio n , an d the p o litic a l in te re sts lin k ed to rural areas, w o u ld b e affe cted .
14 D esp ite th is h isto ric situ a tio n o f fra g m e n ta tio n o f th e ru lin g class, th e re h ave b e e n th re e fa ile d atte m p ts
in C o lo m b ia to lin k a n d h a rm o n iz e th e d iffe re n t se c to rs o f th a t c la s s a n d to d e v e lo p th e n a tio n -sta te on
th is b a sis. T h e se w e re th e g o v e rn m e n ts o f R a fael N u n e z (1 8 8 4 -1 8 8 6 ), A lfo n so L o p e z P u m a re jo (1 9 3 4 193 8 ), C a rlo s L le ras R e stre p o (1 9 6 6 -1 9 7 0 ).
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o f economic "opening", has managed to become articularted into the global economy.
This last aspect will be analyzed in Chapter 5.

This rupture between political and economic elites has led to an institutional
fragmentation of the state: the political elites express themselves and act through the
Congress and other non-technical institutions, while the economic elites pursue their
interests through institutions responsible for economic policy, such as the Central Bank,
the National Planning Department and the Finance Ministry. This fragmentation
becomes apparent in three ways:

First, the primacy of economists over lawyers and

politicians in public policy making.

Second, concern over the excessive clientelist

influence on economic policy which led to administrative reforms aimed at insulating
state institutions responsible for economic policy; and, third, the new role that the
Consejo Gremial Nacional (a federation o f the principal business organizations) has
played in Colombia’s political life in recent years.

In relation to the first aspect, until the fifties politicians and lawyers exercised a
privileged management of state institutions and economic policy. Political activity and
membership in political parties were also mechanisms of prestige and social mobility at
that time.

However, adopting Palacio’s hypothesis, it seems plausible to affirm that

since 1948 "militance in political parties was no longer a channel of social mobility,
especially for professionals, who began to seek public office through distinct
mechanisms" (2001: 115).
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In the 1960s, the process of industrialization and

“semi-modernization” was

consolidated in the country, and the economic functions of the state increased and
became more complex. This coincided with the development of economics as a science
and a university career.

Economists began to replace lawyers and politicians, who

remained as representatives of the traditional social relations and political culture
(Palacios, 2001: 115).

The number of schools or departments of economics in

Colombian universities increased from 3 in 1952, to 9 in 1960, to 35 in the 1980s, and to
48 in the 1990s. Consequently, the number of graduates in economics grew from 60 in
1960 to 1449 in 1980, and descended to 812 in 1997 (Palacios, 2001: 111). It can be
said that, as of the 1960s, the economists began to replace to humanists and lawyers as
the primary "organic intellectuals" of Colombian society. As Gramsci points out, "each
social group, upon emerging from the original base of an essential function in the
productive sphere, creates at the same time, organically, one or more layers of
intellectuals that give that group homogeneity and consciousness of its own function in
the economic field: the capitalist businessman creates with himself the economist, the
scientist of the political economy. In addition, the businessman is also an intellectual"
(Gramsci, 1981: 187)

In Colombia, the tecnocratic economists, have formed a closed social circle
based upon its commmon social class identity, its academic formation in few
universities, especially Los Andes University (Bogota), a elite University; its
professional fulfillment in the same

institutions in the public and private sectors,

especially, the Ministerio de Hacienda, the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, the
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Banco de la Republica, and the Asociacion Nacional de Instituciones Financieras, ANIF;
in research centers such as CEDE and FEDESARROLLO, and in international
multilateral organizations such as ECLA, Inter American Development Bank, and the
World Bank,

Between 1958 and 2000, 62 people

have occupied ministerial posts,

director of the Departmento Nacional de Planeacion, and director or codirector of the
Banco de la Republica, and the great majority of them have been economists. Of these
62 officials, 32 are Los Andes University alumni (Palacios, 2001: 128).

O f the all

Colombian economists, 164 have carried out doctoral studies at foreign universities,
especially in the United States; and 80% are Los Andes University graduates (ibidem:
121). Additionally, 70% of the scholarships offered by the Banco de la Republica to
conduct doctoral studies outside the country have been offered to Los Andes University
alumni (ibidem: 122). In consequence, the economics school of this University has
been the alma mater of the main decision makers of Colombian economic development
policies during the last four decades.

According to Palacios, in the context of

Colombian economics schools, Los Andes University "has better complied with the two
requirements consistent with the values of the practical ideal: it has been more apolitical
and tecnically oriented in all aspects, and more open to internationalization” (Palacios,
2001: 118)

In regards to the Consejo Gremial, this organization has filled the political gap
left by the traditional parties since they abandoned the function of channeling, debating,
and proposing solutions to general interest issues. The Consejo Gremial has replaced
political parties on issues such as conflict and peace, erosion of the social fabric, and
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citizen security.

It is illustrative in this respect to quote Cesar Gonzalez, former

president of the Consejo Gremial:
business institutions should perform a cultural role in the formation o f public
opinion and strengthening o f citizenship. It should be this w ay because o f the
w eakness our society exhibits in performing a real public action aim ed at
so lv in g our fundamental problem s. The concept o f “public action” refers not
only to the administration and control o f state power and instruments but also
to civil so ciety ’s ability to obtain general interest goals. Peace, cultural
modernity, an identity w orthy o f C olom bia in the international com m unity,
and sustainable econ om ic growth are our fundamental interests” (G onzalez,
Cesar, 1997: 75-76).

As will be shown below, this fragmentation o f elites and state institutions has affected
the regime’s effectiveness, i.e., its capacity to lead society, especially in the context of
the changing economic model. The situation is reinforced by the neoliberal nature of
such a model, whose exclusionary character limits the possibility for elites to make
alliances with other social sectors.

In synthesis, I have argued in this chapter that Colombia has suffered a crisis of
legitimacy and hegemony, which originated in the interaction of four factors: a) the
weakness o f the state; b) the hybrid character of the political regime, resulting from the
combination of premodern and modern political cultures; c) the limits imposed by new
political and economic conditions at the national and international levels upon the
continuation of such a hibridization; and d) the fragmentation of the political and
economic elite. This crisis becomes more acute due to the confrontation between two
conflicting societal projects that have struggled for recognition since the early 1990s:
that which arises from the 1991 Constitution, and that which arises from the neoliberal
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economic model. The development o f these ideas is the objective o f the next three
chapters.

Chapter 4
Colombian Societal Project I: The 1991 Political Constitution

As shown in the theoretical framework, many o f the countries of Latin American
suffered a series of constitutional reforms during the eighties and nineties that, as
Gargarella has affirmed (1997), share common elements. These constitutional reforms
were the result of three factors. First, the need to institutionalize the transition to the
democratic regime, in the second place; second, the concern among different political
and social forces over the institutional deterioration and social inequality, and third, the
pressure of international economic agencies and o f technocratic national elites to
institutionalize the neoliberal economic restructuring. Colombia has become inscribed
within this general tendency in Latin America. However, it is necessary to point out that
the adoption of a new constitution in Colombia was also determined by the need to find
a solution to a long and profound political crisis.

4.1. The Crisis Leading to the Constitutional Assembly

In the previous chapter we analyzed the weakness of the Colombian state, its incapacity
to integrate the territory and the society, the fragmentation of the ruling class, and its
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incapacity to constitute a hegemony. To have a complete picture of the Colombian crisis
in decade o f the nineties, three more elements must be added to the situation described
above. In the first place, the long crisis of the political regime that had been developing
since the seventies, based on the negative effects of the bipartisanship agreement of the
National Front. These effects are the exacerbation o f clientelism, the fading o f the
parties’ ideology and programs, their inability to carry out the necessary social reforms
in a Country which had suffered an accelerated modernization , and the fragmentation of
the parties to the point that in practice each member of the party organizes its own
political movement for personal ends, as a result of which the representation of the
general interests of society becomes impossible. But perhaps the most perverse effect of
the National Front was the exclusion of the new social forces that arose as the product of
industrialization, urbanization and the relative modernization of the country that
occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. This more diversified and complex
Colombian society faced a
blockade, quite diversified in its m ethods, o f alm ost all the em erging form s
o f political participation. Everything that did not pass through the bipartisan
filter received a system atic treatment, whether subtle or barefaced, o f
annulm ent” (Leal, 1987: 77).

This exclusion was the cause of the rise o f guerrilla movements like April 19th
Movement, M l9.

Future members of this group, united in a dissident nationalist

political party named ANAPO saw their hopes of coming to power legitimately
frustrated in 197015, which obliged them to radicalize and to confront the regime
illegally. However, in 1990, this guerrilla movement became reincorporated into life in

l5D u e to th e fact th a t th e g o v e rn m e n t o f th a t tim e m a n ip u la te d the ele c to ra l re su lts to p re v e n t th e p o p u list
p o litical m o v e m e n t A lia n z a N a c io n a l P o p u la r, A N A P O , from a ssu m in g p o w er. I f th a t had o c c u rre d , the
b ip a rtisa n p o litical re g im e w o u ld h a v e c o m e to its end.
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civil society to participate in the Constitutional Assembly, obtaining a high number of
votes.

In the second place, the deterioration of public order, due to the increase in
common delinquency, the violence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups and, above all,
since the mid-eighties, of drug-trafficking mafias that declared war on the weak
Colombian state in order to prevent their extradition to the United States.

Finally, the tendency of the Colombian economic structure to generate severe
inequalities in the income distribution and high levels of poverty, is reinforced by the
political regime’s scarce receptivity to any reform of the social structure.

This is

manifested in social instability, as a result of the aggravation of the class conflicts and
the increase in social protests.

Thus, adoption of the 1991 Constitution was an attempt to overcome the crisis of
the political regime and its legal expression, the old Constitution of 1886. But to
understand the political meaning of this Assembly, it is necessary to review the failed
attempts at reform that preceded it, which illustrate the rigidity of the power structure in
Colombia and the incapacity of the political regime to respond to the necessities of
democratization and social reform of an increasingly differentiated and complex society.

The idea of convoking a constitutional assembly as a solution to the crisis of the
regime, dates back to the Liberal government o f Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978), who
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proposed to reform the administration of justice and to restructure the political-territorial
division o f the country (Cepeda, 1987), given that the political, administrative and fiscal
centralism started to show signs o f exhaustion at that time and to generate a series of
protests called paros civicos on the part of the different municipalities and regions
throughout the country.

These protests were due to the precarious level of

socioeconomic and infrastructural development of the municipalities. The progressive
increase in the number of paros civicos is illustrative in this respect: between 1958 and
1966 there were 16 paros civicos, between 1971 and 1981 there were 138, and between
1982 and 1989 there were 218 (Orjuela, 1992). However, the idea o f undertaking this
reform was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court o f Justice, due to the fact
that the constitution in force at that time did not permit amendments to be made outside
of the Congress, as president Lopez had proposed.

During the Liberal government of Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), the increase in the
guerrilla activities of the M19 coincided with the popular protests of the subordinate
social sectors, that were a constant phenomenon throughout the period o f the National
Front (Archila, 1997). For this reason, the ruling class diagnosed the crisis as the result
o f problems of public order. Consequently, the policies of Turbay Ayala were directed to
preventing and criminalizing the popular protest by means o f the so-called “security
statute” (Reyes, et. al., 1978). At the same time, he revived the previous government’s
idea of carrying out a constitutional reform of the administration of justice, through the
creation of a general Prosecutor office that would be in charge of the functions of
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investigation and accusation in criminal matters. Nevertheless, this reform was also
declared unconstitutional, for the same reason mentioned above.

During the presidential period of Conservative Belisario Betancur (1982-1986),
the social protests continued to increase, especially those of the peasants, students, and
workers (Archila, 2000). However, Betancur diagnosed the crisis in a different way. He
considered that the crisis and its main expression, violence, had objective and subjective
causes. The former had to do with the lack o f presence of the state in vast areas of the
national territory and their lack of integration into the national market. In order to face
up to this cause, Betancur developed a national integration plan, that consisted basically
of public investment in physical and social infrastructure in said regions. The subjective
causes, were due to the perception among new generations of Colombians that had
grown up in the shadow of the National Front that they had no space in which to
participate in the political, economic and social life of the country. To confront this
situation, the Betancur government developed two policies: a peace process to seek the
reinsertion of guerrilla groups into civil life, and a “political opening” or process of
democratization of the political regime (Bejarano, 1990). This process included
measures like the popular election of mayors, so that the demobilized guerrilla groups
would find spaces for political participation (Orjuela, 1992).

The guerrilla groups with the exception of the Revolutionary armed forces of
Colombia, FARC, received the peace negociations with skepticism. This group entered
negotiations with the government and to test the regime’s determination regarding
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democratization, decided to create a legal political movement, the Patriotic Union.
Nonetheless, the peace negotiations failed due, among other reasons, to the systematic
extermination of the members of that political group, including several presidential
candidates, at the hands o f paramilitaries and anonymous forces o f the extreme right, to
the point that in the past two decades around 3,000 members of these movements have
been assassinated. This situation was the result, in part, of the ambiguous position of the
FARC regarding legal political action, that led them to “combine all forms o f struggle.”
It also derived from the lack of a real will to democratization and tolerance on the part of
the Colombian political regime.

In general terms, it can be said that the Betancur government had a clear vision
of the need to integrate Colombia politically, territorially and economically, and to
oxygenate and democratize the political regime. Nonetheless, the structural factors of
the Colombian political and social crisis, and the lack of vision of the ruling class, meant
an obstacle for Betancur’s political project. In the end, Betancur was abandoned by the
Conservative party, his own party, who called him “communist”, and by a large part of
the Liberal party. Furthermore, the intransigence of the M l9 guerrilla group, was the
straw that broke the camel’s back. This group’s 1985 assault on the Supreme Court of
Justice, with its violent ending in which many of the Justices died, weakened the
government even more.

In practice, the popular election of mayors was the only reform instituted by the
Betancur government that was relatively successful.
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By establishing a bond of

accountability between the mayor and the local community, it has contributed to
democratize the political regime to some degree and to relegitimate the state.
Nevertheless, this reform has also contributed to strengthening clientelism and
corruption. Only a few municipalities have elected mayors who are “outsiders” or civic
leaders who have tried to positively transform political and social life at the local level.

The Liberal government of Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), sought to revitalize and
relegitimate the bipartisan regime by means of a scheme to end the connivance between
liberalism and conservatism, through the institutionalization of a scheme o f relations of
“government party and opposition party.” However, given the profound socioeconomic
transformations that have taken place in Colombia during the second half o f the
twentieth century, which have resulted in a more diversified and complex society,
solutions to the crisis based on the continuity of bipartisanship are doomed to failure or
to contribute to aggravate the crisis itself. Due to the conviction that the bipartisan
scheme had been exhausted, the Barco government opted for two different strategies.
The first consisted of newly exploring the possibility of a political agreement regarding
the reinsertion of guerrilla groups, which was only possible with the M l9; and the
second, of reforming the political constitution, in response to the clamor o f certain key
sectors in the formation public opinion in the country.

To carry out the the constitutional reform, Barco proposed convoking the citizens
to a plebiscite, in order to derogate a norm of the Constitution of 1886, introduced by the
National Front pact, that prohibited reforming the constitution by means of direct
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participation of the primary constituent power, i.e., the people. If the plebiscite was
approved, the government would proceede to call elections for a constitutional assembly
with popular participation. However, this initiative failed due to the strong opposition of
the Conservative party and of various sectors of the ruling class. Given this opposition,
president Barco was obliged to make an agreement with the Conservative party,
desisting from the plebiscite and committing himself to carry out the reform through the
Congress. But the Congress' decision to include a norm that favored drug-traffickers in
the reform by prohibiting the extradition of Colombians, caused the constitutional
reform to abort.

The late eighties linked all the factors of the political crisis in such a way as to
produce a situation of anomie and increased violence, the catalyst of which was the
violence exercised by the drug-traffickers. The victims of the hard and bloody war that
they unleashed against Colombia's weak state and society included judges, the police,
important public officials, common citizens and, between 1989 and 1980, three
presidential candidates. It was then that a group of university students, interpreting the
feeling of Colombian society, led a movement that diverse social sectors later joined, to
reform the political regime and Colombia's public institutions.

This led, during the

Liberal government of Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994), to the election of a Constitutional
Assembly in December of 1990.

There was broad representation in this Assembly which included not only the
traditional political parties, but also those on the left, some guerrilla groups that
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demobilized during the Barco and Gaviria governments' peace processes to participate in
it16, entrepreneurs, and diverse sectors o f Colombian society.

If, as defined in the

theoretical framework o f this dissertation, the political regime is not simply the sum o f
institutions and norms that regulate the relations between the political parties and the
state, but also the relations between the social classes and between them and the state,
then the Constitutional Assembly was an attempt to broaden the Colombian political
regime, to make room for the social sectors that have never been included in it.

4.2.The Societal Project o f the Constitution o f 1991:
Legitim acy, Dem ocracy and Equity

The main objective o f the Constitutional Assemably o f 1991 was to resolve Colombia's
political crisis. To achieve this purpose, the Assembly introduded a series o f reforms in
six major areas: a) the quest for peace, b) the expansion o f democracy and of the
economic, political and social rights o f citizens, c) the strengthening and relegitimation
o f the state and the political regime, and d) the modification o f the economic regime to
introduce elements of equity.

The Constitution o f 1991 can be considered a societal project that sought to
integrate and democratize Colombian society.

The quest for social integration

manifested, among other things, in the fact that the political and social forces that
promoted that project were very heterogeneous since they covered everything from
traditional bipartisanship and drug-trafficking elements to university students and
16 The M l9, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Socialist Renovation Current (CRS), the armed
indigenous movement “Quintin Lame”, and the Revolucionary Workers Party (PRT).
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progressive intellectuals, as well as indigenous groups, social movements, non
governmental organizations and various radical left-wing political groups that wanted to
explore a peaceful and democratic path to change.

The idea that the new Constitution was considered by its main promoters to be a
societal project is noted in the a posteriori disenchantted reflection o f an analyst who,
referring to participative democracy, introduced by the new constitution, affirmed:

the expectations, perhaps utopian and messianic that we had about what could
be achieved through them and ask ourselves whether on this horizon of the
invention of a new country, we can change - without being fully conscious of
the fact - the citizen who really exists, or at least tries to do so, in a context of
multiple tensions and inequalities, for the elusive image of an imaginary
citizen in the face of whom the former is pathetically deficient, definitely
precarious and lacking in civic virtues. (. . .) It is necessary to recognize that
the dramatically intensified war in the past ten years has significantly
contributed to closing the spaces for participation; that the increased poverty
in the cities and the displacement in rural zones has turned the different
fundamental rights established in the constitution of 1991 into simply virtual
and rhetorical realities (Uribe, 2001: 143).

4.2.1. T he Q uest for Peace

At the beginning o f the nineties in Colombia, leaving aside common crime, which is
comparatively one o f the highest in the world, there were two great focal points of
violence: the guerrilla groups and the drug-trafficking cartels.

In relation to guerrilla violence, it is necessary to say that the idea o f reforming
the

Constitution by means of a constitutional assembly elected by popular vote

generated a process o f demobilization o f armed groups, due to the expectation o f
participating in it and o f being actors in important transformations in the country's
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political, economic and social structure.

This characteristic differentiated the peace

processes o f the nineties with respect to previous ones.

While the processes o f the

eighties were, in the strict sense, processes o f insertion o f armed groups in the social
order, which remained intact, the peace processes o f the nineties have been the
opportunity for these groups to abandon the armed struggle on the condition that they
participate, in an active way, in the transformation o f society for institutional ways. That
is to say, the peace processes, since the nineties, have increasingly been the scenario in
which to reconstruct or to refound the state and civil society in Colombia.

Throughout the eighties, the armed conflict had been aggravated due to the
strengthening o f the military capacity of the different armed actors, due to the abundant
financial resources available to them, flowing from the illegal narco-trafficking business,
extorsion, and kidnapping. A t the end o f the eighties, it became increasingly clear that a
peace proposal based on the surrender o f the armed groups or on their unconditional
reinsertion into the existing order, was not possible. The demand o f the armed groups
increasingly aimed at a reform o f the political regime and the economic and social
structure o f the country.

For this reason, the possibility o f adopting a new political constitution was
presented in 1991 by the Gaviria government (1990-1994) as a peace pact with certain
guerrilla groups.

The negotiation process with the National Liberation Army (EPL),

culminated in the signing o f an agreement in March 1991, to participate in the
Constituent Assembly. The same thing occurred with the Revolutionary W orkers' Party
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(PRT), and the insurgent Manuel Quintin Lame Indigenous Movement.

The M l9

movement that had demobilized since the end of the previous government, also
participated in the Constitutional Assembly, with an electoral success that was
unprecedented for any guerrilla group, which enabled them to exercise importamt
leadership in the Assembly's deliberations. The strongest guerrilla groups as well as the
ones with the greatest destabilizing capacity,

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), did not want to participate
in the constitutional process.

With most o f the guerrilla groups demobilized and participating in the
Constitutional Assembly, the Gaviria government considered this situation as a good
argument for delegitimating the non-demobilized guerrilla groups. On the one hand,
Gaviria considered that after the reforms the new constitution would establish, there
would no longer be reasons for credible guerrilla actions. One the other hand, the FARC
and the ELN, strengthened financially and militarily, did not have sufficient political
vision and assumed an ambiguous position regarding the constitutional process.
Nonetheless, the government made several attempts to approach these groups to
negotiate peace. But with both radicalized positions, the negotiation process ended in a
strong armed confrontation. The government undertook a military offensive against the
guerrilla the same day that elections were held to elect the representatives to the
Constitutional Assembly. This led the FARC to radicalize even more its offensive and
militaristic position that it continues to hold to this day. With this, the possibilities of a
new constitution as an instrument for achieving peace in the country were limited.
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With respect to the relationship between the Constitutional Assembly as a
scenario o f peace and drug-trafficking violence, it must be said that throughout the
eighties drug- traffickers became “narcoterrorists”, due to the articulation o f various
factors. In the first place, the antinarcotics policy o f the U.S. Government, who defined
the problem of drug-trafficking as a national security issue, gives priority to a repressive
strategy to deal with the problem. This translated into pressures on the Colombian
government to deal repressively with the drug-traffickers and to ensure their extradition
to the United States. However, this position o f the U.S. government ignored the weak
nature of the Colombian state, so that the political pressures to confront drug-trafficking
with repression only contributed to further increasing its weakness (Tickner, 2001). The
drug-traffickers on the other hand confronted the Colombian state with a multiple
strategy: assassination o f important political and social figures of the country, the use o f
terror against civil society, the infiltration of illicit money in political campaigns and in
institutions o f popular representation, and open war on the state, under the slogan “ we
prefer a tomb in Colombia to a jail cell in the United States.” In the second place, the
linking o f the drug-trafficking mafias to paramilitary groups permitted the strengthening
of the military capacity of these group, since they had the money to acquire arms and
training. This relationship between drug-traffickers and paramilitaries has been one of
the main factors in the violation o f human rights and the weakening of authority and
justice in Colombia.
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The drug-traffickers' strategy of combining terrorist actions with political actions
makes it possible to think that they sought legitimacy and acceptance among social
sectors that thought the state was incapable of ending leftist subversion. Therefore, one
can sustain the thesis that, as of the late eighties, the drug-traffickers were an important
part o f a politico-military project o f the extreme right. This is confirmed by the rise of
the Movement for National Restoration (MORENA) in August o f 1989. According to
general Miguel Maza Marquez, the director of the Administrative Departament of
Segurity (DAS) at that time, that political movement was
the culm inating point o f a sym biosis betw een drug-traffickers, self-d efen se
groups, and the groups o f paid assassins trained by agricultural entrepreneurs
fed up with constant harassment by the guerrilla (. . .) In the context o f this
accelerated m etam orphosis, one perceives the influence o f the drug cartels
and the laxity o f certain private agen cies that, confused by the volum e
punishable facts attributed to those w ho have risen up in arms, have finally
decided to subtly align th em selves with the opposite block, w ithout paying
attention to the fact that their procedures and barbarism are equally
condem nable (E l Tiem po, A ugust 24, 1989, p. IOC).

Some government measures were finally able to contain the advance of this extrem
right political project; but it is possible to conclude, with president Barco, that at the end
of the eighties the war against drug trafficking should be understood not only as a
struggle of the law against organized crime, but as an effort to permit “the survival of
democratic institutions and public liberties” (Barco, 1989: 137-138).

However, the weak Colombian state was in no condition to confront an enemy
strengthened by such an enormous amount o f illicit financial resources. For this reason,
the drug cartels subjected the country to one of the worst waves of terrorism in its entire
history. There was no other way out than to change the strategy and try to negotiate
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with the drug cartels. In any case, the policy against that phenomenon was ambiguous
throughout the eighties and oscillated between repression and dialogue (Orjuela, 1990).
The change to a clear negotiation against drug-trafficking occured during the Gaviria
government (1990-1994).

This distinguished between drug-trafficking and drug-

trafficking related violence. The former, was considered a transnational phenomenon the
treatment of which surpassed the limits of national politics and required international
cooperation.

The latter was considered to be a national problem and, therefore, the

Colombian government had sufficient autonomy to manage it. The Gaviria government
thus developed a policy of bringing the drug cartels to justice, in exchange for not
extraditing them to the United States. This implied making the negotiations of previous
years with the cartels explicit and public, not so as to legitimate it, but rather to find a
basis on which to elaborate more realistic policies for dealing with it.

The Constitutional Assembly was the scenario in which to legalize this policy.
As mentioned above, the violence associated with drug-trafficking was the straw that
broke the camel's back, and led the Assembly to seek a solution to the Colombian
political crisis.

During the deliberations the bombs and the indiscriminate assaults

against civil society ceased; but the drug-traffickers kidnapped well known journalists in
order to exert pressure on the Constitutional Assembly. Despite the reticence o f some of
its members, it approved an article that prohibited the extradition of Colombians. One
of the delegates to the assmbly summed up Colombian society's posititon on the matter
in a single phrase:
as the lovers o f peace that w e are, w e have the intimate conviction that w e
w ill never achieve it w hile and arbitrary and unconstitutional decree o f a state
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o f seig e continues to allow
C onstitucional, N o . 39: 10).

the extradition

o f C olom bians

(G aceta

The constitutional prohibition o f extradition served to return tranquility to Colombian
society and made possible the surrender of Pablo Escobar, head of the Medellin cartel.
However, this prohibition was derogated during the Samper government (1994-1998),
partly due to the pressures of the U.S. government, and partly to president Samper's need
to

legitimate himself before the national and international community, given the

accusations of having received money from drug cartels in his electoral campaign.

4.2.2. The Introduction o f a Social Democracy

Given the restricted nature of Colombian democracy, Constitutional Assembly of 1991
proposed making the political system more inclusive and representive. In this sense, the
first article of the new Constitution establishes the character of the Colombian state as
democratic, participatory and pluralistic. The second article establishes that one of the
essential purposes o f the state is to “facilitate the participation of all in the decisions that
affect them in economic, political, administrative and cultural life of the nation”. In
addition to the vote, it also established a series of mechanisms for direct political
participation such as the plebiscite, the referendum, popular consultation, the open town
council meeting, the legislative initiative of citizens, and the recall or revocation of
mandate of political representatives by the citizens.

The rights to social participation include traditional right to free association, but
it also includes new rights such as community participation in health services and
education, in decisions that can affect the environment, worker participation in
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management of enterprises, and participation of ethnic, social, economic, cultural and
ecological sectors in the National Planning Council, etc. In fact, the Constitution of
1991 establishes that the professional, labor union, social and sports associations should
be

democratic, and assign the state the role of “fostering democratic practices for

learning the principles and values of citizen participation” (article 41).

Furthermore, it established the popular election o f governors (that of mayors had
already been established in 1986); the local administrative boards for popular
representation o f the diverse zones o f the municipalities; the indigenous communities'
right to govern themselves through their own authorities, in accordance with their
culture and traditions; and the popular election of judges of the peace to deal with minor
conflicts among citizens. In synthesis, it can be said that, at least formally, the new
Constitution broadly established direct participation of citizens, to the point that one of
the members of the Constitutional Assembly pointed out that “the ideology of
democratic participation became the cement of the whole structure of the new Political
Charter” (Fals Borda, 1991: 53).

The Constitutional Assembly considered the old constitution to be very poor in
matters of human rights and that, in addition to the exclusionary nature of the bipartisan
regime, social exclusion and the violation o f human rights were two of the main factors
of the Colombian political crisis. For this reason, it was decided to place the emphasis
on the recognition of three generations of human rights, i.e., individual political rights
and civil liberties; socioeconomic and cultural rights; and collective rights like the right
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to a healthy environment. The first are the traditional and universally known ones such
as the right to life, habeas corpus, and freedom of conscience. Among the second, the
Constitution o f 1991 established the right to social security and health, decent housing,
education, the rights of minorities and disadvantaged or discriminated persons such as
children, women, the elderly and the handicapped. Among the third are the right to
public space, to quality public goods and services , and the right to enjoy a healthy
environment. The emphasis on socioeconomic inclusion is noted from the very first
article o f the Constitution of 1991, which defines Colombian state as a “social state of
law”.

The Constitution of 1991 also established a series of judicial mechanism and
institutions for the exercise and effectiveness of these rights, such as the Constitutional
Court, the Defender o f the People, the injunctive action named tutela, and popular
actions. These mechanisms, as will be seen further on, have been considered by the
community to be really effective for demanding their rights with respect to the state and
public administration, which have often been characterized by arbitrary treatment and
ineffectiveness.

According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, with very few

exceptions, Colombian judges did not know and did not apply norms regarding these
three generations of human rights,
w hereas, under the protection o f the Constitution o f 1991, constitutional
ju stice has been vigorous in the protection o f the rights o f persons and
m inorities, as w ell as in its intention to control the abuses by the authorities
and the powerful (Uprinuny, 1991: 99).
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The constitutional recognition of these three generations of human rights means
the concretion of the quest for greater social justice on the part o f progressive political
and social forces. In this respect, one of the Justices of the new Constitutional Court,
which has led the crusade for the recognition of these rights and social justice, points out
that
the Constitution, in synthesis, proposes tw o strategies o f ju stice. The first,
respect for the person, regardless o f their differences. The second, respect for
the person, taking their historic particularities into account, to maintain the
difference, to suppress it or to discount disadvantages and inequities,
according to each case (. . . ) The Constitution has begun to recognize subjects
w ho require special protection (m inors, w om en, the elderly, the handicapped,
hom osexuals, prisoners, indigenous people, and indigents, etc.) The accent o f
the [new constituional] regim e protection o f social rights, indicates that their
interests were not usually duly articulated by the dem ocratic political process,
w hich certainly cannot be maintained indefinitely (C ifuentes, 2000: 26 8 269).

For this reason, the constitutional mechanisms that have really been effective in the
recognition and guarantee of these rights in recent years have generated the biggest
legal, political and economic controversies that Colombia has experienced in the second
half o f the twentieth century. That debate will be analyzed further on.

4.2.3 Strengthening and Relegitimation of the State and the Political Regime

As has been pointed out in the theoretical framework, the state is an essential element in
the production of the social order, in producing the cohesion o f society and the
integration of the territory through the regulation, the coordination of the different
social subsystems, and the legitimate use of force. Furthermore, the third chapter showed
how the Colombian state has suffered such deterioration in recent decades that it is in no
condition to produce a social order. This situation has translated into violence and
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anomie, in the incapacity o f the public authorities to guarantee even the most elementary
rights o f citizens, and in the degradation with which Colombian society assumes the
diversity, the disagreement, and the demand for their rights.

For this reason, in the last three decades, a series of reforms have been
introduced, without much success, in the administration of justice in aspects such as the
computerization of information and decongestion of court dockets, organization o f the
judicial career, technical and professional development of criminal investigation
agencies, and the physical modification and decongestion of prisons, among other
things. (Escallon, 1998). But it was the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 that adopted a
somewhat more profound reform of the judicial branch through the creation of new
institutions such as the Superior Council of the Judicature, the General Prosecutor’s
Office, and the adoption of the accusatory system in the criminal justice, and the
creation of constitutional justice with the Constitutional Court as its highest tribunal.

The administration o f the judicial branch was assigned to the Superior Council of
the Judicature. This function corresponded to the Ministry of Justice in the past, and its
performance was very inefficient.

It is necessary to emphasize that in addition to

elaborating and executing the budget o f the judicial branch, the Superior Council of the
Judicature must supervise the performance of the judicial offices.

With the adoption of the accusatory system, the judges are relieved of the
function o f investigating crimes, which now becomes a function of the General
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Prosecutor's Office, whose actions are governed more by the technical criteria of
criminal investigation than by the procedural formalism o f the function o f judgment. In
this respect, one analyst pointed out that the investigation o f crimes had erroneously
been attributed to the judges in Colombia, which was incompatible with the nature o f
their function, since they are not trained to investigate the facts, but to analyze them in
law (Giraldo, 1993).

With this technical separation of functions, the Constitutional

Assembly hoped to achieve a significant increase in the effectiveness o f criminal justice
and a notable reduction o f impunity.

It is significant to point out the fact that there had been an attempt to introduce
the idea o f a General Prosecutor’s office and the accusatory system into Colombia in
1979, but the authoritarian bias o f the government at that time prevented its virtues of
effectiveness from being known to the public. At that time, various associations of
judges and lawyers, non-governmental organizations, and academics, considered that
judicial reform to be the repressive instrument of the regime and called the Colombian
state a police state. In this respect, it was said that:
there are, thus, su fficien t sym p tom s to think that the concentration o f
in vestigative functions under a G eneral Prosecutor w h o se designation w ill
correspond practically to the ex ecu tiv e, w as not due to reasons unrelated to
the unstable balance o f the social stru ggles characteristic o f recent years and
tries to project the broadening o f p o lice function o f the ex ecu tiv e into the
ju d icial field . For this purpose, there w ill n ow be an institution w h ich , like
the general prosecutor’s o ffic e g iv e s the state
su fficien t flex ib ility to
crim in ally repress, under the protective appearance o f a norm al ju d icial
process, an yon e w h o the con d ition s o f reproduction o f the capitalist system
point to as undesirable or unbearable" (R ojas, 1980: 157-158).

Two decades later, in the face o f the achievements o f the General Prosecutor’s Office, it
is becoming clear to the different social forces, even those on the left, just how great a
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degree o f deterioration the basic order in Colombia has reached.

Although the

established order ultimately constitutes society asymmetrically and permits the exercise
o f class domination, it is also what makes it possible, as O'Donnell says, for “the
multiple social relations [to be carried out] on the basis of [a minimum of] stable
expectations’’ (1992: 10).

Finally, in relation to the topic of the reform of justice, it is necessary to point out
that part o f the violence that Colombian society suffers is generated in economic and
social disputes among its citizens, due to the impossibility of dealing institutionally with
disagreements and conflicts, because of the congestion of civil, commercial and familylaw cases in the courts. Therefore, effectiveness of the administration of justice in civil
matters has also been sought through the direct participation of citizens in the solution of
conflicts by institutionalizing the process and creating non-judicial mechanisms for the
resolution o f conflicts, such as conciliation, arbitration tribunals, and justices of the
peace elected by the community. The purpose is to see that the judges will only have to
deal with conflicts to which the community has not found a solution. This is because,
according to one expert, the congestion in the courts is due in part to the progressive
process of judicialization that consists o f taking every type of conflict arising between
citizens to the judges to decide, regardless of the transcendence or the degree of
commotion it causes in the community (Giraldo, 1993). Thus, the legitimacy of the state
requires the solution of its lack of effectiveness in the administration of justice, which in
turn requires the participation of the community in the solution of their conflicts, within
institutional frameworks.
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Another important aspect o f the search for legitimacy o f the state, has been the
creation o f the Constitucional Court, which has been assigned the task o f constitutional
control o f the law, which previously corresponded to the Supreme Court o f Justice. But
the most important function o f the Constitutional Court has been that o f being the
supreme human rights tribunal. This is exercised through the revies o f judicial decisions
related to the injuctive action, which is the instrument by means o f which citizens can
make use o f their fundamental rights before any authority that refuses to recognize them.

Due to its decisions, the Constitutional Court has been the institution that has
become the symbol o f the quest for social justice, and has therefore played a
fundamental role in the re-legitimation of the state. From the beginning, the Court has
been very clear in pointing out the normative and political importance o f the new
definition of the state as a “social state o f law”. In a 1992 decision, this entity affirmed
that the social state is not a mere rhetorical formula but one that implies a great
responsibility o f judges in the recognition of constitutional and social rights o f citizens
(Uprimmy, 2001).

This function of recognition o f fundamental rights, not only in the political field
but in the social and econmic fiels as well, has caused the Constitutional Court to be
accused of politicizing and usurping the legislative and executive functions o f designing
economic policy, given the decisions that have been taken in the field o f hounsing
finance and the right to health and education, among other things. These accusations
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and the conflicts between the Constitutional Court and the functionaries in charge of
handling economic policy will be analyzed in the last chapter o f this dissertation. For
the moment, one must say that it is not a question of the political character the
Constitutional Court, but rather that the issues on which it has decided have acquired a
notable political character, given the Colombian context o f profound social inequality.
The political character o f these judicial decisions are also derived from the new place
that the 1991 Constitution attributed to the Court in the political system, that puts it in
direct relation with the social and economic conflicts that have not been resolved in the
instances o f political decision, due to deficiencies in political representation, to a lack of
political will of the ruling class and to the weakness o f civil society. The Constitutional
Court was created to “ensure that the democratic ‘opening’ initiated by the constitutional
movement would be maintained” (Cepeda Manuel Jose, 2000: 519). This democratic
spirit had a text: the new Constitution, but not, as Cepeda says, a context, or, rather, it
lacked another context, because “on the social plane, the need to put an end to
arbitrariness was as great as the conceptual vacuum [that the Court] had to fill (Ibidem:
553).

In general terms, one can say that the Constitutional Court has been the state

institution that symbolizes the spirit of democratization and equity that animated the
constellation of progressive forces that promoted the constitutional movement. From this
viewpoint, the Court has tried to keep open the institutional and legal possibilities for
social reform and effective political participation of minorities and the socially least
advantaged.
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In relation to re-legitimizing the regime, it is necessary to start by saying that the
Constitutional Assembly revoked it in a polemic decision, the mandate o f the Congress
at that time. It was a decision with more o f a symbolic character than a real one, but it
demonstrated the desires o f the new social and political forces represented in the
Assembly to make a "tabula rasa” out o f the "ancien regime", and create a new
political regime in Colombia. For this, the Constitutional Assembly established a series
o f mechanisms and institutions to broaden the political representation of the minorities
and forces other than the traditional bipartisanship, to reduce clientelism and corruption,
and to increase citizens’ control over the activity o f the state, especially in relation to the
allocation and use o f public resources.

Political participation was broadened at the municipal level with the creation of
the local administrative boards and with popular election o f mayors at the departmental
or state level. At the national level, participation was broadened through the creation o f
national circumscription for election the senate, in order to favor political minorities.
Although in the first congressional elections following approval of the new Constitution,
held in October 1991, the traditional political class obtained a majority of the votes once
again, despite the fact that its mandate had been revoked by the

Constitutional

Assembly, the new norm showed its virtues since 18% o f the seats in the senate
corresponded to new political forces different from the traditional bipartisanship
(Restrepo, 1993: 233). Nevertheless, the bipartisanship again regained lost ground in the
1994 elections, which shows the enormous weight of the rusty structure o f the old
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Colombian political regime even after the introduction o f these reforms. However, a gap
was openned up which third forces could take advantage of.

For the representation o f ethnic minorities, a special seat was created in the
Senate for the indigenous communities, and one in the lower house for the black
communities. Furthermore,

in recognizing the indigenous territories as politico-

administrative entities o f the state, their dialects as official languages in that territories,
and the right o f indigenous people to govern themselves through their own authorities,
according to their own customs and traditions, Colombia is inscribed in the worldwide
tendency toward recognition of multiculturalism, that poses to contemporary political
orders the challenge o f constructing political unity on the basis o f recognition of ethnic
and cultural diversity (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka and Wayne, 2000).

In relation to the system of checks and balances, the Constitutional Assembly
was concerned with reestablishing the

equilibrium between the executive and the

legislative, which had been altered since 1968 in favor o f the former. For this reason,
the new Constitution granted the legislative branch faculties and mechanisms for
exercising greater political control over the executive, such as the motion o f censure of
ministers, the congressional power to modify certain executive decrees, prohibition of
codes issued by the executive, and the return to the legislative branch o f certain powers
in economic matters.
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In order to “purifiy” Congress and political activity and to “eradicate” practices
such as clientelism and corruption, the Constitution introduced a series o f limitations
and prohibitions, such as revocation o f the mandate o f mayors and governors, and the
loss o f office for members o f Congress, which is produced by violation o f the severe
criteria o f disqualifications and incompatibilities established for those who wish to hold
a seat in Congress, For instance, since the new Constitution was approved in October
1991, the Council o f State has received 298 petitions for loss o f investiture, o f which 35
have been decided positively (Colprensa, December 11, 2001). The loss of investiture
means political death since whoever is dispossessed o f a seat in Congress can never
again hold any elected public office o f popular representation.

Furthermore, the so-called auxilios parlamentarios, i.e. financial “aids” given by
the government to congressmen, were eliminated, at least on paper. Those “aids” are the
funds the government included in the national budget in favor o f members of the
Congress, in exchange for their approval o f the bills it submits to Congress. However,
this practice continues to be used by the executive, who has considered it to be the only
way to carry out its policies o f economic restructuring.

This situation illustrates the

hybrid character o f Latin American political regimes in which the old clientelist political
practices are combined with the technocratic needs o f economic restructuring,

as

pointed out by Gamarra (1994).

In relation to the political parties, the new Constitution established the right o f all
citizens to found parties and movements, state financing o f political campaigns, and
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equality o f access to public communications media, which favors political minorities
and tries to compensate them with respect to the weight o f bipartisanship. Finally, the
new constitution strengthened the state's agencies o f control such as the Offices o f the
Procurator and the Comptroller, and created the Office o f the Defense o f the People to
ensure that human and other rights are respected.

In synthesis, the Constitutional Assembly attempted to solve Colombia's long
political crisis through strengthening, relegitimation, and democratization o f the state
and the political regime. The international context and the new global actors have also
contributed to this task. The pressure of the U.S. State Department and o f the American
NGO, Human Rights Watch, for Colombia's Government, Armed Forces, and
subversive groups to respect human rights has contributed to the process of reinstitutionalizing the state and society in Colombia (US Department of State, 2000;
Tickner, 2001).

Likewise, the United Nations, with its Delegate Office for Human

Rights in Colombia, has contributed as a global force, to create a more democratic
society in the country. The new agencies o f global governance such as the World Bank
operate in the same sense and its demands for state reform and, while emphasizing
privatization and economic restructuring o f the state, also ask for its democratization and
institutional improvement. However, this combination o f exogenous and endogenous
factors is far from fluid and is full of tensions and contradictions.

4.2.4. The Q uest for Equity

In very general terms, it can be said that the concept o f the economy written into the
Constitution o f 1991, can serve as the foundation for both a policy o f state intervention
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in the economy and a free market policy and intemacionalization of the economy. This
ambiguity is the result o f the convergence in the Constitutional Assembly o f forces that
represent the two economic ideologies and the role played in the Assembly by the
government o f Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994), whose economic role and development plan
were clearly neoliberal (Presidency o f the Republic, National Planning Departament,
1991). From this point o f view, in 1991 two different societal projects confronted each
other: one led by the progressive and leftist social forces that wanted an economy
sensitive to the social needs o f the great majority o f the Colombian population, and
another led by the Gaviria government and its technocratic economic group, that tried to
carry out its neoliberal restructuring project both within the Constitutional Assembly and
outside o f it, in the institutions in charge of managing the economic policy.

Nonetheless, the predominant trait of the new Constitution in economic matters,
and from which it has derived its meaning in the ten years that have passed since its
approval, has been the emphasis on equity and the great number o f socioeconomic rights
established in it.

The concern for equity appears, among others, in article 1, which

defines the Colombian state as a social state of law, and in article 334, which establishes
that the state is in charge of directing the economy and that it should seek the equitable
distribution of opportunities and the benefits of development, full employment of human
resources, and ensure that all persons, particularly those with the lowest income, have
effective access to basic goods and services.
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The new Constitution also established that the state would promote the access of
all Colombians to rural and urban property, foment the participation o f workers in the
companies they work for, and encourage associative and solidary forms o f management
o f property. It also established the social function o f private property and enterprises
(article 333), and leaves open the possibility that they be expropriated when they do not
fulfill this function, even by an administrative process with no judicial process for
expropriation (article 58).

This decision was highly criticized for its effects on the

economic liberalization model, since it is argued that it could frighten foreign investment
away.

In relation to the planning of economic and social development, the Constitution
establishes the possibility of ample participation of the entrepreneurial, social, cultural,
political ecological sectors in the National Planning Council.

But the Constitution also contains norms o f neoliberal inspiration such as those
that establish the independence o f the Central Bank and, therefore, o f monetary, credit
and international exchange rate policy, with which it recognized the global tendency in
these matters (Maxfield, 1997 and 1999). Economic freedom is guaranteed in article
333, which establishes that the state “will impede the obstruction or restriction of
economic freedom and will avoid or control any abuses by persons or enterprises o f their
dominant position in the national market”. The privatizing neoliberal spirit is manifest
in the articles that establish that the private sector could participate in offering public
services, and that the government could sell or liquidate state enterprises or grant private
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firms the right to fulfill their functions when the former do not do so efficiently” (article
336).

Given this ambiguity, in which interventionist welfare-state norms are blended
with neoliberal norms, the Constitutional Court has taken charge, through its decisions,
o f emphasizing the social and equitable nature o f the new political charter. This is one
o f the reasons why it can be considered the garantor of the progressive spirit of the new
constitution and the creator of a viable context for applying its norms.

But the proliferation of socioeconomic rights is undoubtedly the principal
characteristic of the Constitution o f 1991 in economic matters. This is due to the fact
that, traditionally, the social policy of the state was always the last priority and was
never translated into significant financial resources to make it viable.

At the first

inflationary or fiscal obstacle, the social policy was abandoned. The Constitution tried
to modify this situation by establishing that social spending would no longer be a residue
o f the economic policy but rather the main obligation of the state. As has already been
shown, many norms show a clear intention to intervene in the functioning of the
economy and to orient public spending to guarantee its citizens, especially the poorest
sector, effective enjoyment of socioeconomic human rights. Thus, for example, one o f
the most controversial norms for the partisans o f a neoliberal economic policy are
articles 356 and 357, which establish a series o f constitutionally obligatory transfers o f
resources from the national budget to the departments and municipalities to attend the
basic needs of education and health of its poorest citizens.
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At present, these transfers represent about 45% of the current revenue of the
central government. This situation has generated three points o f confrontation between
the model o f social liberalism, established by the constitution, and the neoliberal model
proposed by the government. In the first place, the promoters o f the neoliberal model
argue that the transfers of resources have generated rigidity in the assignment of public
spending, which clashes with neoliberal ideas o f flexibilizing the allocation of resources
and also produces “fiscal laziness” in local governments and communities with respect
to generating their own resources (Departamento Nacional de Planeacion,1981;
Presidencia de la Republica-Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, 1992). In the second
place, liberalization of the economy has implied the dismounting of tariffs on foreign
commerce, which were one of the main sources of fiscal resources for the state for many
years. Therefore, there is a need to seek new sources of fiscal income to finance the
above-mentioned social spending obligations established by the new constitution which
add up approximately to 400 billion pesos and represent 2% of the GDP (Sarmiento
Palacios, 1992). Nevertheless, it is not easy to obtain new fiscal resources for covering
the new public expenditures mandated by the 1991 Constitution due, among other
reasons, to the structural limitations imposed by the neoliberal economic model, which
implies reducing the fiscal deficit and, as far as possible, avoiding increases in taxes.
There is, therefore, a conflict between the demands of the new constitution and the
postulates o f the new economic model. Thirdly, it is argued that the resources transferred
from the cemtral government to the departments and municipalities are wasted or
improperly allocated, due to clientelist practices and corruption. Although there is much
truth to this argument, the remedy to these problems cannot be the reduction o f resources
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for the social policy of the state. Furthermore, this situation clearly shows the cultural
conflict generated between the features o f political pre-modernity introduced by the
regime and the demands for full modernization imposed by the new constitution, the
neoliberal model and the global context. In the fourth place, the agreement on fiscal
adjustment signed by the Pastrana government (1998-2002) and the International
Monetary Fund in 2000 demands, among other things, the reduction and rationalization
of the above-mentioned transfers to the regions. With this, it is not only the
confrontation between the two societal projects that becomes more evident, but the
influence of exogenous factors on domestic policies as well.

4.3 The Balance o f the New Constitution: A Societal Project w ithout
Consensus

As shown above, the Constitution o f 1991 is a project that seeks to re-establish the
Colombian state and society and overcome the political and social crisis through the
quest for peace and reduction of violence, the broadening of democracy and human
rights, the strengthening and relegitimation of the state and the political regime, and the
search for equity. However, after ten years of attempts to strengthen this constitutional
project, the political crisis has not only not been solved, it has indeed worsened.

In fact, the armed conflict has intensified, despite the fact that the Constitution
was conceived as a pact of peace among Colombians. Nevertheless, the agreement was
not possible due to the fact that the significant actors in the armed conflict, such as the
guerrilla groups FARC and ELN, the military, and the paramilitary, did not participate in
it. Furthermore, the armed conflict is due in part to the lack of agrarian reform and
modernization and technical development of agricultural production. However, neither
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the peasants nor the large landholders participated in the Constitutional Assembly either.
And although the Constitution established the social function o f property, until now it
has not been possible to carry out an agrarian reform, due to the limitations imposed by
the power structure in Colombia, where vested interests linked to large rural landholders
still wield significant weight.

Despite the General Prosecutor's successes in combatting organized crime, the
administration of justice, not only in criminal matters, but in civil, labor and family
matters as well, continues to be very deficient (Giraldo, 1996). Criminality and impunity
still run very high. Violations of human rights persist, although some progress was made
in terms of their recognition and judicial protection.

In relation to the opening of the political regime and its democratization, it can be
said that the Constitution laid the foundations for making the transition from
bipartisanship to a multi-party system, but the new political forces are still too weak and
fragmented to dispute the place of the traditional political parties. Nevertheless,
significant spaces were opened up for ethnic and political minorities, and progress was
achieved in terms o f conscientization and citizenship formation.

However, the new

channels for direct political participation have not been fully utilized as yet, due to the
weakness and fragmentation of civil society and its poor capacity to organize
autonomously,

which

hinders its participation in the decision-making process as a

strong interlocutor of the state.

Clientelism and corruption still typify the political regime. The traditional
political class has attempted to dismount the reforms introduced by the new constitution,
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or has managed to evade the restrictions it imposed in order to legitimate Congress and
political activity. The fact that the Pastrana government (1998-2000) and the
independent political forces have attempted, unsuccessfully, to reform both Congress
and the electoral system in the past three years despite the reforms introduced by the
Constitution o f 1991, shows the limited transforming power that legal norms or "formal
institutions", as North denominates them (1990), have had in these matters. According
to North, historic change is the result o f the interplay between formal institutions which
can be modified by the intentional actions o f actors, and the resistance opposed by
informal norms constituted by the culture, which resists all attempts at intentional
modification. From this point o f view, it can be said that the new constitution's efforts to
modify clientelism and

corruption have been precarious indeed since they are the

expression o f a pre-modem political culture that has existed for centuries. The conflict
between the traditional political class and the new constitution, as noted by Feman
Gonzalez, “demonstrates the lack o f congruence between the more modernizing
regulations and the concrete functioning of the institutions that operate in a more
traditional world” (1993: 18).

On the other hand, the progressive and modernizing forces that gave rise to the
constitutional process did not manage to consolidate either their predominance over the
traditional political forces or the unity needed to obtain sufficient power to become an
alternative o f change in the following stage.

Suffering from a lack of popular roots,

internal conflicts, or victims of the violence itself, they became weakened or fragmented
politically, as in the case o f the M l 9, EPL, and the Movement for National Salvation. As
Manuel Jose Cepeda has said, although the Constitutional Court has attempted to
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maintain the reforming spirit of the Constitutional Assembly, "it has been the victim of
the context. It lacked something that it could not create: a configuration o f political
forces similar to those that gave birth to the Constitution de 1991 (2000: 526).

Finally, despite the Constitutional Assembly's attempt to make Colombian
society more equitable, social inequality has increased, as will be seen in the next
chapter, as a result of the neoliberal economic reforms.

In recent years there have been several different interpretative attempts to explain
the "failure" of the Constitution o f 1991. Some o f them, like that mentioned by Gonzalez
(1991), emphasize the limitations of the legal norms to transform society in depth. Other
interpretations attribute the failure to the weakness of the state and to the fact that the
Constitution fell short o f fulfilling its goal of democratizing the political regime,
especially with respect to internal democratization o f the political parties (Bejarano,
1994). Other interpretations consider the time factor and maintain that ten years is a very
short lapse of time for new institutions to mature and become consolidated. Finally, a
recent

interpretation

has

argued that the

Constitution

of

1991

increased

the

ungovernability o f the political system, due to the great number o f institutions that it
created and, especially, to an excess of socioeconomic rights and transfer o f resources to
the regions that it stipulated. All o f this has generated expectations that the government
cannot fulfill, obstacles to economic growth, and impediments and conflicts in the
relations among state authorities (Alesina, Kluger y Rosental, 2000),

Nevertheless, the thesis presented in this dissertation is that the Colombian
Constitution of 1991 did not succeed in putting an end to the country's political crisis, not
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merely because of its insufficiencies or excesses, but because it is a project to create an
equitable society which has entered into sharp confrontation with another societal project
of neoliberal inspiration. And to date, neither of the two has obtained sufficient consensus
to impose itself due to their contradictons, the weakness of the state, the fragmentation of
the elites, the weakness of civil society, and the limitations imposed by globalization.

The global context also contributes to making the new constitution ambiguous
because, on the one hand, it reinforces the democratizing tendencies and respect for
human rights (elements of the new worldwide political agenda) but, on the other hand it
reinforces neoliberal tendencies which reduce, at the domestic level, the margin for
manoevering of governments and political forces to undertake and demand social reforms,
since they require what neoliberalism denies: orientational activity of the state in the
economy, strong social spending, and progressive taxation.

Chapter 5
Colombian Societal Project II: Neoliberal Restructuring

In this chapter I will provide an intial reflection upon the prior socioeconomic context in
which neoliberal reforms were inserted (5.1). Next I will describe the composition of the
business groups which have been affected by changes in the Colombian economic model
(5.2), and discuss their diverse reactions to this process (5.3). I will also analyze the
dynamics and contradictions of such a process (5.4 and 5.5), and the way in which it
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contributed to political regime change and to the fragmentation o f the economic elite’s
groups. Finally, I will refer to the way in which transformations in the economic model
implied the breakdown o f political agreements with the labor class and the reduction of
benefits obtained by it during the hey days o f import substitution industrialization (ISI),
which also signified a change in the political regime (5.6).

5.1. E conom ic Liberalization: An A dequate Societal Project?

As shown in the theoretical framework, the new global technological, economic, and
political conditions have led, in Latin America in general, and in Colombia in
particular, to a series o f modifications of economic and state structures that, in turn,
modify the relations among society, the economy and politics. From the national
point o f view, neoliberal reforms are also due to the decisions o f the Colombian
technocratic elite.

This restructuring, as already mentioned, revolves around the

points o f the Washington consensus, i.e., a) reducing the state’s size by reducing
public expenditures and privatizing public enterprises; b) decentralizing the state’s
activity and transferring the responsibility for providing and financing public
services to local governments; c) liberating prices and interest rates from state
control, and deregulating economic activity; d) introducing regressive taxation; e)
reducing tariffs and barriers to foreign trade; and e) making the labor force market
more flexible.

These reforms were introduced in Colombia towards the end o f the Barco
government (1986-1990) and during the Gaviria government (1990-1994), for the
purpose o f making the transition from the import substitution industrialization (ISI)
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economic model to one o f liberalizing and internationalizing the economy. These two
governments, and the Gaviria administration in particular, based their economic policy
on the Washington Consensus' common diagniosis for all Latin American economies,
i.e. that the excessive protectionism o f the old ISI model is one o f the main causes o f
reduced productivity and the slow growth of the national economy (Presidency o f the
Republic, 1991; Montenegro, 1991). However, it is necessary to point out two things
regarding this diagnosis.

In the first place, the economic liberalization policy in

Colombia was not the result o f a need for severe economic adjustment programs in
Colombia because, unlike other Latin American economies, Colombia had a lower level
o f foreign debt and therefore suffered less from the debt crisis o f the eighties and had
managed to maintain a moderate, stable economic growth rate and avoid hyperinflation.
In fact, the average inflation in Colombia between 1970 and 1995 oscillated around
22%, and the economic growth rate fluctuated between 3% and 6% during the 19501990 period (Misas, 2001: 115-116). According to some economists, this was thanks to
the fact that economic policy during the second half of the twentieth century has been
managed with prudence, pragmatism, gradualism and stability, as a result o f political
and institutional agreements. If, as has already been mentioned, these agreements gave
rise, from a political and social viewpoint, to a hybrid regime that blends elements of
premodernity and modernity (in terms o f the coexistence of agrarian and industrial
interests, along with clientelism and political rationality), from the economic viewpoint,
it was expressed in a stable exchange rate, moderate inflation, and moderate fiscal and
balance of payments deficits (Ocampo, 1992; Florez, 2001).
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In the second place, various economists, historians, and political scientists have
pointed out that both industrialization and state interventionism were very weak in
Colombia due, among other things, to the weight o f agrarian interests and agricultural
production in the country's economic activity (Gomez Buendia, 1976; Palacios, 1980b;
Ocampo 1992). Therefore, neither state protectionism nor the inward development
model is the cause o f the Colombian economy’s structural problems.

In this respect,

Ocampo affirms that
protectionism clearly preceded industrialization but w as incapable in its e lf o f
inducing dynam ic industrial d evelop m en t.
Furthermore, o n ce the
industrialization p rocess w as initiated, protection perform ed a secondary role,
i f com pared w ith the e ffects o f the exp an sion o f the internal market induced
by the c o ffe e bonanza at the b egin n in g o f the tw entieth century, the external
eco n o m ie s generated by the integration o f c o ffe market into the international
market, the e ffe c ts o f that integration on the traditional internal d om estic
eco n o m ic structures, and the strong fluctuations in the real exch an ge rate
generated by the c o ffe e c y c le (. . .) the country m ade an early transition to a
m ixed m odel that com bined the substitution o f imports w ith the prom otion o f
exp orts (. . .) the serious problem s o f industry in term s o f productivity,
structural dynam ism and financial fragility on ly began in the m id -sev en ties
w h en any import substitution strategy had been abandoned (. . .) already
lack in g any strategic con cep t o f its role in the d evelop m en t p rocess, industry
beca m e very vulnerable to diverse external and internal sh o ck s” (O cam po,
1992: 19).

But despite the fact that the country maintained a positive economic growth rate,
without great traumatisms in the second half o f the twentieth century, except for the past
four years, during which the economy has experimented the worst recession of the
century, its growth dynamic was not sufficient to integrate a large part o f the population,
redistribute income, or modernize its productive structure.

This situation was due to

various factors, including a symbiosis of the agrarian and commercial elites in the
formation of the industrial entrepreneurial class, the small size o f the internal market and
the limited expansion o f the salary relationship. This led to slow growth of the internal
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demand, and determined the formation o f scarce, poorly diversified industries,
specialized in the production o f non-durable consumer goods, which suffered an early
process o f oligopolization. All o f this created little need for enterprises to increase their
installed capacity or to incorporate technological advances in order to increase work
productivity (Misas Arango, 2001).

When, at the beginning o f the sixties, the

Colombian state attempted to undertake a second, more intensive phase o f the
industrialization process,

characterized by the production of intermediate goods,

Colombian industrialists firmly opposed it. Only
the action o f the state - very sm all w hen com pared w ith the rest o f Latin
A m erica - and the association with certain m ultinational suppliers, m ade it
p ossib le to introduce the petrochem ical industry, the chem ical industry, and
other producers o f interm ediate inputs into the country (M isa s A rango, 2001:

120).

If the Colombian state, despite its weakness, was the promoter o f this process,
then excessive state interventionism in the Colombian economy cannot be blamed for
the country's economic stagnation, but rather the fact that more o f this type o f
intervencion was needed. In any case, the productivity o f the Colombian economy has
fallen drastically in the past three decades, and compared with other Latin American
economies, it suffers from a technological lag o f more than twenty years, its production
has concentrated on the internal market, and it is in no condition to take advantage o f the
opportunities the economic opening has provided for it to become integrated into the
world market (Garay, 1998). This situation shows that, despite the supposedly wise and
prudent management of economic policy by the economic and political elite, there has
been neither leadership, nor clarity, nor vision of the future to orient the country's
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socioeconom ic development.

This affirmation is corroborated by Garay when he

affirms that
C olom b ian so ciety has traditionally been a so ciety characterized by a culture
adverse to investm ent and capital accum ulation, and m ore prone to
con su m p tion and negative savings. In the past thirty years the rates o f sa v in g s
and private investm ent has never surpassed a very m oderate average lev el (. .
,) in contrast w ith eco n o m ies that have had to sign ifican tly increm ent (triple
or quadruple) their lev els o f savin gs w ith respect to the gross d om estic
product, in a period o f tw o or three d ecad es, in order to d ev elo p (1 9 9 9 : 148).

Thus, what Max Weber called the “spirit o f capitalism”, i.e., the accumulation o f capital
based on the values o f productive work and investment and the “ascetic life”, i.e.,
savings with foresight for the future, has been absent in Colombia, and adoption o f the
neoliberal model o f economic liberalization has contributed to making this evident.

Therefore, it can be deduced that the ISI and state interventionism per se di not
cause the lack o f dynamism and growth in the Colombian economy,

but rather a

complex articulation o f historic factors. Hence, the desirable societal model in
Colombia, from the economic and social viewpoint, would be the strengthening of the
productive structure through the incorporation of new technologies, expansion o f the
internal market, and incorporation o f large sectors o f the population that have been
excluded from the market and the opportunity to consume. Nonetheless, global
tendencies have imposed the articulation o f the Colombian economy with the world
economy. This explains why the policy makers o f the Gaviria government, ignoring the
history of the Colombian economy, assumed the inadequate diagnosis of the Washington
Consensus, and made the decision to change the economic model. This resulted in a
paradox since in order to change the country’s political-institutional structure by means
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o f the Constitutional Assembly, there was an ample consultation process with the
participation o f almost all the political and social forces, the adoption of the neoliberal
development model was done unilaterally and with no consultation, which simply
reinforced the confrontation between the those who favored one or the other o f the two
different societal projects.

5.2. The Main Colombian Business Groups

In this section I will sketch out the main economic interests that exist in Colombian
society, in order to provide basis for understanding the distinct positions of the business
sector facing changes in the accumulation model.

The interests o f large farmers and landholders are represented by the Sociedad de
Agricultores de Colombia (Colombian Farmers Society), SAC, founded intially in 1871
and refounded in 1904, and by the Federacion de Ganaderos (Confederacy o f Cattle
Raisers), FEDEGAN, founded in 1963. Until the first half of the XXth century, SAC
had a significant influence upon the economic policy; in the second half , however, it
progressively lost its power (Urrutia, 1981). Nevertheless, its interests, as well as those
of FEDEGAN, are over-represented in the Congress of the Republic (Hartlyn, 1985) due
to the fact that such an institution, even today, largely represents the interests of the rural
elite, in spite of the increasing urban composition of the Colombian population. Given
that agrarian production received significant state protection and subsidies, this sector
has been one of the most affected by the adoption of the free market model.
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The Federation National de Cafeteros (National Confederacy o f Coffee
Growers), FEDECAFE, founded in 1927, represents, as its name indicates it, the
interests o f coffee growers and exporters. Until the 1980s, it was Colombia’s most
powerful business organization, given the importance of coffee exports for the growth of
the economy. The coffee economy also established the bases for capital accumulation
that enabled the development o f the country’s industrialization as of the 1930s.
FEDECAFE controls more than the 50% of Colombian coffee exports; fulfills not only
private but also a serie of state functions, such as the administration of the National
Coffee Fund; owns a myriad enterprises and investments in the financial, agroindustrial,
and air and maritime transportation sectors; and is the head of a series of
socioeconomics institutions in the Colombian coffee regions.

For this reason,

FEDECAFE has been described for the analysts as "part business organization, part
public company, and part industrial and financial conglomerate” (Urrutia, 1981: 143).
However, FEDECAFE’s power has decreased notoriously, as it will be discussed below,
due to the new political and economic national and international conditions, especially
the breakdown o f the International Coffee A greem ent.

The Country’s industrialization and increased state interventionism which
developed since the 1930s gave rise to the diversification o f social interests and to
multiple organizations for representing new economic interests. Such change was
presented in this manner by one Colombian analyst:
"private interests began increasigly to organize in a b u sin ess-lik e w ay, to take
advantage o f the econ om ic intervention o f the state, and to be able to influence
its d ecision s. A t the sam e tim e these b u sin eess groups served as a c o h esiv e
force to face the new social order, g iv in g w ay, esp ecia lly after 1938, to a kind
o f corporative econom y" (Bejarano, 1985: 214).
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So farmers, cattle raisers and caffee growers had to share their power with a new
business group, the Asociacion Nacional de Industrials (National Industrialists
Association), ANDI, founded in 1944.
industries.

It represents the interests o f large national

The interests of small and medium industries are represented by the

Asociacion Colombiana Popular de Industrials (Colombian Popular Association of
Industrialists), ACOPI, founded in 1951. Given that these two sectors produce mainly
for the internal market, they have been seriously affected by economic liberalization.

The interests of

merchants are represented by the Federacion Nacional de

Comerciantes (National Confederacy of Merchants), FENALCO, founded in 1945. The
financial sector is represented by the Asociacion Bancaria de Colombia (Colombian
Banking Association), ASOBANCARIA, founded in 1936, and by the Asociacion
Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (National Association of Financial Institutions),
ANIF, founded in 1974. Both of these sectors have been benefited from the politics of
commercial liberalizacion and financial globalization.

As of the 1970 there has been a proliferation of business sectors guilds. From 22
existing business groups in 1950, the Colombian business community grew to 81
organizations in 1981, 106 in 1980 and 200 in the 1990s (Urrutia, 1981; Rettberg, 2000).

At the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s, the diverse guilds of the business sector
tried to unify in a common organization, in order to strengthen themselves as
interlocutors of the State, to fill the gap left by political parties, and to better face the
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country’s political and economic crisis.

This common organization was the Frente

Gremial (the Business Front), created in 1981, whose existence was short-lived; and the
Consejo Gremial Nacional (the National Business Counsel) created in 1991, that still
exists but has failed in agglutinating the business community, given that o f 200 guilds, it
only represents 15 organizations. With the exception these efforts, it can be affirmed
that the business community’s interest representation is highly disperse, given its
incapacity to unify, which makes it weak and dependent upon the state. At the same
time, the state’s stability depends in great part upon the business sector support, which
gives to the political regime a certain corporativist character. However, it is an "ad hoc
corporativism" (Gallon, 1982) given that it does not evidence a stable structure, and the
economic rules o f the game are negotiated for short periods, and sector by sector. Until
the end of the 1980s, FEDECAFE and ANDI had, within such a state-businnes sector
relations framework, a privileged position for negotiating their interests. Proof o f this is
the fact that ANDI occupied a seat on the board o f trustees o f nearly 60 state entities
(Osterling, 1989: 206). However, this privileged position was displaced in the 1990s by
the Colombian four largest business conglomerates.

The largest entrepreneurial groups began to form in Colombia in the the 1970s,
by means o f fusions, acquisitions o f some enterprises by others, and horizontal and
vertical integration among them. These groups can be defined as “related firms held
together through interlocking directorates, holding companies, cross-financing, and often
continued family ownership” (Maxfield and Schneider, 1997: 45). At the end of the
1970s there were ten o f these groups in Colombia (Silva, 1978), and there are about
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twenty at present. Nevertheless, the most significant and powerful groups in Colombian
economy and politics are the so-called “big four". These are: a) the “Antioquia
Syndicate”, composed o f 118 firms that cover the following sectors, among others:
financial (20 firms), food products (18 firms), textiles (10 firms), insurance (9 firms),
cement (9 firms), investments (7 firms), and commerce (4 firms); b) The Bavaria
Entrepreneurial Group, which originated in the country's oldest and largest brewery. It is
made up of 80 firms in the following sectors: investments (11 firms), beverages (10
firms), telecommunications and means of communication (9 firms), air transport (4
firms), and services, among others; c) the Aval Group (Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo
Organization), which includes 51 firms mainly in the financial sector (24 firms),
investments

(12

firms),

industrial

(6

firms),

construction

(5

firms),

and

telecommunications, among others; and d) the Ardila Liille Organization, which
originated in the soft drink industry and now includes 46 firms in the following sectors:
textile (12 firms), investments (9 firms), sugar (7 firms), telecommunications and means
of communication (5 firms), financial (4 firms), beverages (2 firms), among others.

Together, these four large entrepreneurial groups own more that 295 of the
country's enterprises, and reported 1,900,000 dollars in utilities in 1997 (Semana, May 4,
1998, p. 83-90), which is equal to more than 2% of the GDP. This means that these four
large groups constitute the main motor of economic growth in Colombia. These groups
have benefited from the economic opening and liberalization policy, as it will be discuss
subsequently.
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Finally, it is important to reiterate that economic stabilization and restructuring
processes in America Latina have taken place not only due to the changes in the
technology and in the world economy, but also to the rise o f new coalitions o f national
interests.

An important expression of such a phenomenon has been the growing

influence o f technocrats in the decision-making process (Centeno and Silva, 1998). The
importance o f teams of economic experts in Latin American governments increases to
the extent in which they displace traditional politicians in the decision-making processs,
political controls upon their activities are weakened, and their social insulation grows.
This situation guarantees the autonomy o f such teams, since the the content o f economic
restructuring programs can be justified as the result of technical decisions. Therefore, in
this decision-making style, political negotiations and ideological fights tend to be
displaced by criteria o f scientific rationality.

In point 3.3 I showed how this

phenomenon was produced gradually in Colombia since the mid-20 century.

The

technocratic elite has been, therefore, one o f the main actors o f changes in the
accumulation model in Colombia, and its appearance on the political stage has
fragmented, still more, the Colombian elite. But far from being a unified actor, state
economic teams also exhibit splits and confrontations, as will

be illustrated

subsequently.

5.3. T he Early Stage o f Econom ic Liberalization: Am biguities and O ppositions

The economic liberalization model had already been adopted during the government of
Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978), who wanted to turn Colombia into the “the Japan of
South America.” But at that time, the country's industrial structure was not prepared to
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face the competition o f external industries that competed on the international market in
prices and quality, by virtue o f technological advances (Misas Arango, 1994 and 2001).
Years later, the Barco government's (1986-1990) development plan again referred to the
need to adopt a model o f liberalizing and internationalizing the economy. The Barco
government intended to iniciate the process in m id-1989, but decided to postpone the
decision, due to the crisis of the coffee economy, produced by the rupture of the
International Coffee Pact, and the need to concentrate efforts and resources on the war
on drug-trafficking which was then at its most intense level.

At the end of February 1990, the government officially announced the
implementation of its economic liberalization policy through a report to the head o f the
National Planning Department to the mass media, who affirmed that economic
liberalization was a fact that was “unpostponable, imminent and irreversible” (La
Republica, February 19, 1990, p. IB). The basis o f the liberalization policy was a
document (Conpes-DNP, 1990) that took up the recommendations o f a study o f the
Colombian economy, done by the World Bank, which called attention to the need to
turn the external sector o f the economy into the motor force of development, by means
of liberalization of the economy that will allow the country's full insertion
world market (World Bank, 1987).

into the

That document was based on the Washington

Consensus' diagnosis for all Latin American economies, according to which the ISI
protectionist development model had been exhausted and had not generated any
significant economic growth, nor any competitive participation o f the Colombian
economy in international markets. The recommendations made by the study in mention
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included liberation o f the exchange rate as a major instrument for regulating foreign
commerce, the reduction o f tariffs, and the replacement o f the pre-importation license by
a more flexible mechanism. The Barco government accepted, without question, this
diagnosis and considered that the protectionist model had produced a distortion in
relative prices, and had not generated incentives for national industry to introduce new
technologies, which was manifested in low levels of efficiency and productivity.

In

order to initiate the process, the government announced measures such as the provision
o f financial resources for the technological modernization o f industry, the reduction of
tariffs, and the gradual and selective transfer o f goods that could not be imported under
the previous importation regime to a regime o f free importation, that measures were to
enter into effect within a period o f five years.

The government’s decisions generated a great debate about the scope and the
opportuneness o f the economic liberalization policy.

The Colombian Association of

Small and Medium-sized Industries, ACOPI, through its president, Juan Alfredo Pinto,
has expressed its concern and confusion with respect to what it considered to be a lack
of clarity on the part o f government regarding a decision as important as the change of
economic model and did still not understand why the decisions on a topic of such great
transcendence should be made known by means o f a mere report. ACOPI called for a
clear official pronouncement, made by the President of the Republic or the Minister of
Economic Development and not just "any functionary who thinks him- or herself
authorized to talk about the subject” (La Republica, February 19, 1990, p.IB).

The

Minister o f Development, Maria Mercedes Cuellar, tried to tranquilize businessmen by
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telling them they would not be affected by the new foreign exchange policy, since the
resources for financing the economic opening, coming from foreign loans, would be
granted in pesos in the country and not in dollars, and there would be ample deadlines
for payment..

ACOPI considered the economic liberalization to have been imposed by the
International Monetary Fund, which demanded the adoption of that policy as a condition
for granting foreign loans. Furthermore, it asked the government to revise the criteria
with which it assigned the quotas o f funds for importing, since the way they were
designed negatively affected small industry (La Republica, May 5, 1990, p. 1A-2A), and
the elimination o f all regulatory and political obstacles that the state imposed on the
country’s entrepreneurial and productive activity (El Colombiano, May 20, 1990, p.7A),
Despite these requests, ACOPI did not reject the opening on principle; on the contrary, it
affirmed that “one would have to be blind not to see that the opening is a necessity in
Colombia” (La Republica, February 19, 1990, p. IB). According to that association, it
was the only alternative for achieving GDP growth rates higher than 6%. Nevertheless,
ACOPI feared that the policy adopted by the government, with the support o f the World
Bank, would lead to the bankruptcy of a large number o f firms, and the subsequent
development of a modernization policy for those that manage to survive.

The National Association of Industrialists, ANDI, on the other hand, was openly
opposed to the economic opening policy. Its president, Fabio Echeverri Correa, affirmed
that it was a policy imposed by the World Bank that could lead to the bankruptcy of
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many Colombian firms, produce unemployment rates of 18% or 19%, and favor the
occupation of Colombian workers in countries like Venezuela, Korea, Taiwan and the
United States. The ANDI demanded clarity from the government in its formulation of
economic policy and steps to achieve a common accord with the private sector, so that
the economic liberalization would not affect its interests (La Republica, February 12,
1990, p. 10A).

For the ANDI, the economic liberalization should be gradual and

selective and the country's transport and communications infrastructure should be
improved as a prerequisite. Furthermore, the vice president o f the ANDI, Jorge
Bustamante, pointed out that it was not so clear that the ISI model had been exhausted
since there had been no studies that demonstrated the fact (El Tiempo, February 12,
1990, p. 5A).

The ANDI also indicated that in order to deal with economic

liberalization, it was necessary to carry out a series of labor law reforms, in order to
reduce the costs o f the labor force and flexibilize the labor market. In exchange, the
industrialists proposed the creation o f unemployment insurance for workers who lost
their jobs because of the liberalization (El Espectador, April 23, 1990, p.p 1A, 7A). In
the economic liberalization policy, entrepreneurs now saw the opportunity to concrete a
series o f demands regarding reduction of the costs o f contracting workers and
flexibilizing the labor market, that they had been presenting to the government since the
early eighties (Orjuela, 1984). The ANDI, which represents the interests of big
industries, criticized the accelerated pace at which foreign commerce was being
liberalized.

Big industry aspired to contain the free importation of products that

threatened national production, and to maintain certain levels o f protective tariffs (La
Republica, July 4, 1990, p.p. 1A-2A). In relation to the opportuneness o f the decision to
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open the economy, ANDI president Fabio Echeverri, indicated that it did not take
account o f the situation of national industry, or the country’s lack o f adequate
infrastructure to face international competition.

Therefore, Echeverri demanded

resources to achieve technological modernization, in order to increase productive
efficiency, reduce costs, and make Colombian exports competitive in the international
market (La Republica, April 27, 1990, p. 1A). Finally, the ANDI demanded that the
government reach a serious agreement with entrepreneurs and workers before permitting
the intervention o f international financial agencies (El Tiempo, May 20, 1990, p. 12B).
Workers supported these petitions (El Siglo, May 2, 1990, p. IB).
The National Federation o f Merchants, FENALCO, was initially in favor of
economic liberalization and shared the government’s diagnosis that it was the only
option to respond to the exhaustion of the ISI model, which manifested itself in the
scarce growth rate o f the GDP and industrial exports. With the reduced growth rates of
the Colombian economy, FENALCO president, Sabas Pretelt de la Vega, said that the
country would take 50 years to achieve the GDP of Argentina, 80 years that o f Mexico,
60 that of Venezuela, and 600 to reach that o f Germany (El Colombiano, February 11,
1990, p,9A), Nonetheless, FENALCO considered that many more financial resources
would be needed to develop the economic liberalization policy and proposed that the
government adopt measures to legalize the nationalization of Colombian capital
deposited in the international financial system. According to its calculations, there were
18 billion dollars that could returned to the country and used to finance the opening,
modernize the productive structure, and conquer external markets.

In any case,

FENALCO emphasized the need to provide diverse types o f support for the economic
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actors and to open the economy gradually and selectively. Failure to do so would be
counterproductive for business (El Tiempo, April 15, 1990, p. 1A, 8C).

Jorge Mendez Munevar, president of FEDEMETAL, the metalworks industry
association, also affirmed that the internationalization of the economy was due to the
demands of the international economic agencies that were willing to offer loans of 500
million dollars to Colombia if it reduced its tariffs. The industrialists of the metalworks
sector affirmed that the liberation of imports could end protectionism, which they
considered the last hope for Colombian industry. FEDEMETAL also rejected the
unilateral and non-consulted way in which the Barco government adopted the economic
opening policy, without considering the opinion of the nation’s entrepreneurs (La
Republica, July 18 de 1990, p. 1A-3A).

Land transport entrepreneurs, associated in COLFECAR, pointed out that for the
opening to be possible, it was necessary to modernize the ports and construct a much
more technified and modem highway network to integrate the country's diverse transport
systems.

They also requested resources and incentives for the replacement of old

vehicles through low-interest loans and reduced taxes (La Republica, April 16, 1990, p.
3A).

In turn, ANDIGRAF, the association of graphic industry entrepreneurs,
expressed its concern over the radical character the government was giving to the policy
of liberalizing and internationalizing the economy and criticized its acceptance o f the
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guidelines handed down by the international finance agencies. It pointed out that the
economic opening should be selective, i.e., limited to goods that are not exported or to
productive sectors that are not linked to external markets (El Tiempo, April 19, 1990, p.
5B).

CAMACOL, the construction industry association, which benefited from state
plans for the construction of housing and infrastructure, warned about the dangers to the
construction industry implicit in a policy to cut social spending in order to contain
inflation, produced by the accelerated devaluation by means of which the state sought to
increase the competitiveness of Colombian exports. CAMACOL also expressed its
concern over the World Bank’s demand that the Colombian government adopt more
radical measures in the economic opening process, as a condition for the disbursement
of loans already contracted with that entity.

According to CAMACOL, that would

represent a threat both to the stability of public investment and to the general dynamics
of the economy (El Colombiano, May 10, 1990, p. 7A).

Eliseo Restrepo, president of the Agricultural Society o f Colombia, SAC,
indicated that the Colombian economy was not yet in condition to undertake such an
opening, since it had great technical deficiencies, produced at high costs, and was not
prepared to meet the demands of the external market (El Espectador, May 1, 1990, p.
7A). The SAC and the National Federation of Cattlemen, FEDEGAN, considered that
the lack of protection for the agricultural sector would expose them to disadvantageous
competition from the subsidized production of the highly developed countries (La
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Republica, February 15, 1990, p. 10A). Therefore, the SAC considered it necessary to
adopt an agricultural modernization program that would make it possible to compete
internationally, to introduce mechanisms for more efficient commercialization of its
products and to establish more adequate tariffs than those that had been in effect until
then (El Tiempo, February 23, 1990, p. 10A).

The Barco government’s Minister of Finance, Fernando Alarcon Matilla, was
emphatic in rejecting accusations that the economic opening policy was a demand of the
international finance agencies, and affirmed that the government was autonomous in
defining economic policy.

He explained that Supplement VIII o f the "Challenger"

contract with the IMF, to accede to multilateral credit resources, only implied the normal
annual visit that the Fund makes to every member country and which results in an
internal report that is binding for rich and poor countries alike.

Furthermore, the

Minister pointed out that the economic opening should not be understood as a simple
liberalization of import, but rather as an effort to modernize the country’s productive
structure, in order to achieve higher growth rates. Nonetheless, he made it clear that the
government could not say how far it would advance in this regard. (La Republica,
February 12, 1990, p. 7A). But the Barco government, which was about to leave office,
decided to leave the task of developing and deepening the initiated process of opening
and internationalizing the economy to its successor.

The Gaviria government (1990-1994) continued broadening the politics of
opening and internationalizing the economy, on the basis of the Washington Consensus
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diagnosis. Therefore, the government also argued the change o f economic model was a
consequence o f the loss of dynamism o f growth and the low productivity o f the
Colombian economy due to the obsolescence o f the national productive infrastructure
(Montenegro, 1991).

Gaviria's government adopted a series o f deregulatory policies

which, while aimed at increasing the efficiency o f state administration and the economy,
resulted in social exclusion. These policies included: a) the flexibilization o f the labor
market through the reduction of workers' benefits like elimination of indefinite- term
contracts and privatization o f the state social security system; b) reduction o f import
taxes and duties, and the establishment o f regressive taxation in which the consumption
tax replaced the income tax as the principal source of financing o f state activity; c)
privatization o f public enterprises in the fields of maritime ports, airports, railroads,
telecommunications, and social security which resulted in the loss o f thousands o f jobs
in the public sector and d) the political, administrative and fiscal decentralization process
through which a great number of the central government's functions were transferred
to municipalities and their fiscal responsibility was increased.

Labor organizations took a stand against the economic opening policy and
affirmed that it was an imposition o f the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, that it would have negative effects not only on production

but on the living

conditions o f the workers, and announced the creation o f a “common front” to oppose
the policy of flexibilizing the labor market and liberation o f imports. Public employees
were especially affected by the policy of privatizing state functions and enterprises. This
meant the firing of around 30,000 workers, according to the National Government, and

180

more than 77.000 according to the Unitary Central of Workers, CUT (Archila, 1995:
263). Regarding the privatization policy, the National Federation of Workers in the
Service o f the State, FENALTRASE, manifested that it “eliminates institutions that have
have performed important public tasks in order to transfer them to the private sector,
which endangers social function fulfilled by these institutions.” They also manifested
that the measures taken by the government ignored “all social and labor rights” (El
Tiempo, December, 30, 1992, 8A).

There were two tendencies in the Gaviria government’s economic team: those in
favor o f total, accelerated opening, led by the Minister o f Finance, Rudolf Hommes and
the Director o f the National Planning Department, Armando Montenegro; and those in
favor o f a gradual, selective opening, led by the Minister of Economic Development,
Ernesto Samper.

President Gaviria did not take sides publicly but was in favor of

accelerated opening.

Business associations and workers supported the gradualist

position o f Minister Samper, with whom they identified regarding the inadvisability of
abruptly exposing national production to foreign competition.

Only FENALCO, the

merchants’ association, supported the government’s decision for total, accelerated
opening. FENALCO’s only objection was related to the exchange rate, because it
considered the pace o f devaluation to be too fast (La Republica, August 24, 1990, p.
3A). This position was due to the fact that the merchants would benefit from the
elimination o f the restrictions on foreign commerce, but could not take advantage o f it
because a high rate of devaluation would increase the price of imports, which would
diminish the volume of its associates’ operations.
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A significant difference between the Barco and Gaviria governments is that the
latter decided to apply the opening policy to the entire agricultural sector as well. In
fact, the Gaviria government announced that the protection of this sector would be by
means o f variable, automatic tariffs based on international prices, and not as had been
done previously, by means o f quotas and import licenses. Thus, the private sector would
have a broader field in which to commercialize imported agricultural products, which
would make it possible to privatize a state agency, the Agricultural Marketing Institute,
IDEMA, the function o f which was to guarantee sustained prices for agricultural
producers,

regardless of the costs and risks, which were assumed by this institute.

Sustained prices would therefore gradually lose their importance, and the costs and risks
would be assumed directly by the producers and investors, as in any other private
activity. Credit for fomenting the agricultural sector would be granted only to finance
commercialization infrastructure and transfer o f technology (El Tiempo, August, 23,
1990, p.p. 1A, 7A and 8A).

Associations o f agricultural entrepreneurs like the SAC and FEDEGAN, and
peasant organizations such as the National Association o f Non Proprietary Peasants,
ANUC; y the National Agrarian Federation, FANAL, among others, united to demand
that the government change its agricultural policy. These associations considered that
the sector should not be exposed to the international competition of farm products that
are highly subsidized by the industrialized countries, and that the farm sector could not
be expected to bear the weight o f the government’s anti-inflationary policy, one of the
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mechanisms of which was massive importation of food products to contain the
generalized rise in consumer prices. (El Tiempo, August 30, 1990, p.p. 1A y 6A).

The government’s position regarding these claims was ambiguous. On the one
hand, President Gaviria, in a speech before the National Agricultural Congress, attended
by more than 1500 delegates from 80 agricultural associations, promised to compensate
the sector for forty years of abandonment by the government, and for the negative
effects of the economic policy. For this purpose, he announced that the economic
opening policy would be gradual and without traumatisms for the agricultural sector. On
the other hand, in the same congress, the Minister of Agriculture, Maria del Rosario
Sintes, detailed the President's generic affirmations in affirming that the development of
the agricultural sector would be done on the basis of “the options offered by the
international market,” and that the objective of the agricultural policy was to achieve a
higher level of income for the producers, on a sound basis that would guarantee the
consolidation and broadening of agriculture in Colombia (El Tiempo, September 20,
1990, p. 12A). However, the Minister manifested that so as not to affect agricultural
production, the pre- importation license and taxes on imported agricultural products
would be eliminated gradually, in such a way as to establish a certain level of protection,
for the medium term, and a variable system of tariffs, for the long term, the purpose of
which would be to achieve a progressive adjustment of the costs of national production
to the real costs of the international market (El Tiempo, November 3 de 1990, p. 13B).
This mechanism was not clear to the agricultural producers, who indicated that the
government only emitted “signs of disconcert” (El Tiempo, November 20, 1990, p. 7A).
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For the associations within the agricultural sector, the above-mentioned positions meant
that the government abandoned the goal o f achieving alimentary self-sufficiency in the
country, that noncompetitive sectors would be sacrificed, and that the nation's
agriculture should become specialized in those products in which the country could take
advantage o f the possibilities o f the external market.

On the other hand, the Minister o f Development, Ernesto Samper, trying to
respond to the numerous objections to the economic opening policy, affirmed, within the
framework o f the First Mixed Foreign Commerce Commision, that the economic
opening would not be done behind the back of the entrepreneurs (El Espectador,
September 26, 1990, p. 7A) and that there would be foreign credit resources, in the
amount o f 1,100 million dollars to finance technological renovation and industrial
relocation projects to foment exports and promote small and medium-sized industry.
Furthermore, the National Planning Department announced programs to develop
transportation and communications infrastructure. That announcements were received
with skepticism by the producers, since they considered the amount announced by the
Minister o f Development to be insufficient, given that the mere renovation o f equipment
for the textile sector alone to enable it to compete in the international market would cost
500 million dollars, and the cost o f industrial renovation projects in their entirety
amounted to 4,500 million dollars (Revista Negocios, March, 1990, p. 26)
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5.4. The Deepening o f the Economic Liberalization

During 1991, three facts characterized the development of the Gaviria government's
economic opening policy: a) the creation o f the National Gremial Council on the part of
the business sector, b) the tensions and contradictions between the the policy to reduce
inflation and the policy to stimulate the growth o f the economy and exportations, and c)
the acceleration o f the policy o f liberalizing internationalizing the economy.

The creation of the National Gremial Council was the result o f an initiative of the
Gaviria government's Minister o f Development, Ernesto Samper, who sought to create
an institution that would group together the business sector, in order to more effectively
concert and discuss the measures o f the new economic model and the initiatives for
economic integration with other countries o f the region (Cepeda Ulloa, 1994, and Pretelt
de la Vega, 1994). For the entrepreneurs, the organization had, in addition, a double
purpose: on the one hand, as mentioned in a previous chapter, they sought to fill the gap
left by the political parties in relation to the need to deal with the problem of the
deterioration o f the social order, and on the other hand, they sought to achieve the
unification of forces to face the government, in order to better confront the economic
opening policy and defend themselves from it. The Council was integrated by fifteen of
the most representative entrepreneurial associations, such as the National Association of
Industrialists, the Agricutural Society of Colombia, the National Cattlemen's Federation,
the Sugar-Growers Association, the National Association of Exporters, the Colombian
Association of Flower Exporters, and the Banking Association, among others. However,
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this number is very small if one considers that the country has more than one hundred
entrepreneurial associations.

In relation to the industrial sector, the economic opening policy included, in
addition to the liberation o f imports, promotion of export development, technological
modernization o f the productive structure, and the foment of new productive sectors
with possibilities o f technological development. These objectives were assumed by
common accord with the private sector. Furthermore, two funds were created: one to
finance new investment projects, and another destined to help workers who were fired,
in order to grant them anticipated pensions, temporary unemployment aids, retraining
programs, and credit for the creation of micro-enterprises (El Tiempo, July 9, 1991, p.
8A). Nevertheless, the policy o f financial support for technological modernization of
enterprises

and

of construction

and

improvement

o f the

transportation

and

communications infrastructure of the country was scarcely developed.

To initiate the policy of support for technological modernization o f Colombian
industry so that it could compete in the international market, the government defined
seven basic industrial sectors: iron and steel, automobile, metalworks, leather, textiles,
and clothing manufacturing industries. Tributary stimuli were established for these
industries, reduced tariffs on the importation of capital goods and raw materials, and
internal and external credit, the latter in the amount of one billion dollars El Tiempo,
March 6, 1991, p,14B). One of the most significant measures was that related to the
automobile industry. In fact, this industry had been highly regulated by the state in
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relation to the models and the number of cars that could be assembled in the country,
and it was in the hands o f just a few firms that dominated the national market, thanks to
the very high protective tariffs on the importation of foreign cars. However, consumers
did not benefit in terms of options, quality or prices, compared with the international
market. To correct this situation, the government decreed total freedom for the
establishment of automobile-producing and -assembling companies, and substantially
reduced tariffs on imported spare parts (El Tiempo, May, 16, 1991, p. 8A).

An exogenous factor that had an influence on accelerating the opening and the
making of the above-mentioned decisions, was the series of negotiations for the
commercial integration o f Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, in order to form the
“Group o f the Three”. In fact, as a result of these negotiations the elimination of tariffs
was accelerated in the metalworks, automobile, steel, and petrochemical industries.
These sectors suffered, in the short lapse of eight months, the process o f eliminating
tariffs on foreign commerce, which was supposed to be carried out over a period o f four
years. This caused conflicts between the Minister of Development, Ernesto Samper,
who defended slow and gradual opening, and the industrial associations, despite the fact
that the former was considered by the latter to be the defender o f their interests within
the government. According to the Association of Steel Industrialists, INACERO, the
elimination of tariffs was harmful to the country, since many metalworks companies
would have to close, with the following social effects, since that sector generated
700,000 direct jobs and 350,000 indirect jobs (El Tiempo, April 1, 1991, p. 7B). Other
trade associations such as the ANDI and ANALDEX, and the plastic producers
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criticized these negotiations since they considered it inadvisable to enter into agreements
with a country like Mexico, which had a much stronger and more developed economy
and infrastructure of ports, roads, and communications than Colombia (El Tiempo, June
25, 1991, p.lOB). It could be said that in this case the integrating tendencies o f the
“geoeconomy” prevailed over domestic interests.

In relation to the agricultural sector, the Gaviria government sought to stimulate
the production o f goods in short supply and great demand in the international market,
promote the creation o f associations of cultivators to strengthen their national and
international competitiveness and reduce tariffs on cereals from 30% to 20% within a
lapse o f six months. This measure was severely criticized by farmers, who considered
that six months was too short a period to prepare the sector to face international
competition, and demanded a greater degree o f gradualism in the process o f eliminating
tariffs on foreign commerce (La Republica, July 6, 1991, p.8B). The Minister of
Agriculture, Maria del Rosario Sintes, announced that the main objective o f the
agricultural policy was to incorporate this sector into the economic opening and to
introduce market mechanisms into it and, therefore, the subsidized credit and the
sustained prices, guaranteed by the state, would end and would be left at the level of
international prices. Furthermore, tariffs on the importation of agricultural supplies
would also be eliminated in order to help to reduce production costs. The Minister said
that the agricultural sector's efficiency would not increase if the producers did not try to
make greater investments and to modernize the technologyused in agricultural
production (La Republica, July 10, 1991, p.p. 1A, 8A).
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These announcements were criticized by agricultural producers' associations,
who manifested that Colombia's agricultural production was not yet in any condition to
compete on the international market and, therefore, it was necessary to maintain
sustained prices and tariff protection for somewhat longer (El Tiempo, October 10,
1991, p.p. 1A, 3A; and Novembre 28, 1991, p.6C), and to achieve this, they were ready
to strongly oppose the government. According to Gustavo Cano, president o f the
National Farmers Association, the government was proceeding unilaterally by not
consulting fanners on the policies relating to the agricultural sector. According to Cano,
the planting o f wheat and barley was suspended due to the lack o f favorable conditions,
while the government stimulated the importation o f food products (El Espectador,
January 16, 1991, p. 8A). In the meantime, Dario Bustamante, manager of the
Agricultural Marketing Institute, IDEMA, a state agency, speaking in the name o f the
government, denied the lack of support for the agricultural sector and said that EDEMA
was willing to buy the crops at sustained prices. At the same time, he affirmed that the
government had the right to formulate an agricultural policy based on the free market, as
a mechanism for determining prices (El Tiempo, January 22, 1991, last p. section A).

But the plans and programs for modernizing the agricultural sector were not well
developed and did not produce greater technical development or increased productivity.
According to data from the Foreign Commerce Institute, INCOMEX, farm machinery
purchases decreased by 28 million dollars between January and September o f 1991,
which meant the greatest fall in recent years, despite the radical tariff reduction on
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imported machinery and the elimination o f many administrative obstacles (El Tiempo,
November 13, 1991, p. 12A).

According to agricultural sector entrepreneurs, this

situation was explained by the fact that they were not willing to make investments while
there was economic uncertainty and problems o f violence and public order (Ibidem).
This position was not accepted by the government and President Gaviria referred to the
fact in the annual assembly o f the SAC.

For Gaviria, the signs o f recession were

transitory and the measures adopted to internationalize the agricultural sector were fully
justified. Furthermore, stabilization o f the opening process would open broad horizons
for investment and productive development o f the agricultural sector (El Tiempo,
November 28,1991, p. 6C).

In response to the criticism from the agricultural sector, the Minister o f
Agriculture

indicated

that

farmers

could

not

continue

justifying

their

low

competitiveness with the argument o f the subsidies that the most industrialized countries
grant their agricultural products, and that they were not taking advantage o f the benfits
the government was offering them to acquire technology and supplies, a fact that was
reflected in their inefficient production (El Tiempo, July 6, 1991, p. 8B). But the most
important point in the confrontation between the government and the agricultural
producers was with the cotton-growers, when almost two hundred o f them carried out a
protest that included the blocking of an important national highway. The cotton-growers
demanded that the government intervene to improve their situation caused by the high
costs of supplies, decreased demand due to the fact that the textile industry was using
synthetic fibers, and low prices o f natural fiber in the national market. In response to the
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cotton-growers, the Minister o f Agriculture insisted on the need to modernize
agricultural production and accepted that it was necessary to adopt measures to improve
the situation o f the sector, but the decisions regarding the economic opening policy were
beyond the reach o f the Ministry o f Agriculture (El Tiempo, July 9, 1991. p. 9B).

As can be observed, positions regarding the economic opening policy were very
polarized and, for that very reason, given the lack of spaces for agreement, and
ambiguity on the part of the government, the adoption o f new measures generated
confrontations among the actors.

The new Minister o f Agriculture, Alfonso Lopez

Caballero, seemed to grasp this situation and, upon assuming office, announced that he
would continue the process o f economic liberalization in the agricultural sector, but
“without academic rigidity” and with the spirit of listening to the agricultural sector's
concerns, in order to make the restructuring process as little traumatic as possible (El
Tiempo, July 9, 1991. p. 9B).

5.4.1. T ensions between A nti-Inflation and Liberalization Policies

In 1991 the economic situation was characterized by a vacillating opening policy that
was highly confronted by the business sector; a decrease in international reserves, and an
annual inflation rate o f 32%, the highest in recent decades. In order to reduce inflation,
the government adopted monetary measures that restricted credit, controlled demand,
and permitted the accumulation o f foreign currency by attracting capital from abroad
(Giraldo Samper, 1993).

This situation originated a contradiction between two

objectives o f the Gaviria government's economic policy: the objective o f achieving
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general economic stability, sought by the Minister of Finance, the National Planning
Department, and the Monetary Board, and the objective o f achieving greater economic
growth of the different productive sectors which the Ministries o f Economic
Development, Labor, and Agriculture pursued more directly.

The monetary policy decisions adopted by the Ministry of Finance were oriented
to preventing increased inflation, but they made credit more expensive, which worked
against the entrepreneurs' need for an adequate flow of resources to finance their
production. Furthermore, the lower rate of devaluation, which in practice amounted to a
progressive reevaluation of the peso with respect to the dollar, was considered by
exporters to be an obstacle to the success of the economic opening policy, if it was
indeed to be understood as an effort to substantially increase Colombian exports, and not
just as greater freedom for importation. This fact was percieved by industrialists and
farmers as a a grave situation of uncertainty for the economy, and as an abrupt, unilateral
change in the rules of the game that the government had announced at the start o f the
economic opening process.

The government's decision to control inflation by reducing the prices of imported
goods was highly criticized by exporters, who were the most affected by this measure.
Jorge Ramirez Ocampo, president of the National Association of Exporters, ANALDEX,
manifested that that measure meant a revaluation of the peso and a denial of the
economic opening policy and that, if it were not possible to advance in this objective in
an inflationary environment, reduced inflation could not be achieved at the cost o f the
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producers; nor did they consider valid the government's argument

to justify that

measure, according to which it was now necessary to revaluate the peso because the
devaluation o f previous years had been excessive (La Republica, July 2, 1991, p. 8A).
According to the vice-president o f the ANALDEX, Javier Diaz, the government had
changed the rules o f the game for exporters, to the degree that it had revaluated the peso,
reduced tax stimuli such as the reimbursement o f taxes on exports, and increased interest
rates on loans from the Fund for the Promotion of Exports, PROEXPO (El Tiempo, July
11,

1991,

p.

14A).

Furthermore,

the

Federation

of

Metalworks

Industries,

FEDEMETAL, pointed out that the exchange measures threatened fulfillment o f the
economic integration agreements particularly those relating to the Andean Pact. This
was due to the fact that the adjustments generated by the exchange policy increased the
price differences among the member countries (El Mundo, November 8, 1991, p. 4A)
and exposed Colombian products to disadvantageous competition in the sub-regional
market.

On the other hand, the Confederation of Chambers o f Commerce,

the

Colombian Chamber o f Book Publishers, the Graphic Industries Association and the
Clothing Manufacturing Industries Association, indicated that the revaluation of the peso
with respect to the dollar, generated by the anti-inflationary policy, created an
environment favorable to the increase o f speculative activities, which was harmful to the
economy as a whole (El Tiempo, 1 November 11, 1991, p. 4C, and November 15, 1991,
last p.A).

Despite the industrialists' protests the government's priority was to curb inflation,
the increase o f which threatened the stability of the economy in general, and it was
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determined to do so, even at the cost o f affecting private sector interests and generating
uncertainty in the short term. The Director o f PROEXPO, Carlos Caballero Argaez,
expressed him self in this sense in defending the government's anti-inflationary policy.
Caballero accepted that the anti-inflation measures had generated high costs for
exporters, but considered that this situation would be transitory. He affirmed that the
first thing to seek was price stability, but recognized that without the stimulus o f the
exchange rate, the objective o f fomenting exports would not succeed (El Espectador,
July 20, 1991, p. 7B).

Industrialists joined exporters in their criticism o f the anti-inflationary and
exchange policy.

The National Association o f Industrialists, ANDI, for example,

pointed out that there were great contradictions between the economic opening and
technological modernization policy and the short term objectives, aimed at counteracting
the inflationary tendencies. The effects of that contradiction were not the best: credit
cuts and the consequent increase in interest rates (on both commercial credit and credit
to foment exports), revaluation o f the peso, and reduction o f tax incentives such as the
reimbursement of taxes for exports. The ANDI argued that it was impossible to fulfill
the economic opening policy objectives in these conditions, and therefore necessary to
adopt a series of measures to permit a return to a balance between the monetary policy
and the exchange policy, without hurting exports (El Tiempo, August 19, 1991 p. 12A).

The

Association

o f Financial

Institutions,

ANIF, pointed out that the

government’s restrictive measures had produced negative effects, such as $450,000
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million cut in investment, an increase in banks' lists o f defaulting debtors, that was
growing at an annual rate of 13%, and a reduction in savings deposits. This situation
partly explained the avalanche o f dollars that were entering the country and that had
produced an increase in foreign currency reserves of more than $ one billion dollars in
just seven months. All o f

this meant that, given the lack o f credit in the country,

businessmen were resorting to foreign financing (La Republica, August 13, 1991, p. 2B).

As far as the Banking Association is concerned, its president, Florangela Gomez,
considered it necessary to eliminate the marginal reserve requirement in order to
normalize the flow o f commercial credit, which had fallen $200,000 million during
1991, as a consequence o f the anti-inflationary measures. It was evident that it was very
important for the banks to have access to the resources taken out o f circulation through
the reserve requirement, in order to undertake a larger number o f brokering operations.
But the banks also realized that the scarcity o f credit resources could cause a dangerous
increase in the defaulting debtors' lists (La Republica, August 24, 1991, p.p. 1A, 4A).

M erchants supported the financial sector's request that the government modify
its anti-inflationary policy, so as to consolidate the commercial opening and promote
economic growth. Therefore, they proposed that the government adopt measures, such
as eliminating the marginal reserve requirement, reducing tariffs on the importation of
capital goods, eliminating exchange certificates as a form o f payment to exporters,
permitting Colombians to hold bank accounts in dollars within the country, establishing

195

stimuli for firms that modernize their technology, and fully promoting the privatization
process (El Tiempo, August 26,1991, p. 2B).

The Gaviria government's economic team was not unanimous in its opinion
regarding the advisability o f the measures to combat inflation. That, as mentioned above,
was due to the existence o f two different focuses on the economic liberalization and
internationalization policy: that o f Finance Minister, R udolf Hommes, and that of
Development M inister, Ernesto Samper. The latter requested the former to modify the
anti-inflationary policy, since it negatively affected fundamental industries for the
economic opening process, and to abolish the ninety-day period established for
converting the Exchange Certificates into pesos17, in order to provide greater liquidity to
exporters (El Tiempo, August 12, 1991, p.p. 1A, 8A). The Finance M inister responded
that the export-related exchange measures would not be modified, arguing the
inadvisability o f that decision (La Republica, August 13, 1991, p.p. 1A, 12A). In this
way, the disagreement within the government's economic team was made evident.

On the one hand, the M inister o f Development, Ernesto Samper, made his anti
monetarist and gradualist position clear and proposed a reduction o f the marginal reserve
requirement o f 10%, a percentage which, in his opinion, would perm it adequate
management o f an anti-inflationary policy (El Tiempo, August 28, 1991, p. 1A). Such a
decrease would imply the release o f 400,000 million pesos, which would be an
important flow o f resources for investment in industry (El Tiempo, August 29, 1991, p.
17 A market money instrument representative o f foreign currency, issued by the state to exporters, which
could not be cashed in until after ninety days.
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9A). This position was supported by Roberto Junguito Bonnet, member o f the board o f
directors o f the Bank o f the Republic, who considered it necessary to modify the
monetary policy, since in his opinion it was already showing signs o f exhaustion as an
anti-inflationary mechanisms and had negative effects on economic growth and on the
credit flow to the productive sector. Junguito thought it evident that the weight o f the
monetary stabilization efforts had fallen excessively on the control o f productive credit.
Furthermore, control o f the expansion o f the means o f payment through open market
operations, on the part o f the state, caused fiscal deficit, since it obliged the government
to cover the high cost o f these operations with public resources. Junguito concluded that
the monetary control policy exerted excessive pressure, causing interest rates to rise,
affecting productive investment, and leading to the massive entry o f capital from abroad.
(El Tiempo, August 29, 1991, p. 9A). Finally, the pressures, both internal and external,
led the government to propose to the Board o f Directors that the Bank o f the Republic
release $175,000 million pesos through the gradual dismounting o f the marginal reserve
requirement, so as not to affect the objectives o f the economic opening policy (El
Tiempo, August 30, 1991, p. 13A).

It is necessary to emphasize the Board o f Directors o f the Bank o f the Republic's
opposition to the Ministry o f Finance's monetary policy, since both entities have
traditionally acted in common accord on this topic. This significant fact, together with
the confrontations between the Bank and the Constitutional Court mentioned above,
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originated in the autonomy the Constitution o f 1991 granted the central bank in relation
to the management o f monetary policy.

In synthesis, during the second semester de 1991, there was great tension
between the two objectives o f the economic policy; the objective o f consolidating the
commercial opening, and the objective o f achieving macroeconomic stability. To
guarantee the former, the government should offer industrialists favorable conditions,
including an adequate flow of financial resources at acceptable interest rates, that would
permit investment in productive projects.

It was also necessary to

increase the

competitiveness o f national industry in the international market, which would require
resources to finance projects for the technological modernization o f industry, and a
favorable exchange policy for farmers, industrialists, exporters and merchants. Within
the government, this position was represented by the Minister o f Development and,
partially, by the Minister o f Agriculture.

However, the Minister o f Finance and the

National Planning Department were in favor of a macroeconomic stability policy o f a
monetarist type, that advocated the reduction of inflation through control o f the money
supply, even if this policy affected national producers in the short term. The acceleration
of the opening, which took place in the second semester of 1991, meant the defeat o f the
gradual opening position, defended in the government by the Minister o f Development,
Ernesto Samper, and the definitive triumph o f the more radical positions, defended by
the Minister o f Finance and the Head o f the National Planning Department.
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5.4.2. A cceleration o f Liberalization

Despite the fact that in July o f 1991 the government had rejected the Monetary Board's
recommendations to carry out a more radical liberalization, and had affirmed that it
would not modify either the taxes on exports, or the exchange and foreign trade policy
before January 1994 (El Tiempo July 26, 1991, p. 13A), in August o f 1991 the Minister
o f Finance announced acceleration of the economic restructuring process.

Thus, the

measures that were not supposed to enter into effect until 1994 were introduced ahead of
time, and national products entered into open competition with imported goods. The
decision to accelerate the opening implied a substantial tariff reduction, a decrease of
two points in the surtax on imports, increased devaluation and agilization of
privatization programs and the modernization o f ports and o f the highway network.
Tariffs were also eliminated on the importation o f supplies, raw materials, and capital
goods for industry. The agricultural sector was also included in the government's
decision to open the market.

Among the reasons the government adduced to accelerate the economic opening,
was, in the first place, the stagnation of exports, which businessmen attributed to the
general uncertainty created by the lack of definition and clear direction in the opening
policy; in the second place, the need to increase the supply o f imported goods, since the
government thought that it would have a rapid and positive effect in reducing inflation its main objective- and thus reduce the annual inflation rate to 22%. The substantial
reduction in investment and production costs due to the reduced of tariffs on imported
raw materials and capital goods would also contribute to this objective. The government
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considered that the decision to accelerate the opening would clarify the rules o f the
economic game. The policy was supported immediately by exporters. But the National
Association of Industrialists, ANDI, considered that the decision introduced new factors
o f uncertainty into productive activity, because it affected the planning of production
processes that were already underway, which had been undertaken with the criteria and
deadlines pointed out previously by the economic authorities. The ANDI considered
that the decision to accelerate the opening had been made unilaterally by the
government, without consulting with the private sector, and requested a return to the
previous tariff policy. Furthermore, they considered that the increase in international
reserves was due not just to less dynamic exports but also, mainly, to the restrictive
monetary policy that had prevented greater economic growth and propitiated the entry of
speculative capital, stimulated by the high interest rates (El Tiempo, August 27, 1991, p.
13A).

The industrialists were joined by the construction industry firms, organized in the
Colombian Chamber o f Construction, CAMACOL, who thought that acceleration of the
opening would have only negative effects on the Colombian economy. For CAMACOL,
the government measures generated uncertainty in business, deteriorated the credibility
of the economic policy, reduced the expectations of project investors, produced ups and
downs in the planning of business firms and traumatisms in the modernization process
(El Espectador, September 3, 1991, p. 8D).

Given the force o f the facts, the

industrialists could only express, once again, their intention to oppose the national
government. According to the president of the ANDI, Juan Guillermo Angel, the
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industrialists at least had the right to request real and effective participation in the
decision-making process that affected their activity, and that right had been violated by
the government. Furthermore, the business community demanded coherence and
continuity in government policies, as well as clear and stable rules o f the game to permit
the long-term planning and realization o f their economic activities, and to avoiding be
subject to fluctuations that made it impossible to create a climate favorable to productive
investment.

Finally, in relation to the role o f the Congress, the whole series o f economic
reforms needed to adopt the free market model in internationalization o f the economy,
was approved with very little opposition. This is explained by the following facts: in the
first place, the scarce interest in economic or, more precisely, macroeconomic matters in
the Congress. Given the clientelist nature o f the Congress, an economic law is approved
if it implies an allocation o f associated public funds to the regions or the interests o f the
congressmen. In the second place, the Congress was threatened with revocation o f its
mandate on the part o f the Constitutional Assembly o f 1991 at the time of adoption of
the new economic model.

Given this situation, the Congress, in approving the main

economic projects of the government, hoped to gain the support o f President Gaviria,
who had arisen through the rank and file o f clientelism. In the third place, the approval
of the new constitution and the winds of democratization that it introduced, contributed
to creating a climate that appeased the potential opposition within the Congress among
the representatives o f the social sectors that would be affected by the adoption of the
new economic model (Cepeda, 1994). Although the reforms that affected workers were
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approved, due to the reasons mentioned above, to the lack o f representatives o f the
working class in Congress,

and to the weakness of organized labor since union

membership consists o f less than 6% o f the Colombian labor force (Urrutia, 1994).

The government o f Cesar Gaviria was followed by that o f Ernesto Samper (19941998). Consequent with the position he had assumed as Minister o f Development during
the former government regarding adoption o f the new economic model, Samper tried to
introduce gradualism in adopting the model and to make it more equitable in nature.
With respect to industry, he designed a policy aimed at fomenting technological
development and the formation of human capital. In relation to the agricultural sector,
he developed programs to moderate the effects of the commercial opening and to
promote rural development. He also attempted to improve the country's transport and
telecommunications infrastructure. To make the objectives o f reducing inflation and
improving the situation of the social sectors most affected by the new economic model
compatible, Samper propitiated a reapprochement among producers, workers and
consumers, so as to reach an agreement on prices, salaries and productivity.
Nevertheless, the scandal o f the filtration o f a considerable amount o f drug-traffickers'
contributions into his presidential campaign funds, produced a chain o f events that
polarized the country politically and gravely affected its govemability, to such an extent,
that none of his proposals actually developed significantly. From this point of view, the
Samper government can be considered Colombia's lost quadrennium.
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In the academic world and the “think tanks” there has also been a debate on the
advisability of adopting the model of liberalization and internationalization o f the
economy, that led to the same polarization observed within the government and between
it and the business sector. On the one side, there are the academics who sustain that to
solve the problems of Colombian economy “it would be enough to follow the policies
suggested in the Washington Consensus" (Echavarria, 2000: 122). Nonetheless, this
analysts argue that “in most fields the reforms were not profound and became stagnated
during the Samper administration (1994-1998) that opposed his ‘social model’ to the
‘neo-liberal’ policies of the previous government” (Ibidem: 123). On the other side were
those who considered the crisis and the economic imbalances to be due precisely to the
adoption of the policies recommended by that consensus, since the commercial opening
contributed to the systematic deterioration of national industry. Instead o f an industry
that is competitive in the international market, “sectors have arisen that are highly
dependent on imports and have little capacity to generate employment. Furthermore,
their possibilities of expanding are limited” (Sarmiento Palacios, 2000: 51).

In synthesis, practically all the workers, businessmen from the different sectors
of production, and certain academic sectors expressed their

reservations and fears

regarding the neoliberal economic policy. All of this belied the affirmation of some
comparative-politics analysts to the effect that individual interests had lobbied in favor
of the neoliberal policy of restructuring the economy, and confirmed the conclusions of
Geddes (1995) in the opposite sense.

It is clear that the liberalization and

internationalization of the economy had to affect individual economic interests
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negatively, since half a century of implement o f the inward development model, had
meant a series o f advantages and benefits, the abrupt abandonment o f which would
affect them profoundly and negatively. Failure to take this structural background into
account is what leads many analysts to overestimate the strategic decisions o f the actors.
On the contrary, a “rational actor” would seek a strategy to avoid measures that affect
their vested interests, or a very slow supression o f the old economic structures, in order
to mitigate the negative effects.

5.5. From O ptim ism to Crisis

Prior to the adoption o f the new model o f free market and internationalization o f the
economy, there were a series of economic conditions in Colombia that fomented
speculation, such as: a) the production and commercialization o f cocaine; b) the massive
entry o f dollars resulting from the commercialization o f cocaine abroad and facilitated
now by the flexibilization of foreign currency exchange and the deregulation o f foreign
trade; c) the laundering of illegal dollars through the importation o f luxury consumer
goods, the construction o f housing, and the purchase of landholdings; and d) speculation
with the assets o f existing enterprises, which led to a lack o f real, new investment in the
productive sector (Misas, 1994) and to a lack o f technological renovation in the
productive structure o f Colombian firms.

If to this we add the already mentioned

structural difficulties associated with the introduction o f the new model, which made its
implementation slow and difficult, it can be said that, in practice, the new economic
model degenerated into a promotion of speculative capital, with financial and
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commercial systems, both legal and illegal, that became the new source o f capital
accumulation.

This dependence with respect to speculative activity gave the Colombian
economy certain characteristics and a dynamism that it maintained until 1995, and that
would otherwise be inexplicable, such as relatively high growth rates for a Latin
American country; accumulation of foreign currency despite the fact that Colombia
became more of an importing country than an exporting one; exportation o f capital;
revaluation of the peso at the same time that domestic production was too weak to
compete in the international markets; increased public and private spending due to the
availability of cheap credit, and a simultaneous decrease in internal savings.

In

synthesis, the economic model in fact became a tacit model of accelerated accumulation
of money capital in the short term, that did not benefit the productive sectores and was
therefore condemned to an ephemeral and conjunctural life.

In fact, as of 1996, the first recessive symptoms began to appear in the economy.
All the above-mentioned factors generated a series of macroeconomic imbalances,
increased importations with respect to exports, and an unemployment rate that reached
20% in the year 2000 (Sarmiento Palacios, 2000). The abundant capital that entered
from abroad generated a “dance of millions” that was channeled through the banking
system by means of the offer o f cheap credit, and towards importations, superfluous
consumption, and the purchase of housing (Florez, 2001). But when the interest and
unemployment rates increased, the result could not have been clearer: companies deeply
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in debt or en bankruptcy, homeowners unable to pay their mortgages, and increased lists
o f defaulted debtors in the banks, above tolerable levels. The Bank o f the Republic,
which should have acted as a "monetary policeman”, given the autonomy granted it by
the new Constitution, adhered to the will o f the government, and thus also contributed to
creating the conditions o f liquidity needed for the the above-mentioned expansion of
spending and the revaluation of the currency in the first half o f the nineties (Florez,
2001). The economy began to show recessive symptoms since 1996, for which reason
the government introduced a series o f measures to detain the crisis and recover the real
exchange rate that, as already mentioned, had been strongly reevaluated in the first half
of the nineties.

The end o f the “dance of the millions” revealed the vulnerability o f the economic
measures of the first five years o f implementation o f the new economic model. The
growth rate o f the economy plummeted and the construction and manufacturing sectors
entered into crisis. This situation worsened in 1998, when the economy experienced the
effects o f the Asian and Russian crises, examples o f external shocks that have multiplied
and have become more intense through the effects o f globalization. These effects were:
deterioration o f the country's terms o f exchange, with adverse implications for national
income; restriction and the increased cost o f foreign financing; the flight o f capital; and
strong pressures to increase exchange rates and interest rates. Towards the end o f 1998,
the Pastrana government (1998-2002) found it necessary to declare an economic
emergency to confront the crisis o f the financial sector, due to the increased number of
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defaulting debtors, particularly in the housing-financing system, whose users could not
continue to meet their payments when interest rates increased.

The above provided ground for homeowners to create an organization to pressure
the government to reform the housing-financing system, which had become very
onerous. For this purpose, they questioned the legitimacy o f the housing law before the
Constitutional Court, which decided in their favor, invoking the fundamental right to
housing, established in the Constitution o f 1991.

Given this double pressure, the

government had to intervene in favor o f the users, which led to a serious confrontation
between the Bank o f the Republic economists and the government's economic team on
the one hand, and the Constitutional Court Justices and the defenders o f the new
constitution on the other. This confrontation will be the subject of analysis in the next
chapter.

In 1999, financing possibilities, both external and internal, became even more
restricted. The private sector's demand was reduced significantly and the economic
growth rate fell abruptly. Whereas between 1993 and 1995 the GDP grew at a rate o f 5%
annually, between 1996 and 1998 it was only 2% per year, and in 1999 it was negative
by 4% (Florez, 2001: 48). Due to the above circumstances, the Pastrana government had
to sign a formal agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), aimed at
recovering macroeconomic stability, gaining credibility in international markets, and
achieving support to obtain new external credit resources. This agreement with the IMF
also implied a confrontation with some of the norms o f the Constitution of 1991. As
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mentioned earlier, this established a series of transfers of the central state’s resources
towards the regions and municipalities, to finance educational and health services. These
transfers amount today to almost 50% o f the state's current revenue. One o f the points
of the agreement with the IMF was the elimination o f those transfers o f resources, with
which the confrontation between the two societal projects becomes even more evident,
which will be analyzed in the next chapter.

5.6. T he E ffects o f the C hange o f Econom ic M odel on the Political R egim e

As already mentioned in the theoretical framework, the adoption o f the neoliberal
accumulation model also implied a transformation o f the political regime.

The

Analysis o f this phenomena requires seeing this model as something more than a series
of macroeconomic policy measures and to consider it as a “societal project” . This is
understood as the model o f accumulation from the perspective o f the conception of
relations among the state, civil society, and the economy on the part, o f the social
sector or sectors that aspire to lead the process of social transformation.

This

conception implies, in turn, a redefinition o f the rules of the game among the different
social classes, and between these and the state, which constitutes a modification o f the
political regime. It thus requires surpassing the traditional definition o f political regime
as an ensemble of rules and institutions that regulate the struggle for political power,
and the relations between the different branches of public power. From the perspective
of this dissertation, an important function o f the political regime is to act as an element
of articulation between the state and the accumulation model, generating the possibility
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of establishing alliances among different social sectors, in order to orient the social
process.

The above-mentioned concepts of regime and economic model as societal projects, also
have consequences for the concept of “autonomy of the state.” In its traditional
conception (Poulantzas, 1969; Skocpol, 1979 and 1985), thar autonomy has been
understood as the state's capacity of the state to distance itself with respect to partial
interests of civil society. On the contrary, the existence of a societal project demands
that state action be the result of a combination of internal strength of state institutions
and their articulation with key sectors of civil society that aspire to lead the process of
social transformation (Evans, 1995).

In this sense, the political regime is the link

between the state and the accumulation model, and makes it possible to present the latter
as a societal project or to impede or obstruct its implementation.

To elaborate that concept of political regimes as the organizing principle of
society, it is necessary to base it on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. From his
perspective, the ruling class not only execises domination but a "moral and intellectual
leadership” in society as well (1971, p. 57), i.e., it is a question o f trying to exert
domination not just by means of force but of consensus as well. Max Weber's (1968)
works also contribute to structuring the concept of political regime, to the degree that for
this author, the process of capital accumulation demands a series of cultural conditions
relating to an ethic of the ruling class without which no development is possible. These
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1

leadership and consensus should be obtained through compromises and reforms in which
the interests of different social groups should be taken into account.

From the previous perspective, the change o f change o f economic model renders
inoperative the old agreements between the elites and social classes, which sustained and
made possible the functioning o f the previous model o f industrialization for substitution
o f imports, and imposed the need to generate new agreements that express the new
correlation o f social forces. In the Colombian case, the magnitude o f that change and
the difficulty o f achieving these new agreements has been pointed out by Carlos
Caballero Arguez, one o f the most renowned technocrats in the economic teams o f the
governments o f the nineties, and defender o f the adoption o f the neoliberal model, when
he affirmed that
in C olo m b ia it has taken us great effort to understand the im p lication s o f the
ch an ges that took place in the w orld in the past d ecade and, naturally, those
o f the p rocess w e call ‘o p en in g ’, initiated in the early n in eties in this country.
It w as not sim p ly a question o f op en in g the eco n o m y to trade and foreign
investm en t - com m ercial o p en in g and financial liberalization - but
som eth in g m uch m ore profound. N a m ely , the m anagem ent o f p o litics and o f
eco n o m y in the w orld at the end o f the tw entieth century (. . .) B ut change
in volved and still in v o lv es risks. In this sp ecific case, it affected traditional
p olitician s, that had seen their pow er and capacity to do favors, and to c o llect
on favors, d w in d le. T hey w ere equaly ob lig ed to m od ify their w ay o f acting.
L ik ew ise, productive enterprises and e co n o m ic groups faced the need to
redesign their strategies, to redefine the sectors w here they should be, to
increase in vestm en t to com pete and open up to the w orld. T he ch an ge w as
a lso d ifficu lt to transm it and to sell to p eop le, because it generated nostalgia
for the past (E l T iem p o, July 2 4 , 1998, p. 5 A ).

5.6.1 Fragm entation o f Econom ic Elite

In Colombia, the possibilty o f achieving these new agreements, consensus and leadership
has been [imitated for two reasons. In the first place, because, in addition to the division
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between the political and economic elites mentioned above (Chapter III), it is necessary
to mention the division between the economic elites themselves, due to the model o f
opening and internationalizing the economy. These elites have been dividided into those
that have incorporated technological advances and have been connected to the world's
productive and financial circuits, and less competitive ones that act on the basis of the
national market. While the former advocate free trade and internationalization o f the
economy, the latter are in favor o f protectionism or gradual opening.

In the second

place, through the exclusion o f subordinated social sectors due, among other things, to
the reduction o f public social spending, state subsidies, and labor rights and guarantees,
and to increased unemployment. Both dimensions o f the economic restructuring process
limited the possibilities of the elites to make alliances among themselves and with other
social sectors, in order to democratically construct new rules of the game that regulate
the relations between the social and political actors.

From the above-mentioned perspective, the opening o f the Colombian economy
to the international market, not only signified a profound reformulation o f the
development model in effect until 1990, but a regime change as well, to the extent that
the political agreements to maintain the prudence and gradualism on which management
of the ISI-model economic policy had rested were broken.

Prior to economic

liberalization, the business sector had exerted a significant influence on the state
institutions in charge of formulating economic policy. The state dispensed benefits to
entrepreneurs and protected them from foreign competition and, in turn, the economic
elites offered their unconditional support for the state action. The elites therefore
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established agreements to divide the markets and share the public resources that the state
transferred to them through production subsidies and tax exemptions. Furthermore,
control of the mass media, financing of election campaigns, and the permanent flow of
leaders o f different business sectors to high government positions, especially to the
institutions responsable for managing economic policy, enabled the entrepreneurial elite
to design economic policy in accordance with their interests. However, as already
mentioned, the low growth and investment rates, the growing pressure o f international
agencies, and the inevitable tendency of economic globalization, made continuity of the
old economic model and the political agreements that sustained them, impossible.

To all of the above must be added the 1990 election of Cesar Gaviria, in
circumstances of increased violence and anomie in the country, which gave his
government great autonomy in relation to the economic and political elites. Gaviria and
his economic team were convinced of the need for and the advisability o f opening and
deregulating the nation's economy, as was being done or had been done by other Latin
American governments, and the autonomy they enjoyed because of the circumstances
mentioned, gave them a margin to maneuver to change the economic model, to isolate
themselves from social and political pressures, and to assume the political cost it
represented.

The decision to change economic policy also aggravated the institutional
fragmentation of the state’s decision-making process. This fragmentation was manifest
in the primacy of the technical instances such as those of the Ministry of Finance, the
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National Planning Department, and the Bank of the Republic, and the subordination of
other entities such as the Ministries o f Development, Agriculture, Labor, and Foreign
Trade, which, regardless of the political weight of those who headed them, should
submit to the decisions adopted by the dominant decision-making institutions.

The change of economic model took the business sector by surprise, which was
very fragmented, without a single instance of articulation or representation of their
interests and, consequently, lacking the force needed to impose itself as interlocutor of
the government. The entrepreneurial sectors played only a reactive role and did not have
any long-term proposed goal, accustomed as they were to negotiating with the
government, sector by sector, on the specific aspects of economic policy that affected
each sector. Therefore, when, due to adoption of the new economic model, the rules of
the game changed abruptly, the private sector’s associations to unite in the National
Gremial Council, but did not manage to formulate general proposals and limited
themselves to requesting a slowing-down o f the liberalization and internationalization of
the economy, an extention of the deadlines for the elimination of protective tariffs, and
the continuity of production subsidies.

Furthermore, the new economic model produced a fragmentation o f the country's
entrepreneurial ruling class. Traditionally, it had been divided between the big business
sector, represented by the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI), and the small
and medium-sized business sector, represented by the Colombian Association o f Small
Industrialists, ACOPI.

In the nineties, However, big business has become divided

213

between the sector o f the so called “big four economic conglomerates”, whose interests
are linked to the internationalization of the economy, and the sector that represents
national industry, which is being affected by the internationalization itself. This fact thus
explains the distancing that has occurred in the past four years between the ANDI and
the National Gremial Council, on the one hand, and the big four largest economic
conglomerates on the other. This fragmentation is documented in Gabriel Misas' study
on national industry (1994). He argues that the most outstanding characteristic of capital
accumulation in Colombia in the past three decades has been the formation of large
financial-economic groups and the accelerated growth of financial savings. These two
phenomena show that the logic of accumulation has not focused on expanding
manufacturing production, i.e., Those groups have dedicated themselves to acquiring the
property of existing enterprises rather than to generating new real assets. Thus arose an
entrepreneurial sector with large financial surpluses, situated in a position of control
with respect to a great number o f national enterprises and that benefits from a policy of
economic opening and privatization of state functions, above all in realtion to the
financial, telecommunications, electric energy, and exploration for and refining of oil.

All four groups, but especially the Bavaria Group, the Ardila Lulle Organization
and the Luis Carlos Sarmiento Organization, have benefited from the economic opening
policy since they have taken advantage of new conditions to make investments in
Europe and the United States, especially in the brewery, soft drinks, and financial
sectors. They have likewise benefited from the privatizing of state functions, especially
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from the sale o f state banks and from liberalization of the telecommunications sector and
TV transmission sector, which were highly controlled by the state until 1991.

Furthermore, as an analyst of the Colombian industrial sector has pointed out, the
main assets of these groups are concentrated in non-tradeable goods, i.e., those that
cannot be provided by external suppliers. For the Colombian case, goods like beer, soft
drinks, sugar, cement, and processed foods, behave as if they were non-tradeable goods,
and they constitute the main manufacturing production of the great groups mentioned
above. In relation to non-tradeable goods, such as textiles, these groups
had m anaged to articulate them selves favorably w ith the international
market, and therefore the p olicies im plem ented have not affected them very
unfavorably. In brief, the opening and its related p olicies could not negatively
affect the enterprises that produced non-tradeable goods and, on the contrary,
it offered them great possibilities o f benefits (M isas, 1994: 186-187).

With respect to the industrial sector that acts on the basis of the national market,
represented mainly by the ANDI and the National Gremial Council, one can say that it
has been subordinated to the “four big” economic groups, strongly affected by the
economic opening, since it was in no condition to compete on the international market,
and has lost power in relation to the orientation o f macroeconomic policy. A study by
Luis Jorge Garay (1998) has shown that the productivity of the Colombian economy has
fallen drastically and presently that, in comparative terms, it is suffering from a
technological lag of twenty years, in which national production has concentrated on the
internal market and has not taken advantage of the opportunities the economic opening
has offered for it to become inserted into the world market. This fact would indicate that
despite the supposedly prudent and intelligent handling of the economy on the part of
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the technocratic elite in decades prior to 1990, there was no accord or any clarity to
orient the country's economic development.

Economic opening has also affected the agrarian sector, both that which produces
for the internal as well as for the external market. The most dramatic case is that o f the
coffee sector, which represented 80% of the country's exports in the fifties and fell to
simply 18% in the nineties (Misas, 1994: 188).

Therefore, the drastic reduction in

agricultural sector’s participation in generating foreign currency has simultaneously
signified, for this sector as well, a considerable loss of power in the orientation of
macroeconomic policy and at, the same time, this situation is affecting its capacity of
political influence and social mobilization.

The above-mentioned division of the Colombian entrepreneurial elite, became
evident in 1996, on the occasion of the crisis of the government o f Ernesto Samper
(1994-1998), due to accusations that his presidential campaign had received large sums
of money from the drug-trafficking mafias.

On January 22, 1996, Defense Minister

Fernando Botero admitted in a television interview that President Samper did know
about the entry of that funds into his campaign chest. The following day, given the
evident destabilization, the political parties' inability to find solutions to the crisis, the
polarization o f society, Colombia's decertification by the United States, and the fear that
the U.S. would impose economic sanctions on the country, the Nacional Gremial
Council demanded the president's resignation. However, the four major entrepreneurial
groups publicly expressed their disagreement with the Council's demand, supported the
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President, and applied pressure to produce a reconciliation between the two sides, as a
result of which Samper was strengthened and was able to finish his mandate (Rettberg,
2001). Thus, the four major economic conglomerates became a new factor o f power in
Colombia and showed that a fragmentation of the economic elites exists, in displacing
the country's traditional economic-sector associations that, although they filled the
vacuum left by the political parties, saw their power and leadership dimininished, due to
the internal divisions, loss of affiliations and credibility, and the weakening produced by
the model of liberalization and internationalization of the economy.

5.6.2. The Breakdown o f Labor Agreements

Adoption of the neoliberal accumulation model has also implied breaking the
agreements among the state, the entrepreneurs, and the working class, which had made
it possible to develop a national market, and guaranteed workers minimal basic living
conditions, rights and job stability, however precarious.

These labor guarantees and rights first developed in the mid-thirties, when liberal
president Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938) assumed power with the support o f the
working class, to develop a project o f political and economic modernization and
industrialization of the country. Labor legislation arose, thus, in that period amidst of an
environment of strong state intervention, protection for incipient national industy,
formation of a national market, and constitution of citizens and consumers (Tirado,
1989). Protection for workers, the right to a minimum wage and a maximum workday,
and the regulation of collective labor relations by means of institutionalization o f the
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right to union membership and the right to strike, were examples of the new attitude
assumed by the state, given the practically non-existence of salary relations in the
Colombian economy and the repressive treatment of labor conflicts on the part of
employers and governments at that time. As Archila affirms,
in those years workers' desires to construct an organization to have a
presence in the public scenario, coincided with the liberal governments'
intention o f having an ally in its m odernizing projects.
With the
institutionalization o f the labor conflict, the working class obtained its
citizenship papers. The type o f identity constructed during those years
referred basically to the imaginary horizons o f the factory worker (1 9 9 5 :2 5 7 258).

Thanks to this labor legislation, workers, at least in the formal sector of the economy,
achieved a series of rights and benefits such as overtime pay; extra charge night work;
15 working-days paid vacation each year; a bonus of a half month's salary each
semester; the right to severance pay, which consisted of one month's salary for each year
of work, liquidated retroactively according to the worker's last salary, which was to be
paid when the work contract finalized, or before, in case the worker required it to
finance the purchase o f a home or for higher education; employer's payment of 12%
annual interest on the funds accumulated for workers' severance pay, entrepreneurs'
contributions to the social policy system, distributed as follows: 12.3% of workers'
salary for social security, 3% for the Family Welfare Institute, 4% for Family
Compensation Funds, and 2% for the National Labor Training Service. Altogether, these
benefits and contributions represent about 45% of the workers' basic salary.

In

enterprises where workers were organized in unions, these benefits increased and were
broadened through additional benefits. Over time, and especially in the second half of
the twentieth century, union action was directed to the defense of these rights and labor
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stability, especially in what refers to maintenance o f indefinite term labor contracts, and
retroactivity of severance pay, which, in the opinion o f the entrepreneurs, rigidified both
the legislation and the labor market.

Nonetheless, the dynamics of relations among the state, the entrepreneurs, and
the workers began to be transformed in the eighties and, more clearly, at the beginning
of the nineties. The globalization process, the effects of technological changes in
production and the adoption of the new neoliberal accumulation model, required
flexibilization of the labor market and labor relations, all of which affects stability in the
work place, the systems o f labor remuneration based on fixed social benefits, and
allowances oriented toward workers' welfare, that tend to be replaced by labor relations
schemes based on increases in work productivity.

The Gaviria government and the legislators at the beginning o f the nineties
responded to these new economic, productive, and labor conditions, with Law 50 of
1990, which sought to flexibilize the labor market. This law eliminated retroactivity in
calculating the amount of severance pay, flexibilized labor contracts, and introduced the
possibility of paying an integral salary (with no social benefits or allowances) above a
certain salary level (Arenas, 1991).

Law 100 of 1990 modified the social security

system to broaden its coverage, but also to privatize it and to introduce market
mechanisms in the offer of retirement pensions and health services. The arguments of
policy-makers at that time were based on the fact that the previous labor law was too
rigid and prevented the flexibility firms needed to be able to respond to a more open and
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competitive economy, both in the domestic and the international spheres, and to the new
technological conditions that required highly qualified workers. In synthesis, labor law,
which had been an instrument of protection for worker, becomes a means o f regulating
the labor market based on the needs of the enterprises. At the present moment, amidst
the country’s economic crisis, the government and the business sector have proposed an
even greater flexibilization of labor legislation to permit payment of the minimum wage
without social benefits, the elimination of overtime payments, and extra pay for night
work, among other things.

They have also proposed suppressing the so-called

"parafiscal" contributions that weigh upon the payment of salaries, such as the
percentages for the Family Welfare Institute and for the National Labor Training
Service.

The result of all o f this is the loss of influence of the working class in general,
and organized labor in particular, in national politics and economics, especially in what
refers to the capacity to maintain its standard o f life and employment stability. It is a
lesser power in relation to the orientation of social policy, business administration, the
labor environment and productive processes.

Organized labor is no longer a valid

interlocutor before the state and the the business sector.

The Unions and the large centralized labor organizations (the Unitary Central of
Workers, CUT, and the General Confederation of Democratic Workers, CGTD) are not
prepared nor have they acquired sufficient force to effectively oppose the abovementioned restructuring processes and to offer viable alternatives. Although the level of
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union membership has traditionally been low in Colombia, the growing informalization
of labor relations, the flexibilization of legislation and the labor market, the privatization
of the state and the dismounting of social policies have aggravated this tendency even
more. While in 1970 16% of the economically active population was unionized, the
percentage fell to 8.24% in 1984, to 7.9% in 1990, and to 7.7% in 1994 (Archila, 1995).
Despite this weakness, thel labor centrals unions and the strongest unions (those of state
workers, teachers, and oil-industry workers) carried out 41 general strikes between 1997
and 1999 in protest against the economic and social policy of the neoliberal governments
(Cambio, August 30, 1999, p. 24). The strike carried out in 1999, involved not only
workers but other social sectors as well, such as defaulted debtors in the housing
financing system purchases, transporters, peasants, rice-growers, and bank employees,
amongst others.

Nonetheless, these protests have not been strong enough to modify the
government's economic and social policy, or to give workers and the popular sectors a
better negotiating position in the neoliberal restructuring process. This has led workers
and organized unions to seek direct political participation through party and
parliamentary action. Thus, for the congressional and presidential elections of 2002, the
organized workers' movement and other social sectors organized the “Social and
Political Front”, whose presidential candidate was Luis Eduardo Garzon, the former
leader and president of the CUT. With one year of its existence, that movment has had
unprecedented success for the left, since its congressional candidate,

former

Constitutional Court Justice Carlos Gaviria, obtained one of the highest votes, and his
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presidential candidate, Luis Eduardo Garzon, has obtained the support o f the main
independent and leftist congressmen and voters. This will probably give the Social and
Political Front more than a million votes in the presidential elections at the end of May
2002. Although it is not possible for Luis Eduardo Garzon to presidential elections, his
political movement is already taking shape as an important social-democratic force, with
great possibilities of constituting an alternative to the neoliberalism that has
predominated in the country throughout the nineties. This also contributes to eroding
bipartisanship and to further democratizing Colombian political regime.

Chapter 6
The Conflict between
Project I and Project II:
Legitimacy versus Efficiency

In this final chapter, an analyis will be done o f some o f the main contradictions
resulting from the two societal projects that were undertaken simultaneously in
Colombia since the beginning of the nineties: the Political Constitution of 1991 and the
process of neoliberal economic restructuring.

These contradictions, as will be seen

farther on, are associated with attempts to reduce public spending versus an increase in
the size of the state (6.1), to the attempts to improve and legitimate political
representation versus fragmentation of the political forces and the survival of old clientelist
practices (6.2), to the attempts to strengthen and extend the markert as coordinator of
social relations versus the social, economic, and political heterogeneity of Colombian
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society (6.3, 6,4 and 6.5), and to the disagreement between the two societal projects
regarding the criteria for distributing social goods (6.6 and 6.7).

The evaluation of said reforms has polarized analysts, decision makers, and the
social actors, which, in itself, is already first evidence of the degree o f sharpening of the
social fragmentation to which the reforms of the nineties had led. With respect to the
Constitution of 91, chapter IV showed that opinion was divided three ways: in the first
place, those that considered that the constitutional norms alone were unable to transform
society (Gonzalez, 1993); secondly, those who considered that the Constitution fell short
in its purpose of democratizing society and the political regime (Bejarano, 1994); and
finally, those who considered that the Constitution increased the ungovernability o f the
political system (Alesina, Kluger y Rosenthal, 2000) or compromised the economic
stability and functioning of the free market (Kalmanovitz, 2001; Clavijo, 2001).

With respect to economic restructuring, opinions became radicalized around two
positions. On the one hand, there were those who considered that the internationalization
and liberalization of the economy were based on adequate diagnoses and criteria, but the
negative effects were due to the fact that this process was not carried out in the
necessary depth, or with the necessary speed or skill (Echavarria, 2000). On the other
hand, there are those who consider that the assumptions on which the economic
liberalization policy is based are mistaken and have been the cause of the economic
crisis that the country has suffered since the mid-nineties (Sarmiento, 1998 and 2000).
Other positions (Gonzalez, 2001; Misas, 2001; Florez, 2001) considered that the cause
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o f the problem was not to be found in liberalization or in economic opening as such, but
in the way in which it was justified and the context in which it was implanted, which led
to a very biased and partial consideration o f the effects o f

industrialization for

substitution of imports m odel, in order to provide evidence of the need to adopt an open
market model. According to Gonzalez (2001), since adoption of the industrialization for
substitution o f imports model began, its success was believed to depend on the
development o f an exporting dynamics that would permit the generation of foreign
currency reserves needed to modernize national industry. Furthermore, as of 1968, with
the program to promote exports and achieve Colombia's entry into the Andean Pact, it
was considered that the local production of final and intermediate goods should be
directed not only to the domestic market, but to the international market as well.
Nonetheless, the country did not manage to increase its export capacity significantly,
due to structural limitations, which is different from saying that the substitution of
imports was synonimous of a closed and inefficient economy (Gonzalez, 2001: 402), as
the Gaviria government would have us believe.

It is common practice to measure the success or failure of political, economic and
social reforms by the degree to which they managed to advance in achieving the purpose
and the rationality of their authors. Thus, for example, if the objective was to reduce the
size o f the state and it was not reduced, it is considered that this was due to the deficient
or insufficient application of the measure in question. However, in this dissertation I
assume a position that goes beyond said focus.

As I pointed out in the chapter

corresponding to the theoretical framework, the dynamics of the social processes surpass
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the intention of the actors, or go even farther beyond. It is the context o f forces and
social structures in which action is inscribed that determines their destiny. The economic
reforms, such as the change of accumulation, or political models, such as the
Constitution of 1991, are based on postulates of rationality that are not necessarily
fulfilled in social reality. It is not possible to determine ahead of time the consequences
that a decision would unleash; as Herbert Simon has said,
in an important sense, all decision is a matter o f com prom ise. The alternative
that is finally selected never permits a com plete or perfect achievem ent o f
objectives, but is m erely the best solution that is available under the
circum stances. The environm ental situation inevitably limits the alternatives
that are available, and hence sets a maximum to the level o f attainment o f
purpose that is possible (1947: 6).

Individuals make decisions that may or may not be rational, but society, understood not
as the sum of the individuals but as the ensemble of individual interactions, generates
forces that wind up limiting the individual's field of action. As Marx said, “men make
their own history, but not of their own free will in circumstances they have chosen, but
in circumstances they encounter directly, that exist and are a legacy of the past”(1973:
408).

From this perspective, decisions taken by actors who propelled the economic

liberalization policy found a limit in decisions taken by those who promoted the
Constitution o f 1991 and vice versa. In turn, contexts of structural heterogeneity and
fragmentation that characterize Colombian society, and o f globalization processes in
which it is inscribed, affected the course of both societal projects.

6.1

Reduction Versus Increased Public Spending

As has been established in previous chapters, one of the objectives of the neoliberal
restructuring was to reduce the size o f the state, whereas the objectives o f political
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restructuring was its strengthening and re-legitimization, increasing and improving the
channels o f political representation and the party system, and increasing and improving
guarantees of fundamental rights o f citizens. The interaction of both processes produced
an interesting result: the size of the state, measured in terms of public spending as a
proportion of the GDP, increased from 20.4 % in the 1990 to 37.7 % in 2000 (table 1).

Table 1
Public Sector Spendig as Proportion o f GDP
Y ear

C e n tra l
G o v e rn m e n t

S o c ia l S e cu rity
S y stem

N a tio n a l D e c e n tra liz e d
S e c to r an d P u b lic
E n te rp rise s

R e g io n a l an d L o cal
G o v e rn m e n ts

T o ta l

1990

5 .4

2.6

4.3

8.1

2 0 .4

1991

6 .4

2.7

4.5

8.1

2 1 .6

1992

7.5

2 .7

4 .8

8.1

23.1

1993

6 .6

3.3

5.7

8.8

24.3

1994

6 .6

3.9

6.0

9 .5

26.1

1995

6 .8

4 .7

6.9

9.7

28.1

1996

7.7

5.6

7.6

11.8

3 2 .7

1997

8.2

6.1

7.3

12.4

34.1

1998

8.2

6.8

6.7

12.3

3 3 .9

1999

8.9

7 .7

5.8

14.2

3 6 .6

2000

10.7

6.5

6.9

13.6

3 7 .7

(pr)
S o u rce: D N P , C O N F IS , B a n c o de !a R e p u b lic a , C o rd i (1 9 9 8 )
Pr: p re lim in a r

One could think that the Colombian state's tendency to grow was due to
insufficient or deficient application of neoliberal policies of privatization, deregulation,
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and reduction o f state functions and personnel.

However, although that could be

comparatively true18, this tendency is similar to that o f practically all states throughout
the world. In fact, neither the United Kindgom nor the United States could escape it
during the governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1991) and Ronald Reagan (19801988), which were the governments that most attempted to reduce state intervention in
their countries. In England, the public spending share o f GDP rose from 31% from
1961 to 1973 to 40% between 1981 and 1990. In the United States, said proportion rose
from 29.5% to 34.9% in the same period (Institut Francaise des Relations
Internationales, 1991: 401-407). Graph No. 2, taken from the World Bank (1997: 22),
presented the worldwide tendency to increase the size o f the state between 1960 and
1994. As can be observed, this tendency held constant throughout the second half o f the
twentieth century, for the developed as well as the developing countries. For the former,
the public spending share of GDP rose from 25% between 1970 and 1974, to 37%
between 1990 and 1994, which was precisely the period of most profound application of
neoliberal policies. For the latter, the tendency is less pronounced but also on the
increase, rising from 21% to 27% in the same periods. While the increase in public
spending has been constant in developed countries, a slight decrease has been observed
between 1990 and 1994 in developing countries, but there has been a clear tendency to
increase during the 34 anos taken into consideration.

In Latin America and the

Caribbean, the tendency is similar to that o f developing countries, but while for the

18 If the Economic Freedom o f the World Index, o f the Fraser Institute is considered as an indicator o f the
degree o f economic liberalization, which is measured on a scale ofO a 10, Colombia has a ranking o f 92,
with an index o f 5.6 , below Chile's ranking o f 15 and index o f 7.5, Argentina's ranking o f 30 and index
o f 7.2, Peru’s ranking o f 45 and index de 6.9, Bolivia's ranking o f 51 and index o f 6.7, and Venezuela's
and Brazil's ranking o f 82 and index o f 5.8 (Fraser Institute, 2002).
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latter, considered altogether, the size o f the state has increased by 27% between 1990
and 1994, for the Latin American region that increase has been a slightly lower 23% in
the same period.

Graph 1
Central Government Spending
by W orld Regions (% GDP)

0 1 9 6 0 -6 4
0 1 9 7 0 -7 4
□ 1980-84
□ 1990-94

Source: World Bank (1997: 22)

Three conclusions can be reached from analysis o f the above figures: in the first place,
developed countries, despite the fact that they had adopted neoliberal policies to reduce
the size o f the state, have not been able to limit growth of public spending nor to
dismount the welfare state. Secondly, in Latin America and the Caribbean there has been
a relatively greater tendency to reduce the size o f the state in comparison with other
regions o f the Third World.

In contrast, southeast Asia, which has achieved greater
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economic and technological development in comparison with the rest of the Third
World, has not shown any tendency to reduce the size o f the state.

Thirdly,

multinational finance agencies, in order to achieve a global market economy, have
pressured Third World countries to reduce the size of their public sector, a policy that
has not yet functioned in the developed capitalist countries.

More than the insufficient application of free market policy, the explanation o f
the fact that throughout most o f the world, neoliberal governments have increased public
spending more than during previous governments o f Keynesian orientation, is rooted in
the contradiction between political legitimacy and economic efficiency.

In fact,

legitimacy and efficiency are the most important factors o f state activity (O'Connor,
1973; Offe, 1993) and determine the state's capacity to integrate society and distribute its
resources.

This contradiction is rooted in the fact that the state has to try to

simultaneously fulfill
the con d ition s in w h ich profitable accum ulation is possib le [and] to maintain
or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that openly
u ses its coercive forces to help one class accum ulate capital at the exp en se o f
other cla sses lo se s its legitim acy and hence undermines the b asis o f its
loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the n eed to assist the process o f
capital accum ulation runs the risk o f drying up the sources o f its o w n power,
the eco n o m y 's surplus production capacity, and the taxes drawn from it for
this surplus. (. . .) B ecau se o f the dual and contradictory character o f the
capitalist state, nearly every state agency is involved in the accum ulation and
legitim ization functions, and nearly every state expenditure has this tw ofold
character” (O 'C onnor, 1973: 6 and 7).

Much government spending has a positive effect on the process of capital accumulation,
in reference to reducing the cost of labor and increasing the productivity o f capital in
general. In relation to the former, the state socializes costs that, in absence o f a social
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policy, would have to be assumed directly by entrepreneurs, such as medical attention,
labor training, social security etc. In relation to the latter, state spending on education,
research and development; energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructure, and
the search for markets and investment opportunities contribute to reducing the
investment costs for private investors and to increasing the productivity of the economy
as a whole. Therefore, it is incorrect to think that this activity of the state, although it be
only indirectly productive, is onerous for the economy as a whole. These functions
explain the impossibility o f drastically reducing public spending, together with the fact
that the provision o f collective services by the state is institutionalized and converted
into citizen's rights, which, in turn, influences their perception and acceptance of the
social order. Therefore, the suppression o f state spending and services has a high social
cost in terms o f the erosion of legitimacy o f the state.

Given that the costs of production are socialized and social needs increase, while
the funds needed to finance them are private (rate o f profit, income, salary, etc.), the
need for political representation arises: “No taxation without representation” was the
slogan that fostered parliamentary government in the western world. Therefore, the
principle o f public representation is fundamental for the legitimacy o f the state's
extraction o f resources needed for fulfillment o f the public functions o f contribution to
the accumulation o f capital and production o f a legitimate social order.
demand for quality and effectiveness o f the function of political representation.
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Thus the

In the Colombian case, the contradiction between legitimacy and effectiveness is
the result o f three factors. In the first place, the interaction between the political and
economic elements o f restructuring the state; i.e., o f the contradiction between a new
constitutional order that demands “more state” as a condition for overcoming the crisis of
legitimacy o f the state and integration o f society, and a new model of economic
development that requires “less state” in order to permit the free allocation of social
resources by the market. In the second place, of the contradiction between the deficient
quality of the function o f political representation and the neoliberal demands for effective
and transparent institutions. And in the third place, o f the contradiction between a state that
does not effectively guarantee the political and socioeconomic rights of its citizens and an
exclusionary economic system, on the one hand, and a government that needs to reduce
public spending and deregulate the market on the other. While the Gaviria administration
(1990-1994) privatized state enterprises and attempted to reduce public spending, the new
constitution increased the number of institutions and turned equity, distribution, and
democracy into the cornerstone of the new political and economic order.

The neoliberal objective o f reducing public spending was affected by the great
importance attributed by the Constitutional Assembly to the policy of strengthening the
state, broadening democracy and achieving equity by means of a policy of increasing and
descentralizing public spending, especially in education and health. Due to the demands of
the Constitution of 1991, the participation of social spending in GDP increased from 8% in
1990 to 15% in 1997 (World Bank, 2002: 68 ).
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But despite the efforts of the Constitutional Assembly o f 1991 to strengthen the
state and increase its legitimacy, which was translated into increased public spending,
among other things, the Colombian state is still very weak in its function o f providing
cohesion for society, integrating the territory and providing security and justice for its
citizens. The problem does not derive solely from the possible deficiencies of the
Constitution o f 1991, but rather, as already mentioned in previous chapters, from the
incapacity o f the political and economic elite to conceive and undertake a project of social
integration, colonization, and socioeconomic development o f the national territory as a
whole, and from the fragmentation o f power resulting from the different fractions o f the
dominant class to constitute a hegemony. The reason for this, as already mentioned, is the
strong tradition o f autonomous regional powers which, from the beginning o f independent
political life at the start o f the nineteenth century, produced a rejection of any attempt to
impose a central hegemony or strong national power.

Over the years, this trait of

Colombian politics became one of the pillars of the political regime and one of the principal
causes of the weakness o f the state.

6.2 Political Representation Improvement Versus Political Forces Fragmentation

Political exclusion, the deficient quality o f the legislative function, corruption and the
clientelism o f the Colombian congress, have affected not only the legitimacy of the state
itself but the functioning o f the Colombian economy as well. According to institutional
economic theory (North, 1990), the market economy functions due to formal and informal
institutions, which reduce the uncertainty and the costs of information and transaction.
The institutions orient and regulate the behavior of the agents, establish property rights,

232

facilitate contracting, offer information on prices and, in general, create a social
environment that can favorably or unfavorably influence economic development. The most
important o f formal institutions is the law. Thus the parliament and its legislative activity
are essential in the constitution of a market economy.

For the above reasons, the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 sought to legitimize and
improve the channels of political representation but, paradoxically, the result was the
sharpening of the fragmentation of the system o f parties and representation, and an increase
in the ungovernability of the Colombian political system. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the
Constitutional Assembly of 1991 was based on a diagnosis, according to which the
restrictions of the system of representation and the negative effects of the long
predominance of bipartisanship, had led to the exclusion of other political and social forces,
and stimulated the formation of subversive political organizations. Therefore, the
Constitutional Assembly proposed opening the system of representation to the political
forces excluded by the bipartisan agreement.

Although the purpose of eradicating the liberal and conservative hegemony, and of
incorporating new social and political forces into the state's system of representation was
positive, this was done not only by means of the establishment of spaces for the
participation ethnic and political minorities, but also through the establishment of a lax
normativity to permit the founding of political parties and movements, and much greater
opportunity to postulate candidates for elections. Due to that constitutional norms and their
legal developments (Political Constitution, articles 103, 107-108; law 130 of 1994), the
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number o f political parties increased from 8 in 1990 to 80 in 1998, and that of political
movements rose to 64. Likewise, between 1986 and 1998 the number of lists inscribed for
Senatorial and Congressional elections rose from 202 and 330 to 319 and 692 respectively
(Pizarro, 2001: 102). The result has been an atomization of the political forces and a
consequent increase of fragmentation of the political system, since the aggregation of
interests, the formation of significant majorities and minorities, and the formation of solid
political support for the government, or a solid opposition, is impossible.

In the

parliamentary sphere and in the Colombian political process in general, the traditional and
third forces are not an instrument of aggregation of collective demands and interests today,
but an instrument of de-aggregation of social interests.

No party, force or political

movement represents a social sector, a classs, or a significant class fraction in Colombia
today. The fragmentation of political forces is such that for the congressional elections of
1998 there were 222 lists that did not obtain a single seat, despite the fact that they obtained
a total o f 2,540,000 votes altogether (Pizarro, 2001: 103). This fragmentation even works
against the objective of obtaining a more effective and profound democracy, since it does
not favor third forces that have arisen as alternatives to bipartisanship, given that they have
been divided into a diversity of small, weak parties and movements of the most diverse
political, religious, ethnic and regional nature.

6.3 Implementation of Neoliberal Economic Model
Versus its Unintended Consequences

As mentioned in Chapter 5, from the beginning of the nineties Colombia has adopted a
series of measures to introduce the free market model. They include the following: a)
commercial opening and internationalization of the economy, b) elimination of currency
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e x c h a n g e c o n tr o l, c ) fle x ib iliz a tio n o f the labor m ark et, d) a d o p tio n o f in d irect and
r e g r e ss iv e ta x a tio n that is d isp la c in g p r o g r e ssiv e ta x a tio n , e ) p riv a tiz a tio n o f so m e
p u b lic

en te r p rise s,

e s p e c ia lly

in

the

area

of

te le c o m m u n ic a tio n s,

f)

p o litic a l,

a d m in istra tiv e , and fis c a l d e c e n tr a liza tio n , for w h ic h a g reat n u m b er o f fin a n cia l
fu n c tio n s an d r e so u r c e s o f th e cen tral g o v e r n m e n t w e re transferred to the m u n ic ip a litie s,
and g ) th e p o lic y o f re d u c in g th e fis c a l d e fic it in order to d im in ish the “ s iz e o f th e sta te .”
T h e p u r p o se o f sa id refo r m s w a s to in crease th e co m p e titiv e n e ss o f n ational p rod u ction ,
accelerated

e c o n o m ic

gro w th ,

and greater e c o n o m ic

and

so cia l

w e ll-b e in g

for the

p op u lation .

N e v e r th e le s s, e le v e n years after its ad op tion , the n eo lib era l e c o n o m ic m o d el

has not m a n a g ed to im p ro v e the country's d e v elo p m e n t co n d itio n s as a w h o le . T o the
contrary, the g ro w th

o f th e e c o n o m y has fa llen a n n u ally o v er the p ast six years,

cu lm in a tin g in 1 9 9 9 w ith a n eg a tiv e rate o f 4.2% .

Graph 2
The Fall of the Economic Growth Rate (%)

S ource: B anco de la R ep u b lica - D N P
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According to the logic o f the neoliberal model, commercial and financial liberalization
should be accompanied by a decrease or at least a stabilization of real salaries and a severe
reduction of spending, in order to generate surpluses for foreign trade. However, as will be
shown now, the Colombian economy was opened up to the world market at the same time
that both public and private spending as well as real salaries increased. The increase in
public spending, as already mentioned, is associated with the provisions of the Constitution
of 1991, to the extent that it created new state institutions, increased social spending, and
established new socioeconomic rights for citizens.

Public spending also increased due to

the servicing o f the foreign debt, as will be seen below, above all since 1995.

Liberalization o f foreign trade was significant in Colombia, since the average
tariff descended from 33.4% in 1980 to 11.8% in 2000 and imports subject to the
restriction o f quotas went from 73.8% in 1992 to 1.7% in 1998 (Echavarria, 2001: 64).
These figures are similar to those for other Latin American and Asian countries in the
same period (Fraser Institute, 2002).

But the liberalization o f foreign trade is done not only to increase imports but
also to increase the exports that would generate the growth o f the economy. This did not
occur, however, since at the start o f the opening, in 1993, imports grew 48% while
exports grew 3% (Misas, 2001: 116) and during the entire decade o f the nineties, exports
grew at an annual pace of 30% while exports grew at 13% annually. But although
Colombian exports have grown and diversified, 66.4 % o f them still consisted o f
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agricultural and mining products (Sarmiento 2000: 53). The result has been a loss of
economic dynamics, which led to a severe recession in the second half o f the nineties.
According to economic analysts, this lack of dynamics was also due to the contradiction
between commercial and currency exchange liberalization, and the type of goods that
Colombian industry produces.

Graph 3
Average annual Growth Rate o f Exports

| IS 1985-91 ■ 1991-95 01995-2000
S o u rc e: B a n c o d e la R e p u b lic a , D N P , E C L A C

In relation to the goods produced by Colombian industry, it is necessary to say
that the economic restructuring was done on the basis of the the idea that opening up to
foreign competition would oblige domestic producers to adopt new technologies and to
produce with the current standards in force in the international economy. This conduct
was supposed to correspond to the rationality of the actors, since to act otherwise would
imply losing competitiveness in the world market.

But in this aspect, the decision

makers failed in not taking account o f the specific context in which the free market
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model was implanted: in Colombia, around 50% of all industrial goods are non-tradeable
or behave as such (Misas, 1994). Non-tradeable are goods or services that cannot be
replaced or substituted by external suppliers, for which reason the incidence of external
competition is minimum or nil; therefore the commercial liberalization did not produce
the expected results in Colombia. On the contrary, the production o f tradeable goods
were negatively affected by both external competition and the revaluation of the
Colombian peso, which was the cause of the fact that these products could not compete
with those coming from abroad. The profitability rates of the production of tradeable
goods were reduced significantly
givin g place, on the on e hand, to a great m igration o f capital from the
tradeable good s sector to that o f non-tradeable goods and, on the other hand,
to the fact that firm s that produced tradeable goods stopped producing part o f
them and began importing them , taking advantage o f their know ledge o f the
market and the distribution netw orks they had (M isas, 2001: 117).

Therefore, in practice, the neoliberal model degenerated into a “de-industrialization” of
the Colombian economy, since industry's participation in the GDP fell from 23% in
1985 to 18% in 1995 (Florez, 2001b: 163).

The Constitution of 1991 was based on a supposed autonomy of the state in the
management of monetary and fiscal policy. But at the same time, Gaviria's economic team
opened the capital account and liberated both foreign trade and the currency exchange rate,
which implied a reduction o f the autonomy of the state in the management of these policies,
since the latter began to depend on external factors. To carry out these two openings
simultaneously is considered a mistake by diverse analysts (Edwars, 1998; Misas, 2001).
In the Colombian case, it generated two negative effects: in the first place, the greater pace
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of the growth of imports as compared to exports led to a large deficit in the trade balance.
In the second place, the opening of the capital account increased the entry of capital, largely
of illicit origin, into the country. Because of this, the international reserves grew by 68%
between 1991 and 1992 (Misas, 2001). All of the above led to the fact that between 1990
and 1998 the Colombian peso would suffer a revaluation of around 20%, in real terms.
This revaluation also contributed to increasing imports, lowering the growth rate of exports,
and orienting investment toward the non-transable goods sector. All of the above, together
with the increased fiscal deficit that reached 5% in 1999, forced the Bank of the Republic to
adopt a financial restriction policy, which led to the present economic recession. The
interest rates were raised to try to slow down the flow of capital but this, too, produced the
opposite effect. In turn, the increased capital flow produced an expansion of credit, with
the consequent inflationary pressure, which obliged the monetary authorities to change
their policy as of 1994. In the second half of the nineties, the recession and the crisis of the
private sector exploded, due to the indebtedness produced in the first half of the decade.
Thus, the opening of trade and of the capital account required state capacity to generate a
fiscal superavit in order to avoid inflationary pressures and the flight of capital, a capacity
that the Colombian state simply did not have.

As far as the Gaviria government is

concerned, it underestimated the effects of the fiscal imbalance, due to its confidence in the
abundance of recourses that would result from the exportation of the country's large oil
reserves.

Supposedly, these resources would make it possible to balance both the

commercial and the fiscal deficits, but it eventually became known that these reserves were
not as large as they had been believed to be and the resources never arrived ( Misas, 2001:
118).
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According to the postulates o f the neoliberal model, as has been mentioned,
commercial liberalization and internationalization of the economy are incompatible with
increases in real salary. In this field there was also a contradiction between the Constitution
o f 1991 and economic restructuring, since the increase o f state institutions, together with
revaluation of the exchange rate and the increased demand for skilled labor, required by an
economy that experienced a certain degree o f technological development, although slight,
induced an increase in salaries in Colombia. Between 1990 and 1998, real salaries in the
public sector grew 50% (partly due to Constitutional Court decisions, as will be seen
further on), and those of the industrial sector grew 44% for employees and 13% for
workers (Echavama, 2001: 170). One of the manifestations o f the economic crisis is the
high rate o f unemployment which rose from 10.6% in 1991 to 20.5% in 2000. For some
analysts, the lack o f flexibility of the labor market and the increased real salaries have been
the causes of unemployment (Echavarria, 2001: 72).

Other analysts, argue that

employment has increased in commerce and services, sectors that form part of the nontransable goods group, whereas in industry, mining and agriculture it has diminished and,
therefore, the cause of unemployment must be sought not in real salaries but in reduced
demand (Gonzalez 2000).

In synthesis, in decision making regarding liberalization of the economy, the
magnitude o f the influx of foreigh capital that would enter the country was not taken into
account. This effect was foreseeable, given the highly speculative nature of the Colombian
economy and the significant weight ot the illegal activities that link the economy to illegal
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international activities. Given these circumstances, the commercial opening should have
been done first and the capital account opening later, in order to avoid phenomena like
revaluation, speculation and indebtedness. However, external forces did not leave any
margin to manoever and, instead,

simultaneously implanted all the points of the

“Washington Consensus”; the particular context in which they would be put in place was
ignored, and this produced “unintended consequences.”

6.4 The Neoliberal Model Versus Economic and Social Heterogeneity

The neoliberal model has resulted in a notable increase o f social inequality and in the
sharpening of enormous differences in the population's access to the market. This clearly
shows that the contradiction between the two societal projects underway in Colombia since
the beginning of the nineties: while the Constitution of 1991 tried to democratize society
politically and socially, the neoliberal model excluded ample sectors of the population from
the benefits of economic development.

The neoliberal reforms seriously affected the distributive function of the state
which, in turn, affected its capacity to reconcile the interests of the different social actors.
This situation gave rise to a distributive conflict and growing polarization of society. This
is very serious if one considers the fact that Colombia has been a characterized by highly
concentrated income.

Recent data show that this tendency has sharpened with the

introduction of the neoliberal economic model, since the Gini inequality coefficient rose
from 0.467 en 1988 to 0.510 in 1997 (graph 4). In fact, in the early eighties, considered
by economic analysts to be the era of greatest equity, the 20% richest portion of the
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population received 49% of the national income, while the poorest 20% received 6.6%;
whereas in 1996 the richest 20% of the population received 54% of the income, while the
poorest 20% obtained only 6% (Fedesarrollo/Ser,1997: 42).

G ra p h 4

Evolution of Gini Coefficient
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From the viewpoint o f income, the economic reforms of the nineties signified
decreased pay for labor and a broadening of the breach between skilled and unskilled
workers' salaries, this being one of the main causes of the deterioration in income
distribution (Nunez y Sanchez, 1998). The unemployment rate rose from 8.7% in 1995 to
20% in 2001. If the fact that subemployment has increased by 23% in the past decade is
added to this, it can be said that 43% of the Colombian population is either unemployed or
underemployed (Sarmiento Palacio, 2000a).
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The poverty level increased from 60% in 1995 to 64% in 1999 (World Bank, 2002).
If one considers that poverty had been decreasing from 80% in 1978 to 65% in 1988 and to
60% in 1995, it can be said that in the last six years there has been a worsening o f the living
conditions o f more than half the Colombian population, caused by the economic structural
adjustments and, specifically, by the recession that has existed since 1996, induced by
those adjustments, despite the fact that they sought to improve the growth conditions o f
the economy and the well-being of the population. Despite the increased poverty, the
central government's spending on programs to assist the poorest sectors, remained
around 1% during the nineties and decreased to less than 0.7% in 2000 (World Bank,
2002: 10). According to the World Bank, this is an extremely low level of spending if
one compares it with that o f other countries in a similar stage o f development, such as
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, and with the needs o f specifically vulnerable
groups that do not have access to key social-aid programs (Ibidem).

In these

circumstances, the World Bank considers that for Colombia to decrease its poverty to the
level o f 1995, the economy should grow to at a rate of at least 4%, as the minimum goal
for the year 2010 (Ibidem). However, it is not likely that the Colombian economy will
reach that level o f growth. After the negative growth rate (- 4.2%) of 1999, the GDP
growth rate has been less than the population growth rate, since it was 1.5 % in 2001,
and a growth rate o f less than 2% is foreseen for 2002 (Fedesarrollo, 2002)

The above figures make it possible to conclude that the neoliberal reforms do not
confirm the neoclassic economic postulate, according to which free competition in the
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market leads to neutral solutionss with respect to equity; “on the contrary, the greatest
effects against income distribution occurs in the section with the greatest differences in
participants' possibilities [in the market]” (Sarmiento Palacios, 2000: 329). This indicates
that if the state wanted to increase its legitimacy it would have to implement a sound policy
to redistribute income. However, the margin for manoever is very small. With diminished
resources, the state has less capacity to respond to social pressures.

In the present

circumstances, there are three reasons why it has been difficult for the country to carry out
an income distribution policy. In the first place, Colombia has a low imcome tax-paying
rate. This is partly due to the fact that since the end of the eighties, as an effect of adoption
of the neoliberal model, an indirect and regressive taxation has been introduced (taxing
consumption rather than income) which represented 62% of all state revenue in 2002. In
the earl of 1970s the progressive or direct taxation (income tax) represented 51% of total
revenues. (Garay, 2002: 686).

This generated inequitable effects in the distribution of

income, since it concentrates tax payment on the whole population and not on the highest
income sectors. In the second place, the economic crisis makes it difficult for the state to
obtain resources through a tax reform, in order to direct them toward social investment,
since the business sector is in no condition to pay more taxes. Furthermore, the armed
conflict not only obliges the national government to seek new resources, but to channel part
of the already existing ones to security and defense. In fact, spending on defense and
security, as a proportion of the national government's spending, has increased from 10% in
1985 to 12% en 1995; and the intensification of the conflict due to the breakdown of peace
negotiations between guerrilla groups and the Pastrana government (1998-2002), made it
possible to foresee that this increase would accelerate in the coming years until it reached
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15%.

One of the priorities of the Uribe government (2002-2006) is to convince the

members of congress and the business sector of the need to approve and subscribe the socalled “war bonds” that are to provide additional resources to combat subversion. In the
third place, an income redistribution policy would require a coalition o f progressive
political forces to support and promote it. However, the formation of this coalition is not
possible in the present situation in Colombia. On the one hand, the exacerbation of the
armed conflict has contributed to creating a more conservative and authoritarian climate,
prone to trying to solve things by the use of force, that does not favor mobilizations of
social sectors in favor of vindicating socioeconomic rights. Social movements and the labor
movement have been victims of the violence of different armed actors. On the other hand,
the progressive forces are a minority in the Congress and, as shown above, they are very
fragmented, which makess the formation o f coalitions difficult. Furthermore, the Congress
as a whole will concentrate its attention, in the next two years at least, on two of the main
policies of the new government of President Alvaro Uribe: the search for new taxes to
increase resources in order to deal with the armed actors, and reform of the political system,
which includes, among other things, the elimination of one chamber of congress and the
possible revocation o f the mandate of the current members of congress, which does not
generate a propitious environment for discussing great social reforms in the quest for
equity.

In synthesis, in the late nineties, the neoliberal model presented adverse results: a
slow-down in economic growth, crisis of the productive sector, massive unemployment,
increased economic informality, and increased social inequality. The economic benefits
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and the market opportunities remain concentrated in the high income sector of the
population.

This reduces the possibilities o f increasing demand and, therefore, the

possibility o f generating a positive effect in terms of growth and production. Instead of
increasing access to the market and income, the neoliberal adjustment has increased the
requirements and makes access more difficult for the majority of the population. This
results in the exclusion or the unstable insertion of the population in the economic
process and the impossibility of achieving sustained growth based on productivity,
technological innovation, and better employment of the country's human resources. But,
instead of greater productivity, innovation and equity, new spaces arose for speculation
and commercial and financial intermediation, patrimonial ist appropriation of social
benefits, and opportunism and clientelism in contracts in both the public and the private
sectors.

This is not an attempt to sustain a reductionist thesis that blames neoiberalism for
all of the country's problems.

As has been shown throughout this dissertation, the

change o f constitutional norms, the weakness of the state, the armed conflict, the drug
trafficking, the heterogeneity and the fragmentation of Colombian society have also
been factors in the political and social crisis. Nonetheless, what is underscored here are
the unintended consequences of the application of neoliberal measures in a context of
heterogeneity and fragmentation.

From this perspective, the problem has not been

caused only by the economic model per se, but also by its incapacity to modify the
conditions of heterogeneity and assymetry existing in Colombia's society, market, and
productive structure, at the time of its adoption. Given the lack of structural correctives,
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the neoliberal adjustment induced a type o f development that contributed to making the
country's political, economic, and social conditions even more heterogeneous.
Therefore, the decision makers failed in applying the neoliberal model since they
basically and implicitly assumed that Colombia's society and economy were
homogeneous and structurally symmetrical. This supposition o f homogeneity led the
policy makers to adopt policies based on the principle o f neutrality regarding the
divergent conditions o f the agents who participate in the market.

Instead o f opting for a selective and gradual insertion o f the Colombian economy
into the global economy, that would prepare national production to face external
competition, the Gaviria government (1990-1994) opted for an internationalization of
the economy that opened the domestic market to foreign products, with the consequent
negative effect on domestic capital and labor. The multinational companies introduced
their intermediate components and products into the country for them to be assembled in
the national market.

In fact, as shown in Table No.2, the average annual growth of

direct foreign investment (DFI) in Colombia increased from 12% in the 1990-1994
period to 27% in the 1995-1996 period (Fedesarrollo, 1998: 145).
Table 2

Average A nnual G row th of Direct Foreign Investm ent
in Colombia (% )
Year

1975-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-94

1995

1996

Total DFI

10.5

12.8

13.8

12.1

23.3

26.9

US DFI

12.1

14.3

20.2

8.3

12,6

9.5

Source: Fedesarrollo (1 9 9 8 )
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The consequence o f this opening was, as already mentioned, that imports
increased and exports did not increase, due to the fact that Colombia has certain
comparative advantages in the production o f goods for which there is no demand in the
world market (Misas, 2001), a fact that contributed to generating the economic
recession. In the Samper government (1994-1998), the manifestations o f the crisis were
already notorious: growing deficit in the current balance o f payments account,
revaluation of the peso, high interest rates, increased foreign debt, etc. But although said
government recognized the gravity o f the problem (Presidency o f the Republic-DNP,
1994 and 1995), it did not take the necessary measures to correct the structural
imbalances, because it did not have either the necessary legitimacy or the margin needed
to manoever, due to the crisis generated by accusations that the Samper campaign had
received large amounts o f money from the drug lords, and the great political, social, and
international pressures the President had to face as a result.

During the Pastrana

government (1998-2002), efforts were concentrated on trying to reduce unemployment,
but above all, on developing the agreements reached with the International Monetary
Fund regarding reduction of the fiscal deficit, reform o f the pension and retirement
system, and reduction o f tranfers of fiscal resources from the central government to
departmental and municipal governments. However, the only area in which the Pastrana
administration had any success was in achieving the last of these reforms, as will be
shown below.

In these conditions of indiscriminate opening, the industrial sectors that had
traditionally been the leaders of national production such as textiles, clothing, leather,
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and certain capital goods, had clearly come to a standstill, and even entered into a
retrocession due to their technological backwardness, their inability to compete in the
international market, and their displacement from the domestic market by foreign
products. The difference between exports and imports was financed with foreign credit
obtained at interest rates o f over 10%. At the end o f the nineties, the economic situation
worsened because, in addition to the foreign trade imbalance, the interest payments on
the foreign debt amounted to 6.5% of the GDP in 1998 (Sarmiento, 2000a: 53). As
Sarmiento has pointed out, the neoliberal economic model led to results that were the
opposite o f the goals it pursued, since it implied

a large balance o f paym ents d eficit financed w ith foreign credit at interest
rates higher than the econ om ic growth rate, w hich provoked grow ing
indebtedness.
A t present, it amounts to 50% o f the G PD and, as in
A rgentina, it has reduced the country's a ccess to international markets (El
Espectador, June 2 , 2002: 13A).
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Graph 5

Colombian Foreign Debt (%)

T h e in tern al p u b lic d eb t a lso in cr e a sed as an e ffe c t o f n e o lib e r a l p o lic ie s ,
e s p e c ia lly a s an e f f e c t o f th e m o n eta r ist e m p h a sis o f th is e c o n o m ic m o d e l.

D u rin g the

n in e tie s, th e B a n k o f th e R e p u b lic g a v e p rio rity to red u c in g th e a m o u n t o f m o n e y in
c ir c u la tio n in o rd er to d e c r e a se in fla tio n . T h e e m is s io n o f in tern al d eb t b o n d s w a s the
m e c h a n ism th e b an k u se d fo r that p u rp o se. T o the e x te n t that the b a la n ce o w in g o n the
internal d e b t in c r e a s e d , th e in terest in crea sed as w e ll. T h erefo re, th e r e so u r ce s o b ta in ed
from later e m is s io n s o f b o n d s to ta k e m o n e y ou t o f cir c u la tio n had to b e u se d to p a y the
interest o n ea rlier e m is s io n s , to th e p o in t that b y th e m id -n in e tie s, c lo s e to 96% o f the
v a lu e o f th e n e w e m is s io n s w e n t to se r v ic in g the d eb t (C o n tra lo ria G en era l de la
R ep u b lic a , 1 9 9 6 ).

T h u s th e g o v e r n m e n t w a s n ot g o in g in to d eb t to in v e s t in w o rk s o f
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infrastructure, foment productive activities or pay public employees, but to respond for
previous debts that were largely originated by a monetary policy o f a contractionist type.
In addition to the high fiscal cost, the internal debt also had a negative impact on
economic activity because it stimulated financial speculation. This was due to the fact
that the General Treasury of the Nation and the Bank of the Republic competed with the
financial sector for private savings, and in doing so, they contributed to increasing
interest rates. The rise in the internal interest rate led many entrepreneurs to go into debt
abroad. Throughout the nineties, private external debt grew from US$2,000 million to
US$16,000 million. This is a very grave situation because private enterprises contracted
this debt when the dollar was worth $1,000 Colombian pesos and now they must pay it
with the dollar values at closer to $3,000 pesos. In synthesis, this management o f the
internal public debt produced three negative consequences: a) it increased the fiscal
deficit, a problem aggravated by the fact that the resources obtained had not served to
increase public investment; b) it stimulated the speculative tendency of the economy;
and c) it stimulated the external indebtedness of the business sector.

6.5 Strengthening o f Social Hybridation Social

All o f the above factors have reinforced the political, economic, and social
amalgamation o f rationalities and both traditional and modern patterns of legal and
illegal behavior that characterized Colombian society throughout the past decade.
Traditional patterns refer to the existence of privileges, clientelism and patrimonialism
in economic activities, in both the public and the private sector. Modern patterns refer to
the limited conditions of competition in the market and of technological innovation, and
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to the displacement o f unskilled labor by skilled labor. The illegal patterns refer to the
presence of illegal funds in Colombian economic and social activities, and to their
erosive effect on the productive culture and Colombians' relation to the law and the
public sphere. Thus, instead of becoming democratized, the economic process remains
in the hands o f those who are in condition to benefit from the assymetries and the
economic and social heterogeneity, i.e., in the hands o f the four major national economic
groups, multinational enterprises, and the illegal economy. In fact, in the previous
chapter it was shown that one o f the characteristics of Colombian industry in the nineties
was the formation o f four large economic conglomerates (the Bavaria, Ardilla Lulle,
Aval and Sindicato Antioqueno entrepreneurial groups), which currently control the 295
largest firms in the country, a fact that allows them to obtain annual profits that represent
a little more that 2% o f the GDP. This control permitted these conglomerates to place
themselves in conditions to make strategic alliances with transnational capital and
enterprises (Misas 2001:128).

Another characteristic of the Colombian economy over the past twenty years, has
been the growth of the illegal economy (Thoumi, 1994: 98) and, given its clandestine
nature, it has been very difficult to calculate its size and economic impact. The few
available studies have calculated that the illegal economy represented 8.7% in 1985
(Ibidem). However, it is possible to think that illegal activities in the Colombian
economy have increased in the nineties due to the liberation of trade and foreign
currency exchange. The situation described above has been clearly described by Luis
Jorge Garay, who affirms that
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in C olom bia, the prevailing productive culture does not correspond to a true
capitalist culture, but rather a culture that has inclined to a certain extent to
the search for profit and the satisfaction o f selfish exclusionary ob jectives in
favor o f certain groups, achieved by m eans o f the use o f individual privileges
related to their position in the country's political, econ om ic and social
structure. Even more, this culture m anifests typically rent-seeking traits; i.e.,
practices through w hich the dominant groups privilege their obtention o f
profits as a result o f their position in the social structure rather than as the
fruit o f work, savings, investm ent, innovation and risk (1999:24).

For this reason, in order to overcome the rent-seeking nature o f the economy and its
harmful effects in Colombian society, it is necessary acclimatizing an entrepreneurial
culture that will make it possible to advance toward modernization and efficiency of the
productive apparatus so as to generate true social wealth and to set the bases for
economic growth accompanied by distributive justice. This will require, as a group of
Colombian scholars led by Garay asserted recently, Colombian entrepreneurs and all
agents involved in the productive process to assume
greater responsibility and an active co m m itm en t. . . that is not ju st lim ited to
the fulfilm ent o f their tax-paying and labor responsibilities, but must also
include d ecisiv e actions to improve productive conditions and to assum e
c o llectiv e responsibilities for system ic com petitiveness, so as to propitiate the
participation o f other social groups in the definition and implantation o f
actions that w ill guarantee greater social inclusion(Garay, 2002: 35).

In synthesis, the Colombian social and economic amalgam consists in the fact
that the precariousness o f the country's industrial and market development, the
exclusion, and the old clientelist and patrimonialist practices are not eliminated by the
new forms o f economic action and their corresponding regulatory institutions, but are
instead juxtaposed beside the former. This is the main characteristic of Colombian
society: the dichotomies of tradition-modemity, development-underdevelopment, and
inclusion-exclusion, which have been strengthened by the adoption of the neoliberal
model.
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On the other hand, neoliberal adjustment has produced a disconnection between
economic and social policy that has contributed to fragmenting social relations even
more. The new economic policy has not considered social heterogeneity either, or its
effects on income redistribution. The deterioration of the latter has sharpened the social
integration crisis, which is manifested in the existence o f ample sectors o f the population
excluded from both the market and socioeconomic development, or that have been
precariously inserted into them. Indicators of this exclusion and precarious insertion are:
in the first place, the unemployment rate that, as has been mentioned several times,
began to increase in 1995 until it reached a level of 20% in 2001. Secondly, the informal
sector of the economy and the underemployment that represent about 50%. Thirdly, the
Gini inequality coefficient which rose from 0.467 en 1988 to 0.510 in 1997. And finally,
the poverty rate which, as has already been mentioned, reached 64% in 1999. If the
social situation did not worsen even more in the nineties, it was thanks to increased
public spending in education and health, propitiated by the Constitution of 1991.
However, as will be seen in the following section, the agreement the Pastrana
government signed with the International Monetary Fund reduced public spending in
these very sectors. In synthesis, the excluded population has no possibilities of
contributing to the formation of social wealth because they are unemployed or contribute
in a precarious way because they are underemployed or because they do not have the
necessary level of education or vocational training, due to the fact that the Colombian
process o f capital accumulation is characterized by a socialization of costs and a limited
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or concentrated appropriation of social benefits. This contributes to increasing the social
fragmentation and the detonating elements o f the political and economic crisis.

This precarious insertion of the majority o f the population into the economic
process, has also affected the process o f building citizenship, by imposing limits on the
expansion and on the maximization of human capacity since, as shown above, it is
under-utilized for economic and social development, which does not favor increased
production, social wealth, and human development. It is therefore necessary to seriously
consider the problems derived from the insufficient demand, which not only constitute a
source of restrictions for the continued growth and socioeconomic development, but also
for the process o f constructing and extending citizenship.

The construction of

citizenship requires not only the political recognition of the social actors and their rights,
it also requires the development of an active policy to generate employment and income,
broadening of social security, formation of human resources and redistribution of
income and wealth. And it is precisely these policies that have least reached the most
unprotected sectors, which presently constitute a large proportion of the population.
Therefore, when mechanisms o f competition are introduced into the economy without
correcting the preexisting asymmetries in social relations, the discriminatory tendencies
of the market are sharpened and the economic possibilities of the majority of the
population are reduced. The effects of modernization in the functioning of the economy
are thus concentrated in the privileged sectors of society.
reduced sector of

On the one hand, a very

individuals and enterprises (the above mentioned Four Large

Economic Groups: Bavaria, Ardila Lulle, Aval and Sindicato Antioqueno) receive the
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concentrated benefits o f economic activity and change generated by the new model
while, on the other hand, the political, economic, and social fragmentation of the country
is increased.

The exclusion or precarious insertion of the majority of the population into the
economic process, aggravated by the neoliberal model, is one of the obstacles to the rise
of “infrastructural power of the state, defined as its capacity to implement decisions,
penetrating civil society with infrastructures by means of which the it extracts resources
and provides resources (Mann, 2002: 3). This is a characteristic that Colombia shares
with the rest of the Latin American states. According to Michael Mann, the main
challenge of the states o f the region
rem ains essen tially the sam e as it w as alm ost 2 0 0 years ago as they achieved
their independence. It is h ow to incorporate their diverse populations into a
genuine citizenship, w hich can sustain infrastructurally pow erful states,
w hich can b ecom e fin ally dem ocratic. The biggest obstacle is not political
co n flict betw een ethnic or religious groups fighting over w h o se state it is ( ...)
Rather, it is essen tially the level o f dom estic inequality existin g between
cla sse s that generates the main problem (M ann 2002: 22).

6.6 Disagreem ent over the Criteria for Distributing Social Benefits

The fragmentation o f Colombian society has been aggravated by the inability of the
diverse social actors to reach a consensus on the fundamental elements of social order.
In this respect, the societal project arising from the Constitution of 1991 competes with
that arising from the neoliberal economic model. The former was promoted by
progressive socialdemocratic forces, while the latter has been promoted by the forces of
globalization and by the new Colombian technocratic elite. These two projects have
advanced in a parallel manner since 1991 and neither of the two has achieved enough of
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a consensus to impose its will. In the initial euforia of democratization resulting from the
Constitutional Assembly, Colombian society did not realize that there were great
contradictions in terms of concepts and practical application between the two projects
and that they would therefore lead to the present situation due to the impossibility of
reaching an agreement on the fundamental elements of social order and the criteria for
distributing social resources.

The Constitution of 1991 introduced the series of changes that were mentioned
in Chapter 4, but it also introduced others of which Colombian society has been less
aware, such as the introduction of criteria of distributive justice and social liberalism in
the allocation o f social resources, and a new concept of law, less formal and rigid than
that which had predominated in the country until then, where the interpreter of the law
has an active role in creating law. Given the ambiguous relationship that Colombian
society has traditionally had with the law (Gomez Buendia, 1999; Kalmanovitz, 2001),
this new concept gave greater weight to law in structuring society and in guaranteeing
individual rights, broadening its coverage to areas that traditionally had escaped it, such
as the economy and Colombian citizens' relations with the public sphere. This new
concept o f law has required the support of a constitutional jurisprudence more commited
to the culture o f democracy and human rights than that which had predominated in the
Supreme Court o f Justice before 1990.

As already mentioned, the Constitutional Court was conceived by the
Constitutional Assembly as an entity with the power needed to develop the content of
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social justice o f the Constitution of 1991. This power altered the traditional balance of
power between the different state institutions and gave rise to a new configuration of the
political system. This explains the confrontations produced in the past decade between
the different state institutions and especially between the Constitutional Court and the
Bank o f the Republic and the members of Gaviria's economic team.

The new criteria for the allocation of social resources, resulting from the political
agreement o f a socialdemocratic nature were expressed in the Constitution of 1991, the
law, and the jurisprudential decisions of the Constitutional Court. Driven by this and by
the injuctive actions interposed by citizens, the new constitution's societal project has
struggled to develop. Nevertheless, it has not achieved enough consensus to become
consolidated, because the neoliberal societal project harbors social forces and global
tendencies that are adverse to it.

In its function o f preserving the social-liberal character of the Constitution of
1991, the Constitutional Court has preferred a series of controversial decisions,
including the following: a) the Bank o f the Republic's obligation to include production
and employment among its objectives, rather than just monetary policy and control of
inflation, as had been the case previously, b) modification of the mortgage system and
permanent control of interest rates on home loans, in order to guarantee the right to
housing; c) prohibition of bonos pensionales in private schools (by means o f which a
membership fee is charged for admission);

d) equality of salaries in the public and

private sectors, and the indexation of the minimum wage and the salary of state
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employees, and e) state health system coverage for so-called "catastrophic illnesses"
which involve high costs for those who suffer from them.

These decisions, according to the critics, are opposed to the full operation o f the
“laws o f the market”, which are the only criteria the neoliberal accumulation model
accepts for allocating social resources. Therefore, the above-mentioned decisions on
economic and fiscal affairs have been rejected by the government's economic team, the
Board of Directors o f the Bank of the Republic, the economists of the “thinks tanks” that
advise the government on economic matters, the financial sector, and some membes of
the business sector.

In contrast, these decisions have found an echo among the

minorities, the working class, and the disgruntled middle class.

The argument o f those who are against the decisions o f the Constitutional Court
is that they generate macroeconomic instability and that they are both costly and
inefficient. Co-Directors of the Bank o f the Republic, such as Salomon Kalmanovitz
(2001) and Sergio Clavijo (2001), have advocated that economic principles such as
scarce resources, budget restrictions, normative restriction, transparence, and supply and
demand should determine the allocation of social resources. In this regard, Kalmanovitz
demands that the Constitutional Court assume

fiscal responsabilities w hen it is deciding about the services o f the Colombian
state, o f w h ich it is a key part, and w h ose viability it should defend. It
should recogn ize that there are budget restrictions and that the assignm ent o f
spending should be rationalized, w hich leads to greater ju stice in distribution
(K alm anovitz, 2001: 158).
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The authors mentioned have criticized the Constitutional Court for recognizing
social benefits for specific persons, in order to preserve the abstract equality o f a generic
right o f citizenship, as if this were not made concrete in the demand for real economic
and social rights. Many economists' criticisms o f the Constitutional Court have to do
with the decisions that go against the above-mentioned principles. In this respect, Sergio
Clavijo complains that
the basic task of economic and social development in Colombia is seriously
threatened due to the so-called ‘juridical instability’, aggravated now by the
activism of the Constitutional Court, particularly during the 1994-2000
period. In fact, the Constitutional Court decided to alter the interpretation of
the laws sanctioned years before and to accomodate principles o f a populist
nature to diverse articles of the Constitution of 1991, understood as those that
order increased public spending without considering the negative
macroeconomic effects. In this sense, it is not surprising that the main state
unions and political parties with populist inclination have supported the
decisions of the court that imply greater public spending. These decisions
will impede adequate re-dimensioning of the Colombian state, while they
seriously debilitate the separation of powers through which the ordering of
public spending was delegated in the congress. (Clavijo, 2001: ix-x).

Nevertheless, the technical dressing assumed in the neoliberal economists'
critiques fails to conceal the ideological nature o f the debate between the defenders of
each o f the two different societal projects. This is seen not only in the term “populist”
that Clavijo uses to describe Constitutional Court decisions, but also in demands that the
Court be modified to make it more “pluralistic”. In this sense, one critic considers that
the Court requires a better process for selecting its members and their ways
of making decisions. It would be advisable to have a more interdisciplinary
and pluralistic membership (which is clearly not the case today due to [the
presence of] so many laborists and socialdemocrats) (Revista Dinero,
November 10, 2000: 120. Emphasis added).
On the other hand, E. Sarmiento, an economist who is one o f the most outspoken critics
of the neoliberalisml, comes to the defense o f the Constitutional Court in affirming that
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it is not that the ju stices interfere with the dictates o f the econ om ic m odel, but
that the eco n o m ic m odel interferes w ith the Constitution. A retrospective
glan ce is enough to see that the Court’s m ost controversial d ecision s have
been oriented to avoiding further aggravation o f the inequitable effect o f the
present m odel. T he use o f fiscal resources to com pensate for lo sses in the
financial sector w as rejected, the mortgage system that expropriated the
hom es o f a broad range o f C olom bians w as declared unconstitutional, the
Bank o f the R epublic s practice o f low ering inflation at the cost o f
unem ploym ent w as severely criticized and now the econom ic adjustment
based on salary repression is denied. (El Espectador, October 2 9 ,2 0 0 0 ).

The high-ranking officials of the government and the Bank of the Republic do
not take into account the fact that the Constitution of ‘91 took up the principles of
distributive justice, which are based on allocation criteria that are not economic but
extra-economic, i.e. political, as opposed to the principles of commutative justice, which
are proper to the market.

This, of course, affected public spending, but that is the

consequence of a collective foundational decision, in which the criteria and the priorities
to be applied in allocating social resources were decided politically. Macroeconomic
stability is a basic condition for the growth of the economy, but it should not be allowed
to obstruct society's political agreements, if it is to be democratized by providing
effective access to the basic benefits of socioeconomic development to the entire
population.

Therefore, the Constitution of 1991 asigned the Constitutional Court the function
of overseeing the decisions of both the government and the central bank, especially in
social, salary, monetary, fiscal, and currency exchange matters, to ensure that they
adhere to the underlying principles of the new political pact. For this reason, the
decisions of the Constitutional Court transcend the juridical sphere, they surpass the
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logic of the market, and they have political and economic effects since, by recognizing
or assigning rights from a social democratic perspective, they alter the previous balance
of power.

Thus it has been understood by the Constitutional Court which, through one

of the justices, has said that
the country has not yet understood the function o f a constitutional tribunal.
T he Court s d ecision s have not yet been assim ilated sufficiently: decisions
that have been made in law but w hich necessarily have political and
eco n o m ic consequences. And this d oes not mean that w e the ju d g es or
ju stices o f the Court are usurping the functions o f any other entity, but rather
that our function necessarily has consequences o f this type. It is said that the
Court should not interfere in econ om ic matters. But the fact is that econom ic
legislation is not rem oved from the control that the Court must exercise over
all law s, regardless o f the topic they relate to. The decision, o f course,
produces econ om ic effects. And at tim es these econom ic effects can cause
problem s. (G aviria and Uprimny, 2000: 10).

6.7 The A greem ent w ith the IMF and the Dismounting o f the
Constitutional Sources o f Social Public Spending

As mentioned, the Constitution o f ‘91 increased public spending, especially that of a
social

nature

in education and health,

by means of strengthening political,

administrative, and fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization began in Colombia in
1983, through modernization of the municipal tax system and the increase of transfers of
resources from the central government to local governments, since the municipalities
had either lacked resources entirely or had only scarce resources until that year, a
situation that did not allow local governments to adequately attend the needs of the
community. Political decentralization began in 1986, with the popular election of
mayors, who had been appointed by governors until that year, who, in turn, were
appointed by the president. The Constitution of 1991 introduced the popular election of
governors and permitted community participation in the management of municipal
affairs

through

the

election

of Local

262

Administrative

Boards.

Administrative

decentralization also began in 1986 with the transfer to local governments o f a large
number of functions that had previously been the responsibility o f the central
government. These covered a variety of different fields such as the construction and
endowment of schools, contracting and payment o f teachers, construction and
endowment o f hospitals, construction o f roads, aqueducts and sewerage systems, basic
environmental improvement, agricultural technical assistance, elaboration of economic
and social development plans at the local level, etc. However, the great problems with
decentralization were the insufficient resources, the local governments’ lack of technical
and administrative capacity, and the low level of social participation. (Orjuela, 1992).
For this reason, the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 proposed improving the
decentralization process through increased fiscal resources so that the departments and
municipalities could extend the coverage of education and health services, and through
political participation at the local level. This was intended to increase the legitimacy of
the state, by facing the country's enormous inequalities and the need to deepen
democracy, especially at the local level. Generally speaking, from the perspective of
relations among the three levels o f government, it can be said that the constitution
propitiates a process of redistributing powers, functions and resources of the central
government, in favor o f greater autonomy and leadership for the departments and
municipalities and more direct community participation in the allocation of resources
and management o f local public affairs.

To achieve this purpose, the Constitution of ‘91, in articles 356 and 357,
established a series o f transfers of resources from the national budget to the departments
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and m u n ic ip a litie s to fin a n c e th e p r o v is io n o f ed u c a tio n and h ea lth se r v ic e s, e sp e c ia lly
for the p o o r e st se c to r s o f the p o p u la tio n . A t p resen t, th is tran sfers rep resen t 4 6 .5 % o f the
n a tio n ’s cu rren t in c o m e . D u e to th is c o n stitu tio n a l o b lig a tio n , so c ia l p u b lic sp en d in g
in crea se d fr o m 8 .2 % o f th e G D P in 1 9 9 0 to 1 4 .4 % in 1 9 9 8 ; i.e ., 6 .2 p e r c e n ta g e p o in ts, a
fig u re th a t s lig h tly su r p a sse s th e g r o w th o f to ta l p u b lic sp e n d in g (N a tio n a l P la n n in g
D ep a rtm en t, 2 0 0 0 ) . 1 h is in c r e a se d so c ia l p u b lic sp e n d in g m a d e it p o s s ib le to e x ten d the
c o v e r a g e o f e d u c a tio n an d h e a lth s e r v ic e s , as a resu lt o f w h ic h the form er r o se from 68%
in 1 9 9 3 to 8 0 % in 1 9 9 7 , an d th e latter in cr e a sed fro m 2 4 % to 55% in th e sa m e p eriod ,
and to 6 5 % in 1 9 9 9 (D N P - P N U D , 2 0 0 0 ).

C o v e r a g e o f w ater and se w e r a g e se r v ic e s

a lso in cr e a se d . A s a r esu lt, the p o p u la tio n w ith u n sa tisfie d b a sic n e e d s w a s n otab ly
red u ced fr o m 3 7 % in 1 9 9 3 to 2 6 % in 1 9 9 9 (Ib id em ).
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Despite the above-mentioned advances, the decision makers on the government’s
economic team considered that articles

356 and 357 of the Constitution, which

permitted financing progress in social matters, constituted “a true drain on public
finances (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2000) and one of the main causes o f the state’s fiscal
deficit, which is 5% o f the GDP today.

Therefore, one of the points of the fiscal

adjustment agreement that the Pastrana government (1998-2002) signed with the
International Monetary Fund in 2000 was the reduction and rationalization of the abovementioned transfers to the departments and municipalities (Banco de la Republica Ministerio de Hacienda, 1999). For this purpose, the government presented a bill to
reform the Constitution, Legislative Act 012, which was approved by the Congress in
August 2001. This reform generated a series of protests on the part of mayors,
governors, the teachers' union (FECODE) and students. But despite the protests and the
regressive nature o f the reform, it was approved by the Congress, due to the fact that the
national government resorted to the traditional practice of distributing “parliamentary
aids, i.e., money from the national budget given by the government to the politicians to
“invest” in their own regions in exchange for their approval of the government’s
proposals.

Given that the Constitution linked those transfers to the growth of the Cnetral
Government’s current revenues (consisting of tributary and non-tributary revenue,
except for capital resources), the reform consisted of unlinking them from that parameter
and linking them to the annual increase in inflation over a 7-year period, with which a
significantly lower increase of transfers is achieved.
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With the above-mentioned reform, the Central Government sought to reduce the
fiscal deficit by saving 7 billion pesos and, at the same time, recovering the flexibility of
its revenues since the old scheme of calculating the transfers limited the national
government’s possibilities of obtaining fiscal resources through a profound tax reform,
since almost half o f the resources obtained this way would have to be transferred to the
departments and municipalities.

However, the transfers could not be blamed for the

increase in the fiscal deficit since the national government's effective spending increased
by 8.3% o f the GDP between 1990 and 1999, while transfers to departments and
municipalities represented only 2.2% of that increase. The remaining 6.1% was due to
the growth o f foreign debt servicing, which amounted to more than 40% of the national
budget in 2001, and to the increased operating expenses of the central government
(Contraloria General de la Republica, 2001). Therefore, the transfers do not represent
even one third of the fiscal deficit, so the argument that they caused the imbalance in the
state’s finances is not well founded.

The constitutional reform of the transfers not only has quantitive effects, in
producing a decrease of 7 billion pesos in financing for social policy, but qualitative
effects as well, to the extent the future growth of the economy and state income will not
translate into significant increases of resources for social policy in the regions and
municipalities, as established by the progressive social forces that approved the Political
Constitution o f 1991. The reform of the transfers will slow down the growth of the
education and health sectors, since the reform was conceived in such a way that,
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according to the experts, the growth o f transfers will be inversely proportional to the
growth o f the economy, i.e., the greater the growth of the economy, the smaller the
increase o f the transfers. According to Jaramillo (2001: 7), it is not true that the reform
is only for seven years, as “the government sold the idea”, for this would be
unacceptable to the IMF. The design of the legislative act will make it possible for the
transfers to be linked to the Central Government’s current revenues once again in 2008,
but percent-wise these transfers will no longer be 46.5% of the Central state’s current
revenues, but only 36% or even as low as 30%, so that even if economic growth
improves, the percentage of income transferred to departments and municipalities will
be lower. As a consequence of that reform, at the end of the seven years, there will be a
reduction o f around 870,000 places for students in primary education, and 1.9 million
impoverished Colombians will have no access to public health care. (Jaramillo, 2001: 7).

In synthesis, what the confrontation between the neoliberal and the socialdemocrat societal projects are showing is that no fundamental agreement exists
regarding the essential elements of the social order in Colombia, nor about whether the
assignment of freedoms, goods, and social opportunities should be done on the basis of
political criteria and legal norms, or on the basis of the laws of the market and the
principles o f economic science.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions with Some Hints for Latin America

In these pages I have proposed to characterize the present Colombian situation as a crisis
of political and social integration. In order to surpass the actor-centered focuses that
have prevailed in contemporary political science, especially in the United States, I have
established a structural relationship among three dimensions that I consider
fundamental: a) the weakness of the state; b) the tensions between the tendencies toward
integration and disintegration of society; c) the tensions and contradicition between
political and social democratization which is inclusionary, and the neoliberal economic
adjustment model which is exclusionary.

Likewise, I have proposed to go beyond the minimalistic and procedural
concepts o f democracy that predominate in political science and reduce its conception
and practice to purely electoral and representative aspects. Nevertheless, beyond the
technical problems posed by the election of those who are to govern lie the problems
that constitute the essence of politics: collective and public deliberation regarding the
distribution o f resources, freedoms and social opportunities. The traditional concepts of
democracy leave its social and economic dimensions aside precisely at the moment in
which neoliberal economic restructuring has transferred the function of distributing
social resources from the state to the market and limited the state s possibilities of
producing a more egalitarian social order in societies like those of Latin America which
are characterized by a high degree of concentration of income and wealth.
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For analytical purposes, I have defined society as an ensemble o f social
interactions resulting from the permanent tension between cooperation and conflict. For
this reason, all societies present a tendency to a certain degree of disintegration, so that it
is never possible to consider society as absolutely integrated. The integration crisis
presents itself when profound social changes distort the relations among the different
spheres that constitute the societal pattern (politics, economics, and culture), in such a
way that the inter-systemic coordination of society, and the relations among the different
social actors become difficult or even impossible. Based on the concept o f societal
pattern, I have attempted to express the mutual determination of politics, culture, and
economics in the constitution of social relations and institutions. This focus is intended
to provide an alternative to focuses based on the actor and its agency, that predominate
today in the social sciences and neglect the structural aspects of social phenomena and
unsought effects of individual decisions.

On the basis o f said framework, I have shown that the crisis which Colombian
society has suffered during the past ten years is a result of the convergence of tendencies
toward political and social disintegration. The former were expressed, in the first place,
in the violence which is the manifestation of a state that has not yet completed its
formative process, and that has a limited capacity to regulate social relations,
institutionalize conflicts,

integrate the nation’s territory, and distribute its social

resources. Secondly, in the exacerbation of clientelism and the persistence of traditional
forms of social relationships, which make the transition from a type o f conduct guided
by personal loyalties and inclinations to one prescribed by general and impersonal norms
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very difficult. The social integration crisis is expressed in the ruling classes’ inability to
elaborate and agree upon a societal project broad enough to articulate diverse social
interests, in social exclusion, in the fragility of the social fabric, and in the degradation
of the ways o f assuming conflict, diversity, and disagreement.

This two-fold integration crisis worsened in the nineties due to the confrontation
between two different societal projects: that which arose from the Constitution of 1991,
and that which arose from the neoliberal economic development strategy. Whereas the
former was promoted by the progressive forces in the Constitutional Assembly, the latter
has been promoted by the forces of globalization and by a new domestic technocratic
elite. These two projects have advanced in parallel form since 1991, and neither one has
achieved enough o f a consensus to impose itself. In the initial euforia of democratization
caused by the Constitutional Assembly, Colombian society did not realize that there
were great contradictions between these two projects, and that they affected the
possibilities o f achieving an agreement regarding the fundamental elements o f the social
order and the criteria for the distribution of social resources.

The neoliberal model has advocated the development of a market logic in the
allocation o f resources and the insertion of the economy in the world market, all of
which is reinforced by the imperatives of the globalization process, and has implied a
loss o f sovereignty and autonomy of the state in favor of the supranational regulatory
agencies.

However, adoption of the neoliberal strategy has sharpened the social

fragmentation by introducing market mechanisms in a society like that of Colombian,
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characterized by a lack o f territorial integration which, in turn, has prevented the full
constitution o f a national market, and by strong tendencies o f social exclusion that have
not permitted complete constitution of the social actors as “consumers and citizens”.

The economic model has also led to a division among the economic elites, and it
is exclusionary in nature due, among other things, to cuts in public social spending and
state subsidies, and to the generation of unemployment. These elements have limited the
elites’ possibilities of forming alliances among themselves and with other social sectors,
for the purpose of constructing new rules of the game to regulate social relations
democratically.

The situation described above aggravated the old division of the country’s ruling
class, which had been split since the sixties into a political elite and an economic elite,
with opposing interests. This in turn led to a fragmentation of state institutions: while
the political elite expressed itself through the congress and the non-technical institutions,
the economic elite did so through the technical institutions responsible for designing
economic policy. The Constitution of 1991 also contributed to sharpening the political
and social fragmentation, in altering the balance between the three branches of
government, atomizing the system o f parties and representation, and introducing nonmarket criteria in the allocation of social resources, which were in contradiction with
those established by the neoliberal reforms.
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The way in which the neoliberal development strategy was adopted in Colombia
contributed to generating a severe economic recession and a high degree of social
exclusion. And for this reason, it entered into contradiction with the advances in matters
of political and social democratization produced by the Constitution of 1991. The
adoption o f the neoliberal model was done behind society’s back and behind the back of
the political institutions that articulate and aggregate interests, a fact which demonstrated
the growing divorce between the mechanisms for the generation o f consensus and
legitimacy and the mechanisms for the formation and implementation of macroeconomic
policies. Consequently, in excluding participation from the sphere of macroeconomic
policy, which is precisely where the foundations can be laid for a society that is not only
democratic but a just society as well, the path was opened in Latin America in general,
and in Colombia in particular, to a type of legitimacy of a technocratic and efficiencyfocused nature that is displacing political legitimacy. Nonetheless, the fact that it has
not been possible to achieve ample participation in the formulation o f macroeconomic
policies is also due to the fragmentation and weakness of the progressive forces and the
lack o f representativeness o f the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties.

In synthesis, in Colombia, in the past decade, all of the factors mentioned above
converged to produce an inconclusive process of economic modernization, but without
political modernity, expressed in an ambiguous attitude on the part of society with
respect to democracy, a lack of interconnection between politics, the economy, ethics
and culture, and a relative and very partial social integration that generates, in itself, the
social conditions for its own undoing.
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The focus developed in this dissertation for the Colombian case can be applied to
the analysis o f other Latin American societies. The adoption of neoliberal restructuring
processes throughout the region, and their convergence with the democratization
process, have given way to contradictions between inclusion and exclusion, and are
sharpening the fragmentation and the heterogeneity of Latin American societies. Albert
Hirshman said, over a decade ago, “never has Latin America been lectured and advised
as insistently as in the last few years on the virtues of the free market, privatization, and
foreign private investment” (1987: 30-31), and never, for the same reason, had Latin
America ever suffered such an economic and social crisis as the one it is suffering now.
At the beginning o f the nineties, Washington Consensus’ recipes predicted growth rates
of between 4% and 6% for the economies of the region. After twelve years of severe
fiscal, monetary and currency exchange adjustments, the situation could not be worse: in
2001 Latin America barely grew 0.5% and the prognostic for this year is 0.7%. Even
Chile, which had been presented as the ideal model of a market economy, has not grown
since 1996. The free market also promised to rescue the region from underdevelopment
and poverty.

However, the number of the poor has grrown to over 210 million,

increasing by one million each year, and 87 million are indigent (IDB, 1999). Of the 44
million people in the region that were incorporated into the labor force in the past ten
years, 20 million are employed in the informal sector or are underemployed and 10
million are unemployed. This social regression is the region is further aggravated by the
fact that the foreign debt grew from 450,000 million dollars to 740,000 million dollars in
the course o f the past decade.
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Most Latin American countries have very large deficits in their balance of
payment current accounts, which limit their possibilities of growth and threaten financial
and

currency

exchange

stability.

This

is aggravated

by

the

effect

of the

“interconnectedness of globalization, in virtue o f which the enormous current account
deficits o f the Asian countries implied strong devaluation and a sharp fall in the prices of
basic products.

In 1998 Colombia registered deficits equivalent to 6% of the GDP,

Brazil had a deficit of 4.5%, and Argentina and Mexico had deficits of 3%. In this
field, the most illustrative case is, again, Chile, which has been presented as the model to
follow, and now faces current account deficits of 6% of its GDP (Cepal, 2001).

In synthesis, the region’s economies have been exposed to structural balance of
payments deficits which increase with economic growth and their correction is subject to
substantial devaluations that imply a fall in real salaries. All of the above makes it
possible to question those analysts who, despite the evidence, considered that “the
politics o f economic adjustment” was undergoing a series of stages characterized as
periods o f “crisis, painful measures, monetary stability, recovery (stability and some
growth); investment and sustainable growth” (Acuna and Smith, 1994, Joan Nelson). In
even the best of cases, this scheme may have only precarious validity in terms of
reducing inflation in Latin American countries.

The social deterioration and economic imbalances described above have led in
many countries of the region to an increase in the fragmentation and anomie that are
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characteristic of Latin American societies. Mexico is divided is split into two societies:
the modem and prosperous society o f the NAFTA and the premodem, indigenous, poor
society of the Zapatista Movement; Venezuela is politically and socially polarized
around the figure of Chavez; Ecuador faced a profound political destabilization that led
to the overthrow o f two presidents following strong protests and social uprisings; Pern
also overthrew a president but did not manage to overcome the high poverty levels o f the
population.

Argentina is the last country in the region to explode socially and

economically, with sharp manifestation o f social anomie.

The crisis in which most Latin American countries find themselves immersed
today has unleashed a wave o f criticism against the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. This comes not only from the transnational anti-globalization movements
but from the Congress o f the United States and from the Nobel Prize winner in
economics and former vice-president of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, as well.
Stiglitz not only questions the International Monetary Fund’s technical capability and
knowledge of Third World reality, but its role in the deterioration of democracy as well.
According to Stiglitz,

in theory, the Fund supports dem ocratic institutions in nations it attends. In
practice, it underm ines the dem ocratic process through the im position o f
p o licies.
O fficia lly , o f course, the IMF im poses nothing.
It sim ply
‘n eg o tia tes’ the conditions for receiving aid. But all the pow er is on one side
in the n egotiations —that o f the IM F— and the IMF rarely con ced es enough
tim e to ach ieve an am ple consensus or even extensive consultations w ith the
con gress or civ il society. A t tim es the IMF dispenses w ith pretending to be
totally transparent and negotiates secret pacts, (2001: 2).
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The Meltzer Commission expressed itself along the same lines in its report to the
Congress o f the United States which pointed out that the actions o f the IMF not only did
not bring about economic development in the countries that signed agreements with it,
but that its programs actually impoverished the nations that received its aid, and its
influence in domestic policy in fact undermined national sovereignty and often
negatively affected the development o f democratic institutions in the countries that
applied its economic recipes (Anif, 2002: 7). In addition to these criticisms, some voices
have been raised in favor of reconsidering development theory, the problems of poverty in
the Third World, and the inclusion of greater concern for political institutions, cultural
aspects, and social cohesion (Birdall and Londono; Naim, 1999). However, this has not
sufficed to change the formula, to judge by the IMF's demands of Argentina following the
recent debacle. To these exogenous factors must be added other endogenous factors
characteristic o f Latin America such as economic and social inequality, clientelism and
corruption, drug trafficking and violence. The region's economic calamity is due as much
to these factors as to the international financial agencies' refusal to accept the lack of
realism of its diagnoses and the error of their economic policy demands. Despite the clear
evidence that the reforms they demand have not produced the expected results, their
promoters and defenders justify maintaining them with the argument that protectionism is
the worst option.

To the contrary o f what some comparative political analysts have attempted to
show, what has become clear is that there is no relationship between structural economic
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adjustment and democracy. Instead, there has been a progressive weakening of
democracy since the beginnings of the nineties, and not just in Latin America but
throughout the rest o f the Third World as well,, which manifests itself in many ways,
among them: the loss of sovereignty of states in favor of supranational institutions that
act without democratic control. The growing freedom of action that transnational and
financial firms have acquired, the transnationalization of culture that homogenizes and
dissolves all possibility of cultural and ideological diversity, the technocratization of
political life and the corresponding generalization of a discourse on economics and
political economy that defines them as spheres in which citizens' participation and
political and ideological debate have no place. All of this is a clear expression of the fact
that "neoliberal politics" has brought with it less democracy, reduced the decision
making capacity of citizens, and sharply limited the power of the least advantaged
sectors of the population to influence the course of social affairs.

Therefore, the decade of the nineties has not only been "another lost decade" for
Latin America, but one of sharpened social and political fragmentation as well. To lay the
foundations for a better future, the countries of the region will have to build social and
political institutions that promote social cohesion, and economic institutions that promote
savings, investment, especially in the development of human capital and scientific and
technological development. The historical evidence shows that there are no common
recipes nor any one single development model that is equally valid foi all who undertake
this task. Economic development has taken place in societies with very diverse political and
economic institutions. Countries like South Korea and Taiwan are an example of this fact.
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Therefore, counting on a "check list" of reforms, like that of the Washington Consensus,
which are expected to be carried out unfailingly simply does not help at all. On the
contrary, the reality of the facts and the social analysis suggests that these inadequate
theories should be reconsidered and substituted by others that are more representative of the
particular realities of diverse societies. It is not a question of

switching back from

neoliberalism to “cepalism” but rather of designing a model of one's own, that is more
adequate and dictated by a long duree historical perspective and a more structural and
systemic focus which overcomes the deficiencies of those based on voluntarism and
methodological individualism. Latin America has to construct institutions that are adequate
to its historical particularities, the aspirations of its peoples, and the nature of its economic
policy.

Institutions matter, of course, but so does the nature of the socioeconomic system in
which they are immersed. In societies like those of Latin America, characterized as they are
by endemic discrimination and inequality, it is almost impossible to achieve social stability
in the long run unless the institutions provide opportunities for participation and decision
making capacity to those who have been excluded. Reduction of the undesireable effects of
the economic process, such as inequity and poverty, depends on the political power
structure within the society. Therefore, economic growth tends to reduce poverty only if the
poorest sectors o f the population have enough political power and access to education and
to decisive institutions to be able to benefit from it.
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Therefore, the analyses traditionally used in comparative politics would do well in
attempting to overcome their minimalistic concepts o f democracy in order to achieve a
better understanding o f reality, at least with respect to the Third World countries, since that
reality has shown that formal democracy can co-exist with profoundly anti-democratic
social and economic practices. Democracy is an integral concept: political, economic, and
social.
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